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Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Chile 
By 
Pnti H K Murbah 
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Chilean National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in bnngmg about truth, justice and 
reconciliation These institutions aim to help states address how to contend with gross 
violations of human rights under the previous regime Based on literature and interview 
data with Chileans on the perceptions of the results and impacts of the truth commission, 
this thesis concludes that the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 
can be considered an example of a successful commission which, to varying degrees, 
fulfilled its mandate over the short and long-term 
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Posing the problem 
This thesis is concerned with the truth commission in Chile Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRCs) are mechanisms of transitional justice which have been 
implemented by societies as a tool for investigating human rights violations since the 
1970s TRCs have become a popular mechanism by which states address questions of 
justice and accountability In Latin America, the first commission was held in Bolivia in 
1982 but was disbanded due to a lack of funding to complete its mandate Following this 
commission, Argentina held a successful TRC, the National Commission on the 
Disappeared (CONADEP), in 1983 to investigate the fate of the over 30 000 disappeared 
under the military government This commission resulted in a widely distributed and read 
report, which was later used by the courts to pursue prosecutions against military officers 
and members of the ruling junta Other countries in Latin America, such as Chile, 
followed Argentina's example upon then" transitions to democracy 
The central aim of this research was to assess what the Chilean TRC, the National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNVR also known as the Rettig Report), 
intended to achieve Did it accomplish its goals and if so, over what penod of time? What 
were the long-term impacts? Can it be considered a successful TRC? 
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Framing the case study 
In 1973, Chile's long history of democracy was disrupted when the military overthrew 
the socialist government of Salvador Allende m a coup d'etat Allende had been 
democratically elected in 1970 amidst the changing nature of social and political 
relationships in Chile He aimed for a democratic transition to socialism in Chile, but his 
election and the policies that he implemented went against capitalist elites m Chile and 
the United States Soon after his election, the U S changed its foreign policy towards 
Chile, effectively embarking on political and economic destabihzation of the country 
The result was a collapse of the Chilean economy, which led to wide scale protests across 
the country and calls for military intervention 
When the military came to power it implemented a set of policies which were 
found by the Chilean TRC, the Rettig Report, to have led to systemic human rights 
violations By the late 1980s, opposition to the military regime began to grow and the 
military regime held elections in 1991 When the elected government of Patricio Aylwin 
came into power, it had to contend with addressing the violations of human rights 
committed under the military government Since the transition was so tightly controlled 
and pacts with the military had been made by the opposition prior to the elections, the 
Aylwin government was limited in its options Aylwm wanted to pursue traditional legal 
justice but was unable to take this direction because the military government had enacted 
an amnesty law In addition, the judiciary was unwilling to pursue prosecutions The 
government, therefore, had to consider alternative forms of justice Looking to the 
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example of Argentina, the government chose to implement a truth and reconciliation 
commission m 1990 
Gaps in the literature 
The literature on truth commissions falls into the following categories descriptive 
literature which examines the value of these bodies as mechanisms of transitional justice, 
case-study research that is both single-case study and comparative studies that 
demonstrate strengths and limitations of TRCs, and empirical research that examines 
these commissions in order to draw out lessons for policy formation The impact studies 
that have been conducted consider the societal impact of the commission soon after its 
completion What has not sufficiently been examined is the long-term effectiveness of 
these commissions in bnnging about truth, justice and reconciliation For this reason, it is 
all the more important to focus on these Latin American cases, such as the Chilean one, 
as they constitute some of the earliest TRCs from which lessons may be learned This 
research will examine the long-term outcomes and impacts of the truth commission in a 
retrospective manner to determine if the TRC m Chile was actually beneficial or not 
Thesis statement and structure of the argument 
The thesis statement of this study is that, based on an examination of the short and long-
term impacts of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (the Rettig 
Report), the TRC accomplished its mandate and can be considered an example of 
successful management and resolution of a deeply rooted social conflict It was an 
effective response to the need to redress generated by the gross injustices of the military 
3 
government This thesis, which is that the process of establishing the 'truth' of actions 
which occurred under the conflict can lead to justice over time, is argued on the basis of a 
case study of the Rettig Report and the response to this report from diverse social sectors 
including human rights organizations, lawyers, academics, politicians, the military, 
academics, victims and judges The argument is organized as follows Chapter Two 
discusses the conceptual framework which defines transitional justice and frames TRCs 
in this framework The ideas developed in this chapter lead to the development of 
methods for evaluating the framework, namely defining the terms 'success' and 'impact' 
to enable an evaluation of the Rettig Report This is followed by a description of the 
methods used in data collection in Chapter Three, which concludes that the best tools for 
undertaking this research were an extensive literature and archival search in addition to 
the primary research earned out in Chile Chapter Four offers a review of the literature to 
examine the definitions of truth, justice and reconciliation m transitional settings The 
ideas laid out in this chapter enable an understanding of the multitude of goals post-
conflict regimes have and the mterests they must balance to achieve truth, justice and 
reconciliation Chapter Five provides histoncal case study information to desenbe the 
events that occurred in Chile which necessitated the implementation of a truth 
commission and Chapter Six is an outlme of the mandate and findings of the TRC 





Framework of the thesis 
This thesis will analyze TRCs in the Transitional Justice framework as this is the 
framework in which they are rooted and studied It is relatively young in the academic 
tradition but its strength lies in its strong empirical foundation based on historical case 
study research as well as comparative work 
This framework suffers from certain limitations it is under-theorized, the 
comparative studies conducted are based on the most popular cases of countries which 
have implemented transitional justice mechanisms1, and the definitions and concepts used 
are not always clearly defined by researchers in their analysis 
Further, transitional justice and its associated concepts, truth, justice and 
reconciliation are not easily quantifiable when one aims to address whether or not they 
were achieved m a society This research recogmzes these limitations and does not aim to 
measure these concepts in a quantifiable manner Thus, the framework has been adapted 
by defining "success" and "impact" in a qualitative manner, primarily through the 
perceptions of those who influence the formulation of human nghts policy based on their 
1 These cases are Guatemala, South Africa, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Rwanda, Sierra Leon, the 
former Yugoslavia, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
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understanding of these concepts (truth, justice, and reconciliation) These definitions 
follow below, but first, transitional justice, its goals and tools will be defined 
Definition of transitional justice 
There are a few definitions of transitional justice that one encounters in the literature 
Teitel has undertaken an extensive study of the concept and defines it as "a conception of 
justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal response to 
confront wrong-doings of repressive predecessor regimes" (Teitel, 2003, p 69) While 
Teitel understands transitional justice as legal justice, the International Center for 
Transitional Justice's (ICTJ) definition is more general and understands the concept as 
a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights It seeks 
recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted 
to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights 
abuse In some cases, these transformations happen suddenly, in others, they may 
take place over many decades (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, 
P 1) 
These two definitions highlight the definitional ambiguity of the concept of 
transitional justice Some understand the idea to be a new conception of justice, while 
others see it as regular justice only in transitional times This research takes the view that 
justice in times of transition, though not necessarily a special kind of justice, is 
constrained by transitional factors the type of transition and the balance of powers of the 
actors invested in a transition (politicians, military, civil society, etc ) 2 Given this 
2 Samuel Huntington outlmed four different types of transitions The first is transformation which he 
suggests is initiated by members of the authoritarian regime, a "regime initiated transition" (Huntington, 
1991, p 125) and has "mmimal accountability" (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 22) The second, transplacement, is 
a democracy that has resulted from the actions of the regime m power and the actions of the opposition, it is 
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definitional ambiguity, scholars such as Anderhni, et al, and the United Nations (UN) 
have broadened the definition to operationahze the idea, such that there is a focus on 
mechanisms and tools used by transitional regimes For the UN, 
[t]ransitional justice consists of both judicial and non-judicial processes and 
mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives, facilitating initiatives m respect of 
the right to truth, delivering reparations, institutional reform and national 
consultations Whatever combination is chosen must be m conformity with 
international legal standards and obligations (Guidance Note of the Secretary-
General 2010, p 2, Anderhni, Conaway, & Kays, p 1) 
This expanded definition allows for a range of goals and responses that states can 
pursue to address accountability and the human rights question upon re-democratization 
These responses will be discussed below following a brief history of transitional justice 
History of transitional justice 
Transitional justice is an idea that has existed in practice since ancient Greece The 
modern cases of transitional justice began after WWII with the Nuremberg trials which 
set the precedent for punishment Post-WWI there was seen as the failure of national and 
international justice which prevented a transition to democracy At Nuremberg, post-
WWII, the primary offence for which individuals were tned was aggression The victors, 
the Allies, ensured accountability under international jurisdiction Individual 
responsibility was ascribed because the aim was not to punish the country of Germany 
(Teitel, 2000, p 31-34) 
a negotiated transition and has slightly more accountability, while the third, replacement is where the old 
regime is replaced by new through struggle, war, or a coup, and has substantial accountability The fourth, 
intervention is one m which the old regime is replaced by external forces, and also has substantial 
accountability (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 2, Huntington, 1991, p 124-154) 
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Twenty-two Nazi officials were tried by an International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg led by four powers, the US, England, France and the Soviet Union Three out 
of the twenty-two were acquitted, seven were sentenced to prison and twelve sentenced 
to death In addition, American, British and French tribunals convicted German officials 
and the Germans also took on a process of trying Nazi criminals A denazification, 
purging of Nazi officials from public offices, was also set m motion In terms of non-
criminal justice, the Germans and other European nations legislated the compensation of 
victims of the Nazi regime (Elster, 2004, p 54) 
The Nuremberg process accomplished the following the evidence it collected 
made it impossible to deny the crimes that were committed (Minow, 1998, p 48-51) It 
defined just versus unjust aggression and 'crimes against humanity,' and influenced how 
accountability was conceptualized in international law (Teitel R ,2000, p 31) The 
Nuremberg Principles assigned individual responsibilities but expanded criminal liability 
so that public officials "could no longer avail themselves of 'head of state' defense based 
on their official positions" (Teitel, 2000, p 34) It also made the 'due obedience' to orders 
defense unacceptable and ushered in ideas about national obligations to citizens within 
the context of international laws such that nations "cannot simply ignore the most 
barbarous acts of other nations [and perpetrators] cannot neglect 'the ever more real 
possibility that they will be held accountable and brought to justice under law" (Minow, 
1998, p 48) Nuremberg resulted in a paradigm shift m the conceptualization of justice as 
a national to an international process (Teitel, 2000, p 33) Smce Nuremberg, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has been established and other internationally 
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supported tribunals, such as those m Rwanda and Yugoslavia, have been convened 
(Teitel, 2000, p 31) 
The next wave of transitional justice in Europe came m the mid to late 1970s 
when transitions to democracy in some southern European countries such as Portugal, 
Greece and Spam were occurring Notable transitions in Africa include Ethiopia, South 
Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa Most transitions in 
Africa have taken place in the context of returning to a state of peace from a state of civil 
war with most occurring after a peace agreement of some kind has been signed by the 
warring parties Latin American cases were marked by truth commissions sometimes 
followed by trials m Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile 
and Peru The varying responses these states have adopted in their transitions are 
reflective of the goals of the transition that each hoped to achieve (Elster, 2004) 
Goals of transitional justice 
Minow and others (Anderhm et al ) have outlined several goals post-conflict societies 
have in a transition 
1) establish peace, 
2) lay the foundation for democracy through institutional reforms, 
3) ensure support for the "legitimacy and stability of the new regime," 
4) pursue investigations into the violence to establish facts, 
5) acknowledge the violence under the previous regime, 
6) punish the offenders of the violence, 
7) declare to 'never again' be embroiled in violence, 
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8) foster healing and reconciliation, 
9) "restore victim's dignity", 
10) restore the rule of law and promote democracy and human rights, and finally 
11) "accomplish each of these goals in a way that is compatible with the other goals" 
(Mmow, 1998, p 84, Anderlmi, et a l , p 1) 
As will be discussed in chapter four, TRCs can help states meet these goals 
Additionally, some argue that the function of transitional law is to set a boundary 
between the old regime and the new one In setting a boundary, the law re-establishes the 
bounds of legitimate state coercion by establishing accountability for violations, and acts 
as a transformative force that reconstructs and strengthens democracy and the rule of law 
(Nagy, 2004, p 5) 
Dilemmas faced by regimes in pursuing transitional justice 
Transitional justice can occur on several levels the national or supranational level (with 
international tribunals) and can have many actors In a transition, several stakeholders 
have an mterest in how the transition unfolds perpetrators, victims, beneficiaries of 
wrongdoing, helpers who alleviate the wrongdoing, resisters who resisted the 
wrongdoing, neutrals, advocates or promoters of transitional justice, and finally, 
wreckers who oppose transitional justice or obstruct the process These categories are 
overlapping and not mutually exclusive (Elster, 2004, p 99) Additionally, armed groups 
and militaries are often involved m or concerned about the transitional process 
Militaries are concerned about the new state's policy towards the military institution vis-
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a-vis military budgets, organization, control and how the state treats human rights 
violations (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 29) 
As such, the balance of powers between these groups that exist before, during and 
after a transition can affect the degree to which accountability is possible Other factors 
that affect accountability include the following 1) length, intensity, nature and extent of 
the conflict, 2) "prior state of civil-military relations, as well as subsequent reform", and 
3) international influence, if any, on the peace process (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 20-22) 
Accountability also depends on "will and capacity " A sheer desire to see justice achieved 
will not make it so as there may be obstacles which make it impossible For example, a 
strong military, large societal involvement in cnmes and political obstacles such as 
whether the state even has the capacity to hold people accountable, make accountability 
difficult to pursue (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 20-22) 
Since transitions are marked by shifts in regimes, usually from a repressive 
towards a less repressive regime, what rule of law regimes use in this penod is 
consistently debated (Teitel 2000 6, 241) Teitel notes that the "dilemma is that the "law 
is caught between past and future, between backward looking and forward looking " 
(Teitel, 2002, p 241-2, Nagy, 2004, p 4) and "what is deemed unjust is contingent upon 
and informed by pnor injustice" (Teitel, 2000, p 6) Thus, "although the systemic nature 
of cnmes necessitates collective punishment, liberal legal norms of non-retroactivity, due 
process and individual accountability" prevent collective cnminahzation (Nagy, 2004, p 
4) Further, transitional justice involves conflict between "predecessor and successor 
visions of justice" (Teitel, 2000, p 11) Should newly democratic states follow a 
retrospective or prospective rule of law*? Can defenses based on the rule of law of the 
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previous regime be accepted7 The nature of these questions suggests that in dealing with 
injustices committed by previous regimes, successor regimes must consider several 
options in their pursuit of accountability—that is, "full continuity with the prior legal 
regime, discontinuity, selective discontinuities and moving outside the law altogether" 
(Teitel, 2000, p 14) Moreover, what legal order is used to pursue prosecutions—the 
military, civilian, national or international order7 (Teitel, 2000, p 27-28) Other 
dilemmas faced by incoming regimes in a transition include Should the past be 
confronted at all7 Should justice or truth be prioritized7 If the past is confronted, then 
how are victims and perpetrators to be defined and treated7 Additionally, 
how is the social understanding behind a new regime committed to the rule of law 
created7 Which legal acts have transformative significance7 What, if any, is the 
relation between a state's response to its repressive past and its prospects for 
creating a liberal order7 What is law's potential for ushering liberalization7 
(Teitel, 2001, p 3) 
To address these questions, a regime has available to it, a range of transitional justice 
options which it can pursue 
Mechanisms of transitional justice 
Given the complexity of issues that govern a transition, a variety of tools have been used 
to address the sometimes competing concerns that arise These tools can be divided into 
criminal mechanisms such as trials and non-cnmmal mechanisms such as lustrations, 
reparations, reforms and truth commissions 
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Criminal justice 
Following Nuremberg, a democratic state was expected, particularly by victims and 
human rights groups, to treat the violations of out-going regimes through legal justice m 
the form of trials Tnals to condemn the violence of the ancien regime have several 
functions in a transition, yet present just as many dilemmas to incoming regimes 
Tnals meet out punishment to end impunity and promote the rule of law (Fletcher 
& Weinstem, 2002, p 586) When a government holds perpetrators responsible, citizens 
are sent the message that repression has ended This accountability creates a distinction 
or a boundary between old and new regimes such that new regime is legitimized by de-
legitimizing the old regime (Teitel, 2000, p 30) The establishment of individual 
accountability is also said to '"alleviate [ ] collective guilt by differentiating between 
the perpetrator and innocent bystanders'" (Fletcher & Wemstein, 2002, p 598) 
Tnals are also said to respond to the victim's need for truth, acknowledgement, 
justice and healing Thus, there is widespread agreement among mtellectuals and victims 
that a response to massive violence must mclude some sort of truth telling for the repair 
of the social fabric to occur Diane Orentlicher notes that truth telling can only happen m 
a tnal setting, which also creates an authoritative histoncal record of the wrong-doings 
(Fletcher & Weinstem, 2002, p 587) Tnals prevent forgetting the past, domg so can 
further perpetuate inter-group hatreds 
Moreover, most victims prefer judicial mechanisms to deal with cnme because, as 
Martha Minow has suggested, "guilty verdicts afford public acknowledgment of what 
happened, and its utter wrongfulness" (Mmow, 1998, p 123) In the same vein, Carlos 
Nino suggests that tnals empower victims by enabling them '"to recover their self-respect 
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as holders of human rights'" (qtd m Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 363) Some suggest 
there is a cathartic function to trials because suffering in the form of testimony'" is 
listened to with respect and sympathy'" (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 363, Fletcher & 
Weinstem, 2002, p 593) Additionally, prosecutions provide hope and the potential to 
repair negative associations with places where human rights crimes have occurred For 
example, the post-WWII trials in 1945, however flawed, presented the possibility of the 
prosecution of human rights violations (Minow, 1998, p 30) Further, it is argued that 
trials can foster reconciliation (Fletcher & Wemstein, 2002, p 586, Llewellyn & Howse, 
1999, p 362) because they enable society to discuss the painful past and come to terms 
with it, develop closure and "rebuild a 'healthy society'" (Fletcher & Wemstein, 2002, p 
597) Moreover, they transfer to the state the "individuals' desires for revenge cools 
vengeance into retribution, slows judgment with procedure and interrupts the cycle of 
blame and feud" (Mmow, 1998, p 26) 
Limitations of trials 
Trials also have several limitations A primary limitation is the difficulty of assigning 
responsibility This can result in selective prosecutions and the enforcement of a statute 
of limitations on prosecutions, which can make exceptions to try only the gravest cases of 
violations (Teitel, 2000, p 41) 
In situations where violence or repression is systemic, often a large number of 
perpetrators are responsible for committing crimes The sheer number of cases can 
overwhelm new judiciaries, which may be unable to handle such large caseloads Thus, 
selective prosecutions are the norm (Mmow, 1998, p 30-33) which can appear to serve 
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political justice or revenge prosecutions (Teitel, 2000, p 40) Moreover, they present to 
new states the problem of who to prosecute The lme between perpetrators and victims is 
not always clear In situations where large-scale human rights violations occur, victims 
who exact revenge on their perpetrators can become wrongdoers themselves, while those 
taking orders to commit crimes may themselves be victims of the repressive system 
(Minow, 1998, p 41) Nesiah asks whether the law can properly "identify who is a victim 
and who is a perpetrator" (Nesiah, 2005, p 281) The legal system is also not adequately 
set up to deal with those who profited from the violence, by-standers who may not have 
had direct participation in the violence but did not act to stop it, and the states—first, the 
state itself that has the responsibility to protect its citizens and second, outside states and 
(non-state) actors that encouraged or re-enforced the violence (Fletcher and Wemstein, 
2002, p 579, Teitel, 2002, p 244-5 2001) 
New states must decide as to who should be held responsible for the crimes— 
those giving orders, the intellectuals of the repression, or those who earned out orders to 
commit atrocious crimes Under the Nuremberg Principles, due obedience defenses were 
no longer acceptable, making both leaders and soldiers potentially responsible for state 
wrongdoing, and command responsibilities (attribution of responsibility to superiors) 
versus individual and collective responsibilities were questioned The problem with this 
view is that it gave rise to the question of whether it is fan- and legal for a post-dictatorial 
society seeking justice to assign criminal liability based only on an actor's official status 
(Teitel, 2000, p 37) Additionally, "degree[s] of fault" exist (Teitel, 2000 p 41), and it 
has been asked whether "the attribution of criminal to one [for example the leadership] 
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apply lesser criminal responsibility to the other [the foot soldiers] 9" (Teitel, 2000, p 
44) 
Furthermore, trials try individuals and not systems or institutions that enabled 
human rights violations, mass murders, and disappearances Legal justice individualizes 
guilt and judges and prosecutors prefer this because collective guilt is hard to determine 
It has been suggested that when collective guilt is not dealt with, it "absolves everyone of 
responsibility for past wrongdoing" and prevents reconciliation (Fletcher and Wemstein, 
2002, p 599) However, it should be noted that legal justice, and not reconciliation, is the 
goal of trials (Minow, 1998, p 26) Yet, if only individual crimes are dealt with, 
collective innocence may be implied (Fletcher and Weinstem, 2002 p 604) 
In terms of revealing truth, proponents of truth commissions argue that the trial 
system in most countries does not allow for the full disclosure of the truth Both parties 
involved in the trial are allowed to manipulate the evidence to make then own case m an 
adversarial manner, leavmg judges or juries to decide between these versions (Shriver, 
2001, p 11) Moreover, not all perpetrators will tell the truth in a trial-setting in order that 
they may avoid punishment, even if they are offered incentives such as amnesty 
Additionally, legal objectivity does not allow for narrative truths Instead it is concerned 
with facts and the determination of guilt Even if some truth is revealed as the result of a 
trial, there is an assumption that people will accept these judicial facts and not reinterpret 
or distort them "based upon philosophical, moral or political allegiances" (Fletcher and 
Wemstein, 2002, p 588-589), truth is vulnerable to these allegiances 
Retroactive justice—judging the past on today's morality is an issue for 
transitional trials The successor regime must ensure that these trials adhere to the rule of 
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law and are fair so that they are not perceived to be perpetuating political justice or 
vengeance (Teitel, 2000, p 30) Others argue that retroactive justice is unavoidable 
because sometimes immoral regimes established immoral orders or perverted a 
previously established moral order In this case, a moral consensus that arises after these 
crimes are committed means having to contend with retrospectivity or retroactivity Nino 
contends that "retroactive justice may help protect democratic values" (Villa-Vicencio, 
1999-2000, p 174) while others argue that it can put the "legitimacy of the new regime" 
at stake (Huyse, 2001, p 322-327) To address debate, it has been suggested that impunity 
may be necessary for social peace Many note that the best kind of justice is one that 
honors the memory of the events that occurred, not one that brings legal proceedings 
against every smgle perpetrator (Huyse, 2001, p 325) 
Another criticism of trials is that they do not create reconciliation, collective 
memory, or healing because they do not consider the underlying or broader socio-
political and economic contexts of the violence that occurred (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, 
p 363) There is a difference in what reconciliation requires and what justice can offer 
For example, even if victims want and have the right to punishment, reconciliation may 
not always require punishment Yet, many argue that it does require repentance on the 
part of the perpetrators However, the law does not demand remorse or repentance for a 
sentence to be meted out, and repentance does not negate the responsibility for the crime 
Data on community rebuilding and the contribution of justice to this process is limited 
and yet the contribution of trials to reconciliation and community building has been 
assumed as fact by practitioners and academics (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002, p 600) 
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In terms of healing, aspects of a courtroom setting may not be beneficial for all 
victims Public accountability also may not be important for healing In this vein, Judith 
Shklar and Hannah Arendt noted the "inflated claims about the healing or pedagogical 
impact of Nazi war criminals trials" (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 358) and few studies 
on the contribution of legal process to healing have been conducted 
Finally, trials and tribunals can be expensive, resource taxing and time 
consuming The legal process can be slow m a society that does not have adequate 
judicial or staffing capacity (Othman, 2005, p 258) and may be dependent on 
international bodies such as UN and General Assembly for "resources and continued 
operations" (Minow, 1998, p 39) 
For these limitations of judicial mechanisms, non-cnmmal methods of 
accountability have been developed 
Non-criminal justice 
Non-cnmmal mechanisms of justice can mclude administrative forms such as purges of 
the public sector or implementation of institutional reforms, reparations and truth 
commissions 
After a democratic government comes into power, as a way to restore confidence 
in its institutions, it may implement a policy of purging the public sector of those 
associated with the pnor repressive regime This process is called lustration and usually 
results m a large number of purges, which can be problematic because it can appear as 
collective punishment of a group of people based on their political affiliation Lustration 
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may put into question the legitimacy of the new government and its commitment to rules 
of due process and law (Kirtz, 1995, p xxxiv) 
Transitional regimes can also undertake vetting of individuals before they are 
hired for civil service posts In this process individuals with integrity—those who have 
demonstrated a commitment to human rights and democracy are given priority in 
employment for public service (Duthie, 2007, p 17) 
Institutional Reforms 
New states may also undertake institutional reforms such as security sector reform, 
judicial reform, and political reforms These can include rewriting the constitution m 
order to remove authoritarian elements and addressing corruption m the judiciary to 
inspire public confidence in the new government (International Center for Transitional 
Justice, 2009, p 1-2, (Anderlmi, Conaway, & Kays, p 1-7) 
Reparations 
Reparations are implemented by states to "help repair the material and moral damages of 
past abuse" (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, p i ) Reparations can be 
monetary or symbolic such as memorial projects and apologies from the head of state 
The function of material compensation is the following 
it aids the victims to manage the material aspect of their loss Second, it 
constitutes an official acknowledgement of their pain by the nation Both of these 
facilitate the societal re-integration of people who have long been made to suffer 
in silence Third, it may deter the state from future abuses, by imposmg a 
financial cost to such misdeeds (Kirtz, 1995, p xxxvu) 
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International law has also recognized the state's obligation to provide compensation to 
victims of human rights abuses (Shelton, 2002) 
Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions have become the most popular means, often one of the first 
mechanisms, newly democratic states implement to address questions of accountability 
The term 'truth commission' has a young history in transitional justice discourse (Natua, 
2002, p 333) but Pnscilla Hayner's work on the subject has been central in offering a 
definition of truth commissions She, as well a majority of the literature following the 
release of her book, defines truth commissions in the following manner they are 
temporary bodies often having a pre-determined time limit in which to complete their 
investigation and report, they investigate periods and patterns of human rights violations, 
and they are officially sanctioned by the state (Hayner, 2002, p 14) 
While the mandates, power and level of significance differ depending on which 
institution has created the report, it is important to note that although Hayner considers 
truth commissions to be officially sanctioned by the state, they can take other forms For 
example, church groups have been fundamental, particularly in Latin America, m 
collecting testimony from victims and military records (when available) and publishing 
reports This was the case m Brazil and Guatemala where the Catholic Church published 
its own truth commission report Thus, while Hayner identifies twenty-five TRCs, 
expanding Hayner's definition to include non-state sanctioned commissions, Dan 
Bronkhorst identifies forty-five commissions of inquiry (Forsberg & Teivamen, 2004) 
The aims and critiques of these commissions will be further discussed in chapter 4 
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Temporality of transitional justice 
One more idea that is of relevance to this research is the idea of the temporality of 
transitional justice that is elucidated by Elster He is one of the few in the literature who 
distinguishes immediate, protracted, and 'second wave transitional justice ' 
Immediate transitional justice proceedings begin shortly after the transition and 
come to an end within, say five years [where as with protracted transitional 
justice], the process starts up immediately but then goes on for a long time until 
the issue is resolved (Elster, 2004, p 75-6) 
Second wave transitional justice starts with immediate justice that leads mto a latent 
period of no action and then years or decades later new proceedings are launched 
Postponed transitional justice occurs when "first actions are undertaken (say) ten years or 
more after the transition" (Elster, 2004, p 75-6) This protracted and second-wave justice 
is important to consider when examining the long-term impacts and successes of TRC 
Methods of evaluation: Definition of success and impact 
The existing research evaluating the success and impact of truth commissions is based on 
short-term impacts That is, they examine the initial results and reception to the 
commission's work after a TRC report has been released Many of these studies define 
'success' and 'impact' in various ways Based on Braham's review, these include the 
following truth commissions can be considered successful "simply by virtue of 
completing their work" (Braham, 2007, p 18) "The extent to which" a commission 
determines the "fate of individual victims" may also be a criteria for success (Braham, 
2007, p 18) The problem with this measure of success is that each commission will vary 
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in the degrees that it does this based on its mandate Moreover, "the true extent of human 
rights abuses often remains in dispute if one would like to assess truth commissions 
based on how much information they uncovered, it is not clear what the baseline would 
be" (Braham, 2007, p 18) Studies that focus on the legal and moral effects of a truth 
commission determine success on whether, to what extent, and how the truth commission 
has fulfilled these legal and moral obligations to victims and to what extent they created 
the conditions for reconciliation This research uses Braham's simpler definition of 
success, which is "the degree to which a commission fulfilled the duties assigned to it" 
(Braham, 2007, p 17) This definition allows for the "variation m commission structure 
and powers, the environment m which they operate and the nature of the crimes 
they investigate" (Braham 2004 17) Thus, if a commission is able to fulfill its mandate, 
"it could be considered a success" (Braham 2004 17) Following this, impact is defined 
as the "sort of empirically verifiable effects a truth commission has in the transitional 
context" (Braham 2004 19), these effects maybe short or long-term 
In terms of this impact, this research examines the degree of truth, justice, 
reconciliation and awareness of human rights that has been achieved in Chile since the 
release of the Rettig Report One measure of this impact is the perceptions of 
stakeholders that influence policy such as politicians, military, human rights 
organizations, judiciary, and victim's groups A limitation of impact studies based on 
examining perceptions, including this one, is that there is no baseline data that allows 
researchers to determine what perceptions were before a truth commission existed 
Therefore, to determine whether a change in perception actually occurred because of the 
TRC is difficult As a result, this research uses as its baselme initial perceptions and 
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reactions to the TRC report and then examines how these initial perceptions and reactions 
have changed over time It does not purport to examine perceptions of truth, justice and 
reconciliation 'before' and 'after' a commission as this would be difficult to do in a 
retrospective study 
Summary 
To summarize, while recognizing the limitations of the framework such as bemg under-
theorized, the existence of definitional ambiguities and the difficulty of quantifying 
philosophical concepts, this research uses a transitional justice framework to 
contextuahze truth commissions because this is how they are contextualized in academic 
study as well as practice Transitional Justice, practiced by states since Ancient Greece 
but modernized by the Nuremberg process after WWII to become the way in which 
democratic states deal with the abuses of the regime ancien, refers to justice that takes 
place in a politically changing environment It is charactenzed by a range of mechanisms, 
criminal and non-cnminal, that states have at their disposal to address issues of 
accountability 
To study the impact and success of the truth commission in Chile, this research 
adapts the framework by defining success as whether the duties of the commission were 
fulfilled and impact as the effects the a commission produced in the transition These 
effects are measured in terms of the perceptions of those who influence policy-making m 





The methods used m this research were a mixture of primary and secondary research 
This research relied on a combination of semi-structured in depth interviews and 
secondary research (archival and literature review) to obtain the data needed for analysis 
Primary research examined the truth commission report itself and conducted 30 
interviews with scholars on the truth commission processes, representatives from human 
rights organizations, victims, the military, and government officials to gam insight into 
what these groups in society thought of the truth commission and the processes of 
reconciliation and stability it hoped to achieve Secondary and archival work included 
making use of the literature on truth commissions, newspaper and magazine articles, in 
addition to the reports of human rights groups on the truth commission 
Before arrival for research in Chile, it was expected, based on scholarly warnings 
that research on truth, justice, reconciliation and human rights in Chile would be an 
extremely difficult undertaking as Chileans are hesitant to discuss the Pinochet era and 
the topic of human nghts Additionally, this researcher had none of the personal 
connections, pitutos as Chileans call them, that Martz (to be discussed below) mentions 
and others suggested would be needed to conduct mterviews and gain access to archival 
materials However, the opposite was found to be true in Chile for this research It was 
possible to make direct connections with all of the interviewees and the research only 
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received one denial of requests for interviews To maintain the confidentiality of these 
sources, they have not been named If available, and consent was given, their political or 
social affiliation has been cited in the footnotes 
Secondary data sources 
Secondary sources are those that exist prior to the researcher having started his/her own 
research Thus, these are pre-existing sources of information "that were generated for 
reasons other than those the current researcher has in mind" (McTavish and Loether 
2002 201) Secondary research is the "use of data that are already available" (McTavish 
and Loether 2002 201) These data can be either quantitative such as the use of statistics, 
or qualitative such as the use of archives that may include newspaper and magazine 
articles, or transcripts of interviews conducted by others Use of secondary data requires 
the researcher to make judgments about what data will be necessary for analysis and 
whether existmg data are appropriate for the study at hand Existing data are available 
from public and private archives, and government and university libraries However, 
researchers should not formulate a study question based on the availability of secondary 
data Research questions should be formulated because they will contribute to scientific 
knowledge, not simply because data exists which would allow one to study a particular 
question Additionally, researchers should avoid trying to substitute data that exist for 
data they are searching for (Stewart, 1984, McTavish and Loether, 2002) 
Following McTavish and Loether (2002, p 207-208, 211-214), what follows is an 
outline of some of the advantages and disadvantages of secondary data use after which 
the use of archives will be discussed 
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Advantages and disadvantages of secondary sources 
The use of secondary data can decrease costs for the researcher since the data are often 
already available for use This allows the investigator to save time, money and effort that 
would normally be expended in trying to collect data anew (Stewart, 1984, p 13) 
Additionally, access costs are often reduced since data is often available publicly For 
example, newspaper articles or other media sources may exist in libraries and will be 
available to researchers at very little cost, if any 
Third, is the sample size, qualitative secondary source databases often contain a 
significant amount of information For example, if one is usmg newspapers, there are 
several thousand newspapers one might have access to in a National Library Conversely, 
researchers must be aware that sometimes secondary sources or research may not have 
been based on large sample sizes, with the result that limited conclusions could have been 
made by the research Fourth, secondary data is often much more representative of the 
population of interest If census data are used, North American censuses are quite 
representative of populations and so can be used rather safely when making "statistical 
inferences about the population" (McTavish and Loether, 2002, p 207, Stewart, 1984, p 
13) However, it must be remembered that the target population in one's own study are 
not the populations for which the secondary data was collected 
Another advantage to secondary data is that over-time data are often available 
Thus, m the case of quantitative secondary data, data may be cumulative such that 
"similar data are collected periodically from the same number of comparable 
respondents" (McTavish and Loether, 2002, p 207) Quantitative data yield historical 
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data that will make longitudinal studies possible An additional advantage of secondary 
data sets is that they are often non-reactive Since they already exist, there is little room 
for the researcher to influence the data or bias it in one direction Biases that are of 
concern in secondary data sets are those of the original researcher To minimize these, 
one would require knowledge as to how the data was collected and what questions were 
asked of participants 
An important concern in the use of qualitative data is its quality Although top 
quality textual data does exist, sometimes the use of personal documents can present the 
problem of legibility Documents may not be written clearly or may have faded over 
time, thus contributing to the loss of information for a researcher using this kind of data 
Further, initial data preparation by original researchers may have resulted in errors when 
information was coded or a diary entry made It may not be easy for a researcher relying 
on this source of information to eliminate these errors 
Additionally, secondary quantitative data may not mclude all the variables 
initially used, smce the original "researcher may [have] decide[d] to drop variable for 
which there are no data from the conceptual model" (McTavish and Loether, 2002, p 
208) Moreover, some secondary sources, such as newspaper articles and personal 
documents "may not include direct information on the variables the researcher wants to" 
use because they were ongmally produced for different purposes (McTavish and Loether, 
2002, p 213, Stewart, 1984, p 14) This may lead the researcher to make inferences about 
the information in the document that cannot be justified The resources may also contain 
irrelevant information, called dross, which is higher for secondary qualitative data then 
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for quantitative data and quantitative responses may not be categorized in the manner in 
which the researcher requires for his/her own study (Stewart, 1984, p 14) 
Another weakness of secondary data is that the researcher may not be aware of 
how the data were created The researcher must keep in mind that "documents are 
created in a social context that may have both desired and biasing effects on the resulting 
archived data" (McTavish and Loether, 2002, p 213) For example, if using letters and 
memos as secondary data, one must remember that there were two (or more) parties 
involved m the transaction and the researcher may only be getting one side of the story 
Finally, the researcher must be mindful that secondary data often yield access to 
older data as current data are not always available (Stewart, 1984, p 14) 
Archives 
Archival and historical work often involves the use of primary documents Archives are a 
set of records that may be textual documents, or statistical information produced for 
purposes other than the research at hand (Robson, 2002, p 35) It is important to note that 
what is found in archives is what others have defined as documents worth keeping for 
future use Thus, there are several layers of sedimentation that go on before a researcher 
has access to a document First, those that own the documents decide what they will 
donate to an archive and what they will dispose of, second, if the owner of the matenal is 
deceased, it is often archivists or historians who evaluate and decide what is worth 
keeping and what can be discarded, and third once materials arrive at an archive, 
archivists decide what they will accept and allow researchers to view Thus, before a 
researcher even becomes aware of available secondary or primary documents, several 
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sorting processes have already occurred (Hill, 1993, p 8-16) There are several issues 
researchers encounter when undertaking archival work These include access to matenals, 
the unique nature of matenals, non-circulation of materials, property rights and the 
closed-stacks organization of some archives 
Often, in order to gain access to matenals, permission is required to use the 
archive This must be negotiated beforehand and sometimes permission to enter the 
archive is denied If permission to the archive is obtained, then permission to special 
collections may have to be negotiated Access problems may also result if the researcher 
is unable to travel to the archive since many archives do not loan out matenals 
Additionally, researchers often have to conform to the times and schedules of archive 
hours, and this can lead to increased time and expenses being expended on research 
Moreover, some states, such as Germany, have archival laws that need to be obeyed to 
ensure access to these resources (Franz, 1995, p 73) 
Despite potential problems of access, it is important for researchers engaging in 
histoncal work to try to gain access to archives because often the matenals contained 
within these repositones is unique and can provide a new perspective on a research 
problem However, once access to archives is obtained, researchers may encounter issues 
of property and copynghts because sometimes, "donors of archival matenals retain 
pnvate property nghts over [the] matenal deposited in archives" (Hill, 1993, p 23) 
Therefore, the use of archival material may also require the permission of the donor 
Further, due to these copynghts, there may be "restrictions on the quotation, copying and 
publication of matenals" donated by the donor (Hill, 1993, p 24) Finally, researchers 
might have to deal with closed stacks in archives because archival matenals can only be 
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found in restricted areas to which they will not have access In this case "researchers must 
request or 'page' materials for use" and it will be brought down for the researcher to use 
However, sometimes archivists may not allow viewing of closed stack materials or may 
suggest that they do not possess the materials the researcher is searching for In this case, 
the researcher has "no way to verify what materials are actually in the stacks or whether 
their use of materials is hmdered by unseen obfuscation" (Hill, 1993, p 24) 
Assuming that one does obtain access to archival materials several issues exist 
with historical research The selection of the matenal used may not be without 
controversy Researchers performing historical research may be charged with selectivity 
bias, which is unavoidable to some degree because what we see is determined by what we 
are looking at Selection bias contains two elements first is the bias that may be inherent 
in the selection and use of some sources over others The second is selectivity that is 
introduced when cases or documents analyzed by a specific historian are selected while 
others are consciously excluded Mechanisms to prevent selectivity and bias include the 
following one must keep in mind that the sample of documents available may not 
represent the entire sample of documents that actually exist, documents that seem 
suspicious in their origins and authenticity should be avoided, documents should be 
evaluated in their social and historical context and not from the point of view of the 
present (so as to engage in presentism), one should triangulate the information received 
from archival sources with other sources of information to ensure validity and reliability, 
be aware that there is a political culture and intellectual hentage associated with scholarly 
work that one is using, keep in mind that "facts are interpretations based on implicit or 
explicit theories" (Thies, 2002, p 360), and finally, one should start their research with 
30 
the most recent sources available on the topic and "work backwards through the literature 
to see which histoncal 'facts' have stood the test of time" (Thies, 2002, p 362, 358-364) 
The following will outline archival research m Latin Amenca, where this research was 
earned out 
Bueno de Mesquita (2002, p 2, 5) notes that in international relations the use of 
the case study method often entails the use of histoncal methods and he expresses the 
necessity and value of such studies for advancing knowledge in the field of international 
relations However, undertaking research abroad is certainly not easy (Martz, 1989) In 
Latin Amenca, Martz suggest that the researcher's status is important Institutional or 
national affiliation can work to benefit or harm the researcher's ability to conduct 
research if that affiliation is not viewed m a favourable light For example, he points out 
that in the 1980s in Latin Amenca, scholars affiliated with the United States (US) 
aroused suspicion because many in Latin Amenca feared that these scholars might be 
affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) This may have made potential 
interaction with the scholar difficult or unlikely in some cases (Martz, 1989, p 57-58) 
Martz suggests that to do basic archival work in Latin Amenca, one needs an 
awareness of what (and where) resources are available He suggests that although 
national libranes are a place to start, m Latin Amenca, they are often not adequate as sole 
sources of archival information Therefore, it is necessary to turn to university libranes 
and Catholic seminanes that contain invaluable sources of information However, in the 
case of Catholic seminanes, women may not be allowed in some of these If documents 
from family libranes and personal collections are required, then a personal connection is 
necessary to obtain access However, if access is granted, other problems may result, 
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such as the unavailability or limited availability of photocopiers to copy material 
required Additionally, it may take time to travel between archives that may be located in 
different cities This can be extremely time-consuming since travel m the developing 
world is not often easy 
Although vanous archival holdings are unique to the region, and some local 
holdings are complete, vanous problems exist with archives in Latin Amenca Damage 
and loss of archives is a common problem Damage can be due to climatic conditions, 
inadequate storage facilities and procedures, and untrained staff that are unable to 
manage the resources (Hazen, 2003, p 345) Additionally, matenal is often acquired for 
personal collections and copies removed from archives Matenal available may be un-
catalogued or unsorted due to the lack of resources devoted to preservation of matenals 
To remedy this problem, several projects have been started by North Amencan 
universities in partnership with Latin Amencan institutions The first is the Latin 
American Microform Project (LAMP) started in the 1970s The LAMP project brought 
together 42 North Amencan Libranes to work with host institutions m Latin Amenca to 
microfilm vanous sources Another project is the Program for Latin American Libraries 
and Archives (PLALA) project started by Harvard University, which supports over one 
hundred archival and library projects in seventeen Latin Amencan countries (Hazen, 
2003, p 345-346) 
Despite the fact that many Latin Amencan archives may not be as advanced as 
those in North Amenca, valuable information can still be obtained from those sources 
that are available For example, m his research on the Brazilian truth commission report, 
Weschler found that Sao Paulo's Catholic Archdiocese had kept extensive records of all 
32 
the documents used to create the report In fact, once he had personal contact with Jaime 
Wright, a Presbyterian minister in Sao Paulo, he was able to view over a million 
documents related to the truth commission (Welsh, 1991) 
In his study offavelas m Rio de Janeiro, Pino outlines several archival sources 
that can be used to study these shanty-towns Although they are unrecognized officially 
and therefore have no official written history, those who wish to study favelas can still 
rely on other primary archival sources to do so For example, primary material such as 
employment history, health reports and land deeds exist that can reveal the social history 
of zfavela Additionally, city archives, records from the Catholic Church that dealt with 
favelas may reveal statistical information on family organization and housing, and 
records of welfare organizations can be used to show whether individuals m these 
settlements have been receiving the services they need Moreover, records of engineers 
and planners may be important in determining whether housing meets people's needs 
However, since these records are not catalogued they can be considered archives only in 
the loosest sense since they may be missing pages, and may not be in their original 
condition (Pino, 1997, p 112) Many of the national archives mentioned by Pino require 
permission from a Brazilian academic authonty to be used and require the presentation of 
an identity card Photocopymg is allowed in some, but not m others, and may result m 
delays with the material (Pino, 1997, p 113-120) 
Finally, Bickford (2000) offers an analysis of archives containing material on 
human rights and memory m Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
The main archive in Chile accessed for this research was the Fundacion de 
documentacion y Archivio de la Vicana de la Solidandad Erasmo This archive has a 
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well organized collection of over 80 000 legal documents, victim testimonies, eye witness 
accounts from the dictatorship period, and published and unpublished materials 
Materials are readily available to scholars, researchers and journalists The archives have 
computerized indexes, and about "half a million newspaper and magazine clippings on 
human rights cases from 1973 to the present" (Bickford, 2000, p 65-166) 
The Fundacion de Ayuda Social de las Igesias Cnstiane (FASIC) was also another 
archive used for research in Chile This archive has a large collection of human rights 
books and documents, but some are unorganized, and in boxes (Bickford, 2000, p 167-
168, 180) 
Primary data sources: Interviewing as method 
Method selection is a crucial aspect of researching Methods should be chosen based on 
the kind of information required in order to answer the research question at hand 
Interviews are one tool used for such data collection Charles Booth was the first to use 
sociological surveys that relied on interviews in his work Life and Labour of the People 
in London in 1902-03 in which he examined the socioeconomic conditions of people in 
London He used a combination of survey and unstructured interview methods to ensure 
the reliability and validity of his results 
Interviewing further came to the fore after a psychological study on solders in the 
Second World War called The American Soldier, directed by Samuel Stouffer (Fontana & 
Frey, 1998, p 49-50) In the 1970s and 1980s despite the popularity of survey interviews, 
other qualitative interview techniques also came to be commonly practiced Interview 
techniques can be placed in three categones structured, unstructured, and semi-structured 
34 
interviews They can be done in groups, formal or informal and be long or short The 
length of the interview should be determined by the nature of the information sought, if 
the information required "can be obtained by asking only a few questions, then the 
interview may be quite brief (Berg, 2004, p 91) However, a long interview may be 
required if the information needed is to be detailed and extensive If long interviews on a 
particular topic are used, it may be not be necessary to interview as many individuals 
since, at a certain stage, the researcher will hit a point of saturation, where new 
information is no longer being obtained from participants about the research topic at hand 
(Berg, 2004, p 91-92) 
Interviews "are a special form of interaction between people, the purpose of 
which is to elicit information by asking questions" (Kirby & McKenna, 1989, p 66) 
Non-exploitive interviews are guided conversations in which information is shared by 
both parties (Kirby &McKenna, 1989, p 66) Additionally, interviews are described as 
partnerships in which a listening space is created and meaning constructed through a 
sharing of viewpoints (Miller & Crabtree, 2004, p 185) 
Structured interviews 
The goal of structured interviews is to collect "precise data of a codable nature in order to 
explain behavior within pre-established categories" (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 56) This 
type of interview is often characterized by a pre-set list of questions to which responses 
fit a set of categories chosen by the interviewer The questionnaire is adhered to for each 
individual interviewed, leaving little room for flexibility in the way the questions are 
35 
asked This standardized nature of the structured interview makes it particularly useful 
for survey research 
The role of the interviewer in this type of interview is one of neutrality The 
interviewer must assume a casual, friendly, yet impersonal attitude to ensure that a 
"balanced rapport" exists between the interviewer and the interviewee (Fontana & Frey, 
1998, p 52-53, Berg 2004 79) The interviewer's role is to direct the interview m a 
particular direction that is determined by the questions asked The information sought 
from the respondent is decided well in advance of the interview 
Errors from three sources can occur m these types of interviews (a) respondents 
may try to give socially desirable responses, and (b) the type, wording or technique of 
questions asked can influence the responses received (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 53) 
Although "the predetermined nature of structured interviews is aimed at minimizing 
errors structured interviewers are aware that interviews take place in a social context 
which can affect the interview" (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 53) Structural interviews do 
not factor in the emotional dimension that plays into answering questions (Fontana & 
Frey, 1998, p 53) 
Unstructured interviews 
These interviews are the opposite from structured interviews They are open-ended and 
the interviewer has a list of topics s/he would like to broach with the participants, but 
allows the participants to speak openly and freely on these topics These interviews can 
be m-depth and offer a greater breadth of matenal They often take a more conversational 
tone where the interviewer will also answer questions asked by the participants (Fontana 
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& Frey, 1998, p 56, Berg, 2004, p 80) Thus, m an unstructured interview, although the 
interviewer may have a list of topics s/he would like information on, the questions arise 
from interaction with the interviewee 
Semi-structured interviews 
These kinds of interviews as the name suggests, are somewhere in between the structured 
and unstructured interview The interviewer has a list of predetermined questions but 
room for digression from these questions is allowed That is, unlike in a structured 
interview, the question order and wordmg may be changed slightly in consideration that 
each participant may be different or assign a different meaning to words The 
"interviewers are permitted (m fact, expected) to probe far beyond the answers to their 
prepared standardized questions" (Berg, 2004, p 81) By adjusting the language used in 
these types of interviews to the level of awareness of the participant, researchers are able 
to "approach the world form the subject's perspective" (Berg, 2004, p 81) 
Group interviews 
These can take the form of structured, semi-structured, or unstructured interviews and are 
often conducted in the form of focus groups Several individuals are brought together in 
formal or mformal settings and questions are posed to the group In group interviews, the 
interviewer is responsible for directing the "interaction and inquiry" (Fontana & Frey, 
1998, p 54), yet the "interviewer must be flexible, objective, empathic, persuasive, [and] 
a good listener " (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 54) 
37 
In-depth interviewing 
The m-depth interview is a qualitative and semi-structured interview Interviews are 
verbal exchanges but also consist of "non-verbal and emotional interchanges" (Miller & 
Crabtre, 2004, p 187) Interviews are forms of discourse They contam an actual message 
as well as forms of messages through verbal gestures, facial expression, and other body 
language The purpose of m-depth interviews is to "generate narratives that focus on 
fairly specific research questions" (Miller & Crabtre, 2004, p 188) The "emphasis is on 
'depth, detail, vividness and nuance'" (Miller & Crabtre, 2004, p 189) These interviews 
"use open, direct, verbal questions that elicit stones and case oriented narratives" (Miller 
& Crabtre, 2004, p 189) Before undertaking an in-depth interview, the researcher must 
do a literature and cultural review A cultural review is a study of newspapers, radio, and 
other media to gain an understanding of the various cultural categories and 
understandings of events It also enables researchers to perform a personal check for 
biases and assumptions, thereby facilitating a self-review The interview process involves 
selecting respondents so that the appropriate information is received for the study These 
interviews are essentially open dialogues and no two interviews are the same The goal is 
to seek deep collective interpersonal understanding The interviewer is the research 
instrument The factors that can prevent a respondent from answering questions and 
providing information mclude competing demands for time, discussion of sensitive 
events and poor memory (Miller & Crabtre, 2004, p 197) 
Although the interview may be viewed as a conversation between the interviewer 
and the interviewee, "it is not a conversation between equal partners" (Berg, 2004, p 99), 
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therefore, more time needs to be granted to the interview so that information regarding 
the topic at hand can actually be obtained To this end, it is very important for the 
interviewer to build rapport with the participants 
Advantages and disadvantages of interviews 
Although useful tools for data collection, like any tool, interviews have advantages and 
disadvantages First, they are flexible information gathenng tools, and if the interview is 
face-face, both verbal and non-verbal behavior can be observed Further, in the case of 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews, questions may be modified depending on 
the answers received to follow up on mteresting responses (Robson, 2002, p 272-273) 
The interview can provide rich and detailed material not often obtained by some other 
techniques However, questions of reliability are raised when using an unstructured 
interview One must also be careful of biases that may be m questions asked and 
responses received Additionally, interviewing is time-consuming To yield valuable data, 
most interviews will last a minimum of half an hour Interviews, especially if extended 
over an hour, make demands on the interviewees time which may limit the number of 
participants in the study and therefore bias the sample Additionally, one must keep in 
mind that the interview does not just consist of the actual interview itself There is a 
process that comes before and after the interview one must prepare questions, arrange 
meeting times, reschedule appointments, select a desired location, take notes and 
transcribe interview tapes (Robson, 2002, p 273) 
Other disadvantages include expectations of the respondents Respondents may 
assume that the interviewer has some knowledge about the topic being discussed and 
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therefore provide information they think the interviewer wants to hear, thereby leaving 
out vanous, and perhaps important, bits of information This strategic communication on 
the part of the interviewee is something the interviewer must keep in mind while 
conducting and analyzing the interview (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000, p 65-66) 
Additionally respondents may not always answer questions truthfully (Fontana & Frey 
1998, p 54) One way to minimize these expectations is to be clear about the objectives 
of the interview and to build rapport and trust with the interviewee 
The problems that can emerge in a group interview include the following first, 
there is the danger that an individual or a group of individuals will dominate the group 
discussion and so the interviewer must ensure that s/he obtain responses from the entire 
group Second, there is a chance that the group may consist of one or two headstrong 
individuals who must be encouraged to participate constructively Third, the interviewer 
may have to undertake the role of both moderator and interviewer, roles that entail 
slightly different responsibilities The moderator must manage group dynamics while the 
interviewer must direct questions This may be a difficult area to navigate for some 
interviewers Fourth, the discussion of sensitive topics must be carefully navigated m 
group interviews Sometimes these can be difficult to discuss, while at other times some 
participants may be comfortable with their discussion m which case a greater 
understanding of the issue can be obtained by the researcher However, "group think" can 
be difficult to avoid in focus group interviews (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 55) 
There are however, several advantages to group interviews as well These include 
the fact that these kinds of interviews are "inexpensive, data rich, flexible, stimulating to 
respondents, recall aiding, cumulative, and elaborative" (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 55) 
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Below some of the issues that arise when using interviews as a method of data collection 
are discussed 
Issues of data interpretation 
Recently, postmodernists have begun to bring to the fore various problems related to 
interviewing First, is the task of asking questions cross-culturally Some questions are 
inappropriate depending on the cultural setting one finds oneself In their research on 
youth migration cross-culturally, researchers found that in Greece, Portugal and the U K, 
asking "young people why9 in response to questions was not 
considered problematic and [it] seemed an obvious question to ask" (Redmond, 2003, 
p 13) However, for researchers in Sweden, why9 was a problematic question because it 
was not seen as a "neutral form of inquiry, nor was it always polite" (Redmond, 2003, p 
13) Swedish researchers felt the use of the question why9 questioned the "legitimacy of 
the respondent's statement, [and instead they proposed asking] 'what are the reasons for 
this9 or 'tell me more'" (Redmond, 2003, p 14) Thus, this research demonstrates that 
concepts are not universal and that experiences may be different even if an event exists 
across cultures and societies Thus, when formulatmg questions researchers must keep in 
mind the use of neutral language 
The use of affective language also appears to have affected the responses Fletcher 
and Wemstein received to the question of whether or not genocide occurred in the former 
Yugoslavia in their study of the perceptions of Bosnian legal professional on the 
relationship between criminal trials and social reconstruction Participants were given a 
choice to say whether they considered the atrocities that occurred to be genocide or not 
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(Fletcher and Wemstein 2002 588-589) However, this question did not allow for other 
options of how individuals may characterize the violence There may have been 
individuals who, although they do not consider genocide to have occurred, do 
acknowledge that grave atrocities did occur Thus, using a term such as genocide, which 
evokes such strong emotions, may have been problematic 
Postmodernists also brought to light the issues of language and the use of 
translators in interviews Butler and Kapborg and Bertero all found language issues to be 
of concern in their research Since language is the way human beings organize their 
world, different languages present different realities, and cultural understanding is limited 
if one does not understand the language of the culture one is doing research in However, 
impossible it may be to sometimes avoid the use of translators, it must be noted that 
various problems arise with the use of interpreters in interviews First, "subtle differences 
in meaning are lost, [and second] some words cannot be translated into English because 
of cultural differences or non-equivalent words" (Kapborg & Bertero, 2002, p 52, Butler, 
1983, p 12) In their study of nursmg students in Lithuania, Kapborg and Bertero required 
translation from responses in Lithuanian into English and then further into Swedish They 
note that had they "been able to find an interpreter who was fluent in Swedish, the 
situation could have been better controlled, thus reducing the threat to validity With two, 
rather than three languages m translation, the potential loss of meamng would have been 
limited" (Kapborg & Bertero, 2002, p 55) They note that the use of translators limits the 
questioning style in that it is difficult to use appropnate probes, and it is difficult to assess 
how the translator interprets the interviewer's questions Additionally, "lack of familianty 
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with the language can affect the adequacy of a study, since the accuracy of the 
interpretations may be reduced" (Kapborg & Bertero, 2002, p 55) 
In his research on units of collective farming, Butler notes that when interviewing 
participants on a topic, it is best to phrase questions in the terminology used by the 
participants to describe the topic at hand However, this may present problems for 
translators because some of the terms used may not have equivalents in English or the 
participants' language since they may be specialized terms translators are not familiar 
with Additionally, translating may strain the translator's English (if this is the language 
they are translating to) Although Butler spoke Mandarin, he initially had trouble 
understanding the local accents, so translation into English was provided for him He 
notes that what he would have found more helpful "was to hear an explanation in 
standard Mandarin" (Butler, 1983, p 12), but as time wore on, his familiarity with the 
local accent increased and found that translation was no longer required 
As already mentioned, the discussion of sensitive topics can be quite difficult in 
interviews If research involves having participants discuss sensitive topics, the 
interviewer must work very hard to increase the comfort level of participants in the study 
If this is not ensured, great emotional distress can result Kagee, in his study of semi-
structured interviews with survivors of human nghts violations in South Africa notes that 
one participant refused to be interviewed because she would have found the re-telling of 
her experience too painful (Kagee, 2004, p 627) The danger of emotional distress 
stresses the importance of interviewers having proper training to conduct interviews on 
sensitive topics The participants comfort level raises the issue of interview location 
Where should the interview take place9 Kagee suggests that the venue where the 
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interview takes place should not be "ideologically loaded " Since he was interviewing 
former victims of human nghts abuse, he suggests that "if interviews had taken place in a 
clinic or hospital, this may have provided contextual cues as to the interest of the 
interviewer" (Kagee 2004 630) and ensured that the respondents provided answers they 
thought were sought by the interviewer To remedy this situation, Kagee agreed to 
conduct interviews in participant's homes or the home of a key person in the community 
Arendell also faced the issue of interview location, although for different reasons 
She was interviewing divorced fathers, and had to grapple with whether she should go to 
a stranger's home, especially since she was not informing anyone where she was going in 
order to maintain the confidentiality of her participants She avoided meeting men m their 
homes because "numerous men used the phrase 'your place or mine' implying a veiled 
analogy to arranging a time and place for a blind date and suggestmg a stance of 
informality "which she did not want (Arendell, 1997, p 349-350) She largely 
managed to meet men m more neutral places such as diners and only ended up meeting 
thirteen participants in their homes because it could not be avoided 
On this note, it is pertinent to discuss the issue of gender and interviewing 
Postmodernists have suggested "that gender filters knowledge [and] the interview takes 
place within the cultural boundaries of a paternalistic social system m which masculine 
identities are differed from feminine ones" (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 64) Arendell 
discusses this issue at length in her report of her research with divorced fathers in New 
York She found that gender hierarchies were maintained in her interviews In contrast to 
her interviews with divorced mothers in a separate study, she found that in her interviews 
with men, she was constantly questioned throughout the interview on a wide range of 
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topics Thus, not only was she interviewing the men, they were also interviewing her 
Additionally, they often gave her directions on matters such as where to place her tape 
recorder, how to operate it etc , and the men assigned her different identities throughout 
their interviews These ranged from being the representative object of anger where men 
would equate her being a woman with the woman they had been 'scorned' by, to being an 
'honorary male' with whom they shared then- anger, to being a social scientist, a parent or 
the "token caretaking woman" (Arendell, 1997, p 355-356) She often found it difficult 
to ensure boundaries were respected as she was sometimes asked out on dates by some of 
her participants, and some of them expressed familiarity by touching her Some of these 
physical gestures "conveyed messages of dominance supervisors tend to touch 
subordinates and men women rather than vice versa" as when many men touched her 
back or shoulders as if to guide her when walking (Arendell, 1997, p 361) Finally, she 
notes that she was unsure of whether she should have disclosed her feminist views to men 
who would often make disparaging remarks about women She decided that since she 
was not carrying out a feminist study per se, she would only disclose her views when 
asked 
The power dynamics present in an interview setting are also highlighted as 
problematic by post-modernists For example, often interviews have a hierarchical 
dynamic to them, whereby the interviewer has more power than the participants being 
interviewed do (Fontana & Frey 1998, p 64) This hierarchical relationship was reflected 
in Arendell's work when men assumed a dominant position to her However, this 
dynamic may be reversed m the case of students interviewing experts or academics that 
may have more information and power than students doing the interviews may In an 
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attempt to "minimize status differences," it has been suggested that a closer relationship 
between the interviewer and the interviewee be allowed 
There is also the issue of reflexivity, the idea that the researcher has influence on 
the study in terms of "methods of data collection and techniques of conducting 
interviews" (Fontana & Frey, 1998, p 62) Arendell (1997, p 342) suggests that 
researchers must be self-aware of the baggage, I e personal history and identity that they 
bring to the interview To minimize the influence of the interviewer Fontana and Frey 
suggest that interviewers should report assumptions and biases in then" reports The 
researcher should also perform a self-review, that is a personal check for biases and 
assumptions, and report these when necessary 
Another very important issue is the clarity of the research objectives Since both 
parties, interviewers and interviewees, have expectations of the interview it is very 
important that researchers are clear about their research objectives Ambiguity about 
these objectives not only has ethical implications, but it leads to unrealistic expectations 
on the part of participants For example, in his study of textile and garment entrepreneurs 
in Zimbabwe, Jackson questioned participants on business policies, and found that his 
participants (textile and garment producers and informal sector traders) expected a 
presentation of results "which they did not get" This may have been a result of Jackson 
not making clear his research expectations and objectives to his participants (Jackson, 
2004, p 774) 
A further issue about interviews is samplmg Various samplmg strategies may be 
used to locate participants Some studies have used stratified random samples, some have 
used purposive sampling while others still have used snowball sampling The sampling 
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mechanism used will depend on the nature of the research question, but one should be 
careful that the sample size is not too small A small sample size prevents researchers 
from making large generalizations This was the case for a comparative study of truth 
commissions in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa The 
researchers wanted to gain insight into victim's perceptions of truth commission 
processes in the above-mentioned countries However, out of a sample (that was not pre-
selected) of 102 individuals only 82 interviews were conducted This size prevents 
generalizable conclusions, which is often one reason comparative studies are done Since 
the participants were not pre-selected, it was found that once interviews began, fifty per 
cent of those interviewed were unaware of the contents of the truth commission reports 
This is quite problematic for research that aims to compare and make general claims 
about victim's perceptions on the truth commissions in their respective countries Given 
the numbers of people in all these countries whose rights were violated, and who would 
be aware of the truth commission reports, the researchers could have increased their 
sample size m order to increase the validity of their results No reasons were given in the 
research report as to why such a small sample size was used (Cuevas, Rojas, & Baeza, 
2002, p 4) 
Another problem with sampling and obtaining interviewees is the method used to 
increase one's sample size Some researchers have used personal informants or contacts 
to obtain participants for their research For example, in his study of Chmese students, 
scholars and professionals leaving Chma, Zweig (1997) notes that he and his research 
team used Chinese contacts in various cities across the United States to gain access to 
students, scholars, and professionals of Chinese origin who left China to study or work 
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but then decided to stay in America However, the problem with using personal contacts 
or informants is that is some informants may have power over the participants s/he is 
trying to recruit and therefore, participants may feel forced or pressured to participate in 
the study, thereby affecting the kind of information that is received (Zweig 1997 110) 
Before offering a summary of the methods used for this research, the issue of 
conducting interviews in Latin America must briefly be mentioned Martz (1989) 
suggests that to get an interview m Latm America, a personal introduction is often 
absolutely necessary The access to individuals is also dependent on the information 
being sought, and how open or closed the society is Additionally, dependmg on the 
openness of society and how comfortable individuals may be with the subject matter at 
hand, the use of tape recorders may not be possible For example, in the 1970s and 1980s 
researchers in Latin America would have found that many "interviewees would have 
prohibited the use of such intimidating contraptions" (Martz, 1989, p 52) Thus, one 
must always be prepared to take copious notes 
Summary 
To gain an understanding of the effects of the truth and reconciliation commission in 
Chile, this research used secondary data—archival documents and literature review on 
truth commissions, and primary data—interviews with Chileans (human rights 
organizations, victims, lawyers, judges, military officials, academics, government 
officials and politicians) 
The advantage of secondary data in the form of archives was that it made possible 
this longitudinal retrospective study This data provided information about reactions of 
48 
vanous sectors to the TRC at the time of its release and was then used as a baseline from 
which to compare current perceptions and understandings of truth, justice and 
reconciliation that were obtained through primary research 
Primary research involved in-depth semi-structured individual interviews that 
lasted 45-60 min and allowed for open dialogue between the researcher and interviewees 
Interviews were chosen as a research method because it was thought the best method to 
obtain information on opinions and perceptions of the impact of the TRC as a tool of 
transitional justice 
The following chapter details the literature debates on TRCs 
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Chapter 4 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
In order to answer the question of this thesis, namely what were the effects of the TRC in 
Chile and was it successful in achieving its aims, it is necessary to have an understanding 
of the general goals TRCs hope to achieve Based on a review of the literature, these 
goals—truth, justice and reconciliation—and the debates surrounding them are defined 
and discussed in this chapter 
Truth commissions and truth 
To review, truth and reconciliation commissions are temporary bodies that investigate 
and report on periods and patterns of human rights violations Hayner considers only 
those commissions created or sanctioned by the state to be truth commissions, while 
others include non-state sanctioned commissions such as those started by church groups 
in their definition 
Aims of truth commissions 
Truth is a contested concept with multiple meanings and layers Truth telling in a 
transitional context is divided into a 'before' and 'after' the conflict The truth sought 
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builds on previous historical national narratives and allows societies to build a bridge 
between the past and the future It is held that an official truth process enables a shift to a 
democratic order from one where deception and repression are common (Teitel, 2000, p 
69-70) Teitel notes that truth is conditioned by the political and social circumstances of a 
country at the time that it is being sought (Teitel, 2002, p 256) and "in political contexts, 
truth is subject to ideological manipulation" (du Toit, 2000, p 132) Official truth is 
"politically established through public mechanisms" such as m a truth commission Its 
validity depends on "the level of legitimacy of the government" (Zamora, 2005, p 177) 
As a tool of transitional justice TRCs can reduce pressure on a political transition by 
meeting some of the demands victims and human rights organizations have for truth and 
justice (Center for Development Research, 2001, p i ) 
Furthermore, in a post-conflict society there is not one exclusive truth when 
referring to the experiences that people were subjected to There are official and 
unofficial truths, and the experiences of the victims, perpetrators, judges, and the press 
must all be dialogued with and respected (Sachs, 2002) 
Truth commissions are not in search of an absolute truth of the past They are an 
investigation into the past and so seek to establish a publicly arrived at conception of this 
past They do not engage a legal space like trials do but a social, political collective space 
and have brought to the collective space a discussion of "what constitutes truth?" They 
engage truth in both the ethical and political sphere and have expanded the notion of truth 
from philosophical, ethical and juridical conceptions to narrative, experiential, 
ontological and performative ones Though these conceptions of truth may converge, they 
also contest each other (Sachs, 2002, p 52-53) 
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With the above m mind, the South African TRC developed a typology of four 
kinds of truths that serve the function of truth telling Other researchers have also 
followed suit by using similar classifications 
Truth commissions establish "an accurate record of a country's past, clarify 
uncertain events and lift the lid of silence and denial from a contentious and painful 
penod of history" (Hayner, 2002, p 24-25, Nesiah, 2005, p 283, Achour, 2002) In this 
regard, they engage in what the South African TRC called factual, forensic or 
microscopic truths which are the empirical facts of the crimes that can be verified 
numbers of human rights violations, tortures, deaths, and disappearances, patterns of 
violence and who was killed, where, when, how and by whom"? (Crocker, 2000 p 100, 
Sachs, 2002, p 52-53) The state's actions, repressive structure, abuses by opposition 
groups and the chain of command responsible for the violence are revealed with this kind 
of truth Factual truths enable the pursuit of the other goals of transitional justice 
retributive justice if political will and evidence exist to pursue prosecutions, and 
reparations by the state to victims for their suffering (Crocker, 2000, p 100-101) 
Thomas Nagel distinguishes two senses of truth knowledge and 
acknowledgement By knowledge, Nagel refers to the forensic facts of the abuses the 
victims and perpetrators have already been aware of but may have been demed by the 
state and society, this refusal to acknowledge adds to the victimization, reaffirms the 
power of the perpetrators and permits impunity Acknowledgement is when the facts that 
have been known but denied are finally accepted officially Acknowledgement of the 
truth can have great significance for victims, especially in societies m which deception 
was central to the commission of crimes 
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The TRC setting is a space in which there is a power shift through the narrative 
underpinnings of the truth commission witnessing, testimony, memory and archivmg 
Power shifts from the torture center to a truth commission hearing, from the perpetrator 
who enforced silence to the victims who testify to foster public acknowledgement 
(Bester, 2002, p 167) The testimony offered in a truth commission setting is 
transformative stones of shame are dignified Recounting trauma allows it's 
'"integration into a coherent history of events allowing the person to feel the pain of the 
losses experienced [and] opens up the possibly for grief and mourning'" (Minow, 
1998, p 66) The TRC commissioners are called upon to be sympathetic witnesses to a 
crime (Minow, 1998, p 71-72) By focusing on victims, they recognize the citizenship 
that may have been denied to those subjected to abuses dunng a conflict or authoritanan 
regime (Achour, 2002, p 131) This recognition of those who have suffered is victim-
centered justice based on truth An acknowledgement of crimes and an apology 
especially from heads of states makes denial impossible, reaffirms the dignity of the 
victims, sends the message that impunity is unacceptable and helps decrease the number 
of lies circulated in the public discourse (Borraine, 2000) 
The epistemology of truth is related to the administrative structures, powers, and 
processes of the truth commissions Social consensus and public knowledge is built 
through a process of engaging victims and perpetrators (Teitel, 2000, p 81) It should be 
noted that the truth commission reports constituted pnmanly on victim testimony lack 
confrontation or challenge as a testimony m a tnal Efforts are made to ensure victims are 
listened to which is particularly important as they were silenced and their expenences 
demed by the previous regime Testifying is said to be a cathartic process 
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The second kind of truth that is revealed in a truth commission report allows for 
an inclusive remembering for the past It is what was called a social, dialogical or general 
truth by the South African TRC This is the "truth of experience" that is based on 
dialogue (Borraine, 2000, p 152) and because it is arrived at through public deliberation 
and debate, it may be contentious since it takes into consideration many points of view 
This "process is never ending, there [may not be a] finalized truth" (Sachs, 2002, p 52-
53) but ideally, it is one that allows a shared historical narrative to be created by and for 
the nation (Crocker, 2000, p 101) 
In a TRC report, victims' stones are connected so that a comprehensive account 
for the sake of history is established (Minow, 1998, p 60) Public hearings and the 
release of reports enables by-standers to become aware of, share in the acknowledgement 
and practice sympathetic listening This public broadcasting of testimony has the 
potential to create a shared experience and change society's relationship to the past 
Through establishment of an accurate record, it attempts to institutionalize and 
democratize memory Thus, "neither winners nor losers, neither perpetrators nor victors, 
have the final word The right to know about the conditions of life in the past is among 
the civil rights of a democracy" (Natua, 2002, p 337) 
The South African TRC was especially based on dialogue and this enabled it to 
examine the "social processes, and cultural and institutional systems responsible for the 
violations" committed under apartheid (Sachs, 2002, p 54) It is hoped that the airing of 
these social truths will create a collective memory that political and social actors will 
draw upon These shared truths that build collective memory are often constructed by 
cultural transmission based on a set of shared understandings which are often missing in 
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transitional situations Therefore, social consensus must be rebuilt and the past 
reconstructed Truth commissions are one mechanism of reconstructing these shared 
truths (Teitel, 2000, p 49, 70, Guttman & Thompson, 2000, p 33) 
The third kind of truths identified by the South African TRC are called personal 
and narrative or what others have called emotional and expenential truths These are 
stories that victims and perpetrators are invited to tell They often convey "the 
psychological and physical impact on victims and their loved ones of nghts abuses and 
the threat of such abuses" (Crocker, 2000, p 100) They are truths arrived at through 
experience, the "understanding gained from being inside and part of a phenomenon 
[requires the ability to examine one's] subjective expenence in a truly unprejudiced way" 
(Sachs, 2002, p 52-53) The purpose of these truths is to give voice to individual 
subjective expenences, and restore the memory and humanity of victims These stones 
are then communicated to the public via the release of the report and through the media 
Due to the public participation required in establishing this truth, TRCs can be 
said to have at least two narrators of truth the victims who tell their stones or the stones 
of their dead, tortured or disappeared relatives, and the truth commissioners, a group of 
prominent citizens chosen for their moral integnty, who contextualize and relay the 
victims' stones to the larger public and the state in the form of a truth commission report 
(Teitel, 2000, p 81) If, as in the case of South Africa, perpetrators come forward to 
testify, then they can also be considered narrators of truth With the exceptions of Brazil 
and South Africa, most truth commissions are based largely on victim testimony Thus, 
truth in a TRC is constructed on this basis 
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Further, where as trials focus on the acts of perpetrators, truth commissions focus 
on accounting victims' stories, thereby giving victims a public voice and allowing them 
to be heard and re-dignified formally (Crandall, 2004, p 1, Nesiah, 2005, p 283) This is 
different from how victims are given voice m a legal process Victim testimony in a trial 
is different because 
victims are interrupted, [while] in a truth commission, they are listened to 
respectfully Further when perpetrator testimonies are included in a truth 
commission the truth commission body attempts to listen to the perpetrators and 
understand why the crime was committed so that political and moral 
responsibilities can be assigned (Kiss, 2000, p 71) 
Fourthly, the South African TRC defined healing and restorative truths These 
kinds of truths are based on the notion that healing can only occur once knowledge is 
followed by acknowledgement and accountability (Borrame, 2000, p 152, Mmow, 1998, 
p 245-247) All these truths are intertwined to serve a particular purpose Through the 
spaces created for dialogue, TRCs aim to reduce social tensions arising from past 
violence It is argued that they may even foster reconciliation because victims need to 
know what happened before they can be asked to forgive and reconcile (Forsberg & 
Teivainen, 2004, p 9 -10, Kirtz, 1995, Borrame, 2000, p 151, Hayner, 2002 p 30) 
Many commentators have suggested that healing can begin when truth of an expenence is 
acknowledged and validated and people are allowed to speak it without shame (Mmow, 
1998, p 61) The idea is that once victims are allowed to "recover memories and to 
speak of atrocities" they can begin the process of dialogue, mourning, take action towards 
justice, and reconnect with others (Mmow, 1998, p 65) 
Through the airing of these kinds of truths, TRCs act as non-judicial mechanisms 
of justice and accountability Truth commissions are concerned with accountability in a 
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larger, collective sense, whereas trials and courts are concerned with individual 
responsibilities and proof of responsibilities Truth commission reports are based on the 
following kinds of evidence archives, documents, images, DNA (forensic evidence), and 
testimonies Testimonies are subjective experiences and witnesses are often required to 
corroborate other pieces of evidence As a witness, one can only speak to his/her own 
experience of reality and as such can never tell a complete truth However, if it is 
sufficient, evidence collected can be passed on to judicial courts if political will exists to 
hold trials for perpetrators For example, in Argentina the information from the truth 
commission report was used in the criminal proceedings of various military officers 
(Donghi, 1988, p 14-16, Forsberg & Teivainen, 2004, p 13) However, with some 
exceptions, more often than not, significant trials have not resulted from truth 
commissions and the contnbution to acknowledgement, punishment and justice has come 
in the form of TRCs that have named names of human rights abusers and 
recommendations that abusers be removed from public positions (Hayner, 2002, p 29) 
TRCs are said to have a preventive function as well They aim to prevent future 
abuses in two mam ways First, truth commission reports can evaluate institutional 
structures and laws that contributed to violence and recommend changes to these 
institutions and laws Second, these commissions can contribute to social pedagogy by 
presenting an accurate report of past or current violence with the hope "that a more 
knowledgeable citizenry will recognize and resist any sign of return to repressive rule" 
(Hayner 2001 29) 
However, the possibility also exists that in the process of truth-telling "too much" 
painful truth may be revealed which can make it difficult for members of opposing sides 
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to reconnected and therefore, may increase tensions and conflicts among society As a 
result of this possibility, some question the value of truth commissions 
Critiques of TRCs 
Several critiques are levied against truth- seeking and TRCs Some argue that truth 
commissions do not sufficiently recognize the complexity of the categonzation of victim, 
perpetrator and by-stander and the sometimes vague lines between them Minow has 
suggested that these groups "stand in different relationships to the underlying events and 
to the prospect of healing" (Minow, 1998, p 61) and it is difficult for a truth commission 
with a limited mandate to address all of these There is also a "systemic bias in who is 
willing to testify, who thinks his or her suffering is worthy, who is willing to come 
forward as a victim, [and] who is willing to accept responsibility as a perpetrator" 
(Minow, 1998, p 84) Furthermore, these categories are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive That is, individuals can crossover or occupy these varying categories (Nesiah, 
2005,p 282) 
In his discussion of the South African TRC, Mamdani suggests that the 
commission did not adequately identify victims and perpetrators because it focused on 
individual gross violations and political acts m the context of apartheid instead of treating 
apartheid "as the crime itself (Nagy, 2004, p 13) Apartheid is a crime against 
humanity but the TRC did not treat institutionalized racism as a gross violation, nor did 
the commission consider collective crimes (Nagy, 2004, p 13-14) Moreover, some 
people do not want to see themselves as victims so the truth commission's focus on 
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victim-hood may prevent them from participating in the process of truth-telling (Minow, 
1998, p 80) 
Additionally, not everyone will identify or be sympathetic with victims Some of 
those who supported oppressive regimes may feel that the victims were in fact terrorists 
and the punishments meted out to them by the regime were justified 
TRCs and particularly the South African one have been accused of forcing 
forgiveness and reconciliation onto victims due to the religious undertones in the 
language used by its chairperson Archbishop Desmond Tutu However, Minow argues 
that the "healmg sought by the TRC did not require apologies or forgiveness it seeks to 
establish a baselme of right and wrong to humanize the perpetrator " (Minow, 1998, p 
78) She suggests that there were three levels of operation with the South African TRC 
personal catharsis, moral reconstruction, and political consequences (prosecution, 
reparations, etc ) (Minow, 1998, p 79) 
Since the general assumption in the literature and m practice among victims and 
human rights activists is that retributive justice through prosecutions is the first best 
option, truth commissions are considered second best options in cases where tnals are not 
possible (Forsberg & Teivainen, 2004, p 17) However, another reason to pursue TRC 
maybe the "inherent limitations of trials" rather than an inability to conduct trials 
(Minow, 1998, p 58) In an examination of the South African TRC Llewellyn and Howse 
also suggest that the TRC was a first best option that "challenge[d] the conception of 
justice that underlies criminal tnals" and proposed restorative justice (Llewellyn & 
Howse, 1999, p 356) Retnbutive justice assumes that the cnme has disrupted a social 
equihbnum and that this equihbnum can only be restored by punishment, l e nghtmg 
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wrongs Llewellyn and Howse argue that this is "arbitrary and historically contingent 
[and it conflates the wrong] with notions of private vendetta and divine or poetic 
justice" (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 357) Restorative justice rebuilds social bonds, 
equally rebuild victim and perpetrator Strengths and weaknesses of the TRC must be 
examined from this perspective 
Another criticism of TRCs is that when they offer amnesty in exchange for 
securing more truth, they compromise justice For example, the South African TRC was 
seen exactly in this way '"the amnestied killer immediately walks free' while his victim 
must wait for decisions about reparations" (Minow, 1998, p 61) Yet, Mmow suggests 
that this may not entirely have been the case because even applications for amnesty had 
to wait to see if they were granted amnesty, some applications were rejected 
Yet, others have suggested that just like trials TRCs are another form of victor's 
justice Those who make this critique note that TRCs are used by victors to tell one side 
of a story, and that they are a compromise based on political interests present at the time 
of transition However, proponents of TRCs suggest that indeed, all TRCs "are founded 
on compromise" because victors realize they do not gain from a total victory and 
oppressors realize they have lost the war (Achour, 2002, p 133) The political interests in 
a truth commission are order and peace such that truth is "the instrument of politics" 
(Achour 133 2001) Truth paves the way for reconciliation, which is forward-looking 
Further, most examinations of the past are based on a sort of victor's justice According 
to Nauta, TRCs are not a form of victor's justice because people who benefited from the 
conflict or undemocratic regime are not harmed by the truth commission or its work 
(Natua, 2002, p 336) 
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Proponents of truth commissions emphasize the healing power of telling one's 
story and suggest that truth is important to remember because amnesia allows social 
wounds to fester when they are not addressed Amnesia enables distrust, distortion and 
disinformation, which were the norms under the repressive outgoing regime Yet, others 
advocate forgetting or putting aside the past because it "can become an indulgence, an 
obsession and play [ ] into what Breytenbach has called our 'scab-picking curiosity'" 
(Breytenbach qtd in Kiss, 2000, p 71-72, Elon in Kiss, 2000, p 71) 
Additionally, although it has been suggested that truth is a means in and of itself, 
some scholars have questioned the aforementioned functions of truth (healing, 
prevention, bridge between past and present) Scholars like Nietzsche, for example, 
asked whether truth and truth-seeking contributes to our well-being at all It would be a 
"mistake to assume that participation in the victims' hearings of the truth and 
reconciliation commission could somehow guarantee the personal healing of traumas due 
to the human rights violations concerned" (du Toit, 2000, p 134) There are also 
problems with the psychological and medical metaphors, which are not part of legal 
Oustice seeking) language, that are applied to societies For example, injustices are called 
'wounds' that can fester in society if left untreated and can poison society and truth is the 
healing mechanism It is assumed that individual cycles of healing can be applied to 
political and social life on a collective, national scale, yet little evidence appears to exist 
for the basis of this assumption 
Moreover, some have noted that we must be careful to overemphasize the 
"therapeutic" role of hearing stones because this "does a disservice to survivors who 
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regard themselves not as patients m need of healing but as citizens entitled to justice" 
(Kiss, 2000, p 72) 
Perhaps one of the reasons psychoanalytical and medical metaphors are applied to 
societies is because psychoanalysis supports the "emancipatory power of bring the 
repressed truth to the open Once truth is revealed and acknowledged, its subversive 
dysfunctional role is supposed to stop" (Margaht, 2002, p 61) Margalit notes that the 
South African TRCs divisions of truth are "unfortunate" and "clutter the notion of 
truth relativiz[rng] it beyond recognition" (Margaht, 2002, p 62) He is critical of the 
TRC process, noting that in its attempts to reenact that past, it forced victims to relive a 
humiliating past, thereby renewing their humiliation which seemed to undermine the goal 
of healing On the other hand, he says that victims have a need "for their suffering to be 
recognized" and that recognizing their suffering affirms their humanity (Margaht, 2002, 
p 64) The challenge for post-conflict societies is to establish "the proper balance 
between remembering and forgetting " (Simeon, 2002, p 147) 
The preventative function of truth is debatable There are plenty of historical 
examples to show that even when human beings know better, they do not necessarily do 
better Buden suggests that the problem is not that we do not know enough, but that "our 
knowledge has no political consequences the common belief that truth can liberate 
people from the chams of political manipulation is misleading" (Buden, 2002, p 69-
70) The idea that people will choose differently once they know the truth is an illusion, 
one that allows "a kind of political 'restart' once a democratic system crashes" (Buden, 
2002, p 70), "We the people" become "we the innocent victims" of a system There is an 
assumption that people have not made choices to that enabled their participation in 
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undemocratic regimes Once the system crashes people are turned into innocent victims 
and assumed to be passive entities, and once the call for democracy is re-instated these 
innocent victims are "recast m the role of an agent of democratic change" (Buden, 2002, 
p 71) The fantasy of innocence feeds the idea that socio-political conflict in society can 
be reduced to a dichotomy between victims and perpetrators and the social space in 
which to resolve this conflict is the court room and not the political arena Buden 
suggests that in this regard, "the truth of social antagonism no longer emerges out of 
collective political action but rather through a juridical procedure along the relation 
between victims and perpetrators It is a juridical truth not a political one" (Buden, 2002, 
p 71) These juridical truths do not address the complex relations of power and 
domination in society Tribunals and courts establish individual responsibilities, but they 
do not allow for the establishment of political responsibilities 
Further, in politics, the ends justify the means and this may include sacrificing the 
truth Truth can be manipulated, contradicted, silenced and masked, and for this reason 
sometimes it is better not to tell the truth Further, not all truths are public because they 
may conflict with collective interests or the social order 
While, Minow does not embrace the idea that there can be too much truth or 
memory because "'truth' can never be full enough or sufficiently embracing enough, to 
connect profoundly different perceptions of what happened" (Mmow, 1998, p 62), 
others have suggested that seeking absolute truth is dangerous Once the truth of what 
really happened is revealed further conflicts may be aggravated by people taking revenge 
into their own hands, thereby blurring distinctions between retribution and revenge 
(vengeance) It has been argued that just as a lack of truth can cause distrust and 
63 
polarization so can "excessive truth" so much so that Ariel Dorfman, suggests that 
"people can die from an excessive dose of truth " (Nesiah, 2005, p 271) The polarization 
caused by excessive revelation of the truth may even lead to more violence and 
authontananism Seeking truth can also be dangerous, the spreading of "truth" has often 
set the stage for violent conflicts to occur 
On the other hand, Hannah Arendt has noted that "a deliberate denial of factual 
truths is an inherent part of political activity the political truth of some histoncal event 
can only be grasped if the people involved in it have been recognized as political 
beings " (Buden, 2002, p 72) Buden argues that in societies that have suffered a de-
pohticization, truth and reconciliation is not what is needed What these societies need 
instead is re-politicization that goes beyond ethnic, cultural and religious identities that 
can build bndges "No reconciliation, however deep and thorough, can do that instead 
For every reconciliation is finally reconciliation with the status quo, with the existing 
power relations " (Buden, 2002, p 78) 
Finally, there is the question of who owns the truth once it is exposed Knowledge 
has power and can be use as a form of control Information for TRCs may come from 
many sources, including secret files kept by a repressive state These present dilemmas 
for victims and states—what do states do with old files, destroy, keep or release them9 
Some argue that "if repression depended on secrecy, justice depended on exposure" 
(Teitel, 2000, p 97) However, releasing old secunty files has consequences For 
example, in East Germany there was pressure to open the Stasi Files, about six million 
files and 18 million citizens of which over one third were subjected to surveillance The 
files were opened but it was not necessanly good for victims to find out who (family, 
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friends, bosses) spied on them Moreover, the state still had ownership of the files so even 
victims had limited access to them The files also implicated may political actors and the 
security forces, so they were used in purges to the public administration The Stasi Files 
raise the following questions who do secret surveillance files belong to—the state or the 
victims who were spied upon7 Who should have access to these files and for how long7 
How long the files should be kept for7 Should they be destroyed7 What are the 
implications of destroying files7 (Teitel, 2000, p 98) 
Summary 
Truth in a transitional setting has many layers, meanings and functions Truth 
commissions have expanded the notion of truth from an ethical, moral and factual 
conception to one that embraces political and narrative or experiential conceptions 
Through the airing of these narrative truths TRCs aim to create an officially sanctioned 
version of the events that occurred under the prior regime to a) create a boundary 
between the old regime and the new democratic one, b) create a shared collective 
memory and history, c) prevent future crimes with the hope that once people are aware of 
the crimes under the previous regime and how they were committed, that they will never 
again embark on the same path again, and d) allow victims to have a voice, re-dignify 
them and acknowledge their pam so that reconciliation and healing can occur 
However, these functions and aims are not without debate Not only have some 
questioned the preventive function of TRC, it has also been suggested the truth 
commissions do not sufficiently recognize the complexity of categorizing victims, 
perpetrators, by-standers and benefactors of violence and that they have a tendency to 
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force forgiveness and reconciliation on to victims who may not be willing or ready to do 
either 
Additionally, the healing function of TRCs is questioned there is an assumption 
by proponents of truth commissions that individual models of psychological healing will 
apply to the collective political sphere and so much of the language associated with truth-
telling uses medical and psychological metaphors There is little empirical evidence to 
support the assumption that participation in a TRC actually leads to individual healmg 
Some have questioned whether post-conflict societies should even embrace truth-telling 
projects so soon after the end of a conflict They suggest that a little amnesia might be 
necessary in order for society to move forward 
Finally, while some suggest that TRCs are a form of victor's justice, others note 
that they compromise justice by offering amnesty and in fact may even be second best 
options to pursue justice in societies where judicial systems are not able to offer 
traditional legal justice 
Justice 
The most common understanding of justice is a retnbutive conception However, just like 
truth, justice has multiple notions and sources that include state law and community 
traditions, and there is a debate over the reach of the law versus the demands of justice 
Due to their focus on restorative justice, truth commissions do not offer 
retnbutive justice and do not address the question of what a society's expectations of 
justice are These may differ cross-culturally so it is important to establish what they are 
before a prescnptive model of truth commissions as a tool of post-conflict reconstruction 
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is used (Fletcher & Weinstem, 2002, p 584) Howard Zehr outlines three aspects of 
justice revenge, retribution and restoration "Criminal justice tends to be punitive, 
conflictual, impersonal and state centered It encourages the denial of responsibility and 
empathy on the part of offenders" (Zehr, 2001, p 330-331) "Restorative justice assumes 
that justice can and should promote healing, both individual and societal" (Zehr, 2001, p 
330-331) Despite these differentiations, it is generally assumed in human rights 
discourse that some form of punishment, (whether it be trials, naming perpetrators in the 
truth commission report, removal of human rights abusers from power and prohibited 
access to public posts, etc ) is deemed to be important because it serves as "public 
acknowledgement" that victims were not responsible for the abuses and suffering 
endured Holding perpetrators accountable in such a manner can have deep psychological 
effects that may foster healing (Fletcher & Weinstem, 2002, p 593, (Rotbert, 2000, p 7) 
As it is relevant to truth commissions, the debate in transitional justice has been 
whether to punish outgoing regime members and other perpetrators or grant them 
amnesty The prevailing thought is that retributive justice is necessary in the transition to 
democracy (Teitel, 2000, p 6) Punishment can be seen either as a "backward-looking 
exercise m retribution or an expression of the renewal of the rule of law" (Teitel, 2000, p 
27) Additionally when a society decides that it wants to pursue punishment, it must also 
address questions of responsibility Who should be held responsible for the past 
repression and to what degree is this responsibility attributed to the individual verses 
collective society, particularly when the law itself can only be applied to individuals and 
not collective entities7 
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The tension that TRCs create between truth and justice is hotly debated It has 
been suggested that truth commissions weaken the prospects for justice (especially if 
justice is expected m its retributive form) Often accountability of low level military or 
paramilitary operatives is addressed, but those who gave orders to kill are not punished 
for their crimes 
Truth commissions also create a tension between retributive and restorative types 
of justice Retributive models of justice suggest that perpetrators of human rights 
violations must be punished so that others are deterred from acting in the same horrific 
manner The model of restorative justice on the other hand emphasizes that truth telling is 
a form of justice in itself The purpose here will be to provide a brief evolution of the 
thinking and debates on justice as they pertain to truth commissions These debates center 
around the question of "what should a society do with those who break the law" or 
commit "heinous cnmes"7 Additionally, do those who suffered as a result of these cnmes 
deserve compensation7 (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 4) 
In the following paragraphs, retributive justice will be discussed followed by the 
notions of limited criminal sanction and amnesty in times of transition Then reparatory 
justice and restorative justice debates are outlined followed by a short summary of 
concepts discussed thus far 
Retributive justice 
The onginal meanings of justice date back to the Old Testament, Homer's Iliad and 
Hammurabi's legal code The meaning of justice found in these texts is one which is tied 
to punishment and retnbution—'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth ' These texts 
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explicate a notion of justice that attempts to limit vengeance and retribution to "measure 
for measure" such that only the perpetrator of the crime is harmed and not "his or her 
entire family, tribe or city" as in the Iliad (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 13) Jewish and 
Chnstian notions of revenge and atonement still inform popular understandings of justice 
Christian thought has particularly, influenced the legal tradition Saint Anselm, a 
Christian, asked "how to respond to repetitive manifestations of incurable evil" (Villa-
Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 168) In Christianity, human sin is avenged by punishment 
through God Martin Luther wrote that rulers had to "carry out their duty as 'God's 
hangmen'" over the rebellious peasantry (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 168) Revenge is 
a way to respond to evil and God is constructed as an entity that will not '"forgo his 
wrath till he has received at least an adequate great equivalent'" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-
2000, p 169-170) The Church allowed and often urged "the state to deal with crime in a 
harsh and retributive manner, [while it] reserved compassion for individual relations 
and the private response of victim to perpetrator" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 170) 
Did this reduce or shrink the public space for political forgiveness'? It resulted m two 
worlds the spmtual private world of the church and the real (harsh) world of politics and 
revenge" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 170) The South African TRC attempted to 
"reunite these two worlds" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 170) 
Pnmo Levi has said that "evil of an 'incurable nature'" is "an endemic human 
reality" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 171) One argument holds that moral 
condemnation and punishment is "the only appropriate response to criminal behavior" 
(Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 171) Jean Hampton notes that punishment "provides a 
necessary expression of moral outrage in the face of repeated gross violations of human 
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rights, crimes against humanity, and genocide, evil that can perhaps only be appropriately 
responded to by an authoritative retributive stance" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 71) 
Punishment is an expected part of justice (Teitel, 2000, p 27), it raises debates 
and tough questions for transitional societies Some argue that punishment is a backward-
looking exercise while for others it is "an expression of the renewal of the rule of law" 
(Teitel, 2000, p 27) Additionally, how are responsibilities to be assigned and divided 
among the regime, the individual, and the collective7 What legal order should be used, 
military or civilian if crimes have been committed by the armed forces7 A review of 
transitional societies shows that punishment is in fact rare, especially soon after a 
transition has occurred (Teitel, 2000, p 28) 
What does punishment mean to society and why should post-conflict societies 
undertake punishment7 There are several arguments for pursuing punishment Following 
the literature, these have been organized into seven categories Retribution, deterrence, 
victim's rights, social pedagogy, an end to impunity, punishment as a forward looking 
exercise and the obligation of states to punish 
Retribution 
The retributive argument simply holds that wrongs committed must have the 
consequence of punishment (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 7) Carlos Nino notes that human 
autonomy and social responsibility should be a part of justice Human autonomy means 
that people must take responsibility for their actions, "either contribute to the common 
good or accept the consequences of failing to do so" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 172) 
Retribution is an opportunity to uphold the moral consensus and moral order established 
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by society through a democratic process Perpetrators have a moral responsibility and 
retribution "affirms the individual autonomy and responsibility of the perpetrator as an 
agent of the common good" (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 175) The argument for 
retribution holds that breaking the law is a demonstration of disrespect for the rule of law 
and so any violation, no matter how minor, requires punishment Abuses of the law are 
unacceptable and in this view, the crime itself is secondary to the action of violating the 
law As a result, "punishment represents the sanctions that the state applies to uphold its 
own authority" (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 241) Selective prosecutions are 
unacceptable and the punishment must fit the crime 
However, there are problems with this approach It is not always possible to 
punish all the perpetrators who committed crimes Some may be blamed while others 
remain "untouched and by implication innocent" (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 8) A purely 
retributivist approach may also create divisions to perpetuate an '"us vs them thinking ' 
all the blame is put on a select few who are punished, the rest go free and the justice 
system remains suspect" (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 8) Punishment can also provoke 
reactions from out-gomg regime members that may affect how new democracies are able 
to function (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 8) 
Deterrence 
Deterrence argues that punishment is necessary because a "failure to punish mvites 
repetition" (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 7, Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002, p 591) Ifcnmesare 
punished future crimes will be deterred, human nghts, law, and the democratic process 
will be reinforced Punishment sends a message if wrong-doers know they will be 
71 
punished, they are less likely to engage in criminal activity Without punishment, "rule of 
law values" are jeopardized The purpose of punishment is to ensure that the criminal, 
once having suffered the consequences of his or her actions will no longer have the desire 
to commit a similar crime The problem with deterrence, however is that it rests on "the 
assumption that the perpetrator knew or believed her/himself to be wrong " (Lekha 
Snram, 2004, p 8) Many of those mvolved m 'dirty wars' believe that the actions they 
took were nght and justified and they "see such punishments as unjustifiable or simply as 
punishment of behaviour not analogous to their own" (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 9) 
The literature makes distinction between punishment as having retnbutive effects 
and punishment as having deterrence or reformative effects Kant argues that justice 
cannot be bartered away, punishment is necessary and it must have retnbutive effects 
Detenence should "not be confused with punishment" (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 
241) This idea of punishment as retnbution is distinguished from vengeance, which is a 
personal emotion, while "retnbution is dictated by reason and by the law or the court" 
(Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 251) and must operate on the "principle of equality" 
(Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 251) That is, it entails "that the punishment inflicted 
should be the equivalent of the nature and severity of the crime" (Solomon & Murphy, 
1990, p 251) Kant holds that societies must punish to ensure individual accountability 
and to ensure that guilt is not made collective The failure to punish leads to ongoing 
collective responsibility He also "distinguishes injury to society as opposed to injury to 
an individual" (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 255) and notes that it is injury to society 
that deserves punishment 
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Hegel also distinguishes injury to society vs injury to an individual and agrees 
that it is injury to society requires punishment He "accepts retribution and 
'measurement' in terms of both quantity and quality but the danger to society is the 
primary concern" (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 255) Punishment does not necessarily 
always fit the crime because "the seriousness of the injury to the person may have little 
relationship to the threat to society" (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 255) He gives 
recognition to the significance of revenge but does not defend or justify it (Solomon & 
Murphy, 1990, p 255) "Retribution takes on 'objective' form of the law and recognizes 
itself as not merely personal but as a function of 'the mjured universal' to the threatened 
society" (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 255) Punishment erases the crime because it 
allows the criminal to reconcile with himself Thus, it benefits the criminal 
For Camus, retribution, particularly in the form of a death penalty is 
demoralizing, arouses the impulse to murder, it is revenge based on the law of retaliation, 
a violent emotion and not a principle (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 285) It is related to 
nature and instinct, not law Law is not intended to mutate or reproduce that nature, it is 
intended to correct it, and the death penalty, instead of being an act of deterrence, is an 
example of premeditated murder 
Robert Nozick attempts to differentiate more clearly the differences between 
retnbution and revenge He separates revenge from retribution by noting that retnbution 
is essential to justice while revenge is a passionate emotion and an instinct that cannot be 
associated with justice Additionally retnbution is meted out for a wrong and not simply 
for personal harm, it does not need to have a personal connection to the victim or wrong-
doing and "requires stnct limits to punishment while revenge 'by its nature need set no 
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limits, although the revenger may limit what he inflicts for external reasons'" (Solomon 
& Murphy, 1990, p 281) He veils the distinction between punishment and deterrence by 
suggesting that retribution has a communicative function to criminals and others that 
communicates the wrongness of the act It is hoped that through this message there will 
be some moral reform of the offender such that he or she will recognize the wrongness of 
the act and not repeat it 
Victim's rights 
The arm of punishment is also to respond to and decrease the victim's suffering, and to 
re-assert their human worth (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 9, Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 
174) The idea is to make victims feel a part of society once agam, contribute to the 
reintegration and reestabhshment of citizenship, restore victim's dignity, allow them to 
tell their own stories, and have them know that their rights are acknowledged It has been 
suggested that for some victims public disclosure of the identities of perpetrators is a 
form of justice It prevents a disregard and downplaying of the victim's suffering, and 
gives victim back his/her equality in society (Villa-Vecencio, 1999-2000, p 175) To 
preserve the human dignity of the victim, retribution must transcend a malicious desire to 
cause suffering to perpetrators and must defend the moral truth 
Social pedagogy 
Those who argue for the social pedagogical effects of punishment note that punishment 
re-establishes the "rule of law and faith in the legitimacy of the [incoming] regime 
through public accountability " (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 9) In this case, punishment 
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responds to social needs Society needs to learn the events of the past through trials or 
truth commission, which "foster a discussion and force [ ] society to face its recent 
past" (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 10) 
Enforce the rule of law and end impunity 
This argument for punishment suggests that because of the conditions of lawlessness 
under the pnor regime, impunity must be prevented, thus, the new regime is under greater 
pressure to ensure accountability through prosecutions Impunity encourages other 
human rights crimes, and "gives rise to frustrations and anguish which may result in 
renewed cycles of violence" (Othman, 2005, p 254) The law simply must be restored in 
a society recovering from mass violence Additionally, prosecutions "strengthen fragile 
democracies" (Huyse, 2001, p 324-327) 
Punishment as a forward looking exercise 
Another argument for punishment suggests that societies must punish crimes because 
punishment contributes to the social good It "lay [s] the basis of a new liberal order" 
(Teitel, 2000, p 28) That is, it is important for a state's political identity as one that is 
advancing towards democracy to establish a new political order in which the state follows 
the rule of law (Teitel, 2000, p 29) Public accountability helps break "the myths of the 
old regime" (Walzer qtd in Teitel, 2000, p 29) and this kind of law allows a normative 
shift to occur from tyrannous to democratic state identity 
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Duty to punish 
Finally, some suggest that punishment must be pursued because states are often directly 
or indirectly (through silent consent given to public and private actors, perpetrators) 
involved in violence, therefore it is the state's duty to punish and right its wrongs (Teitel, 
2000, p 28, Othman, 2005, p 250) In this way, punishment can allow the state to rectify 
its past wrongs Additionally, several international agreements exist that deplore human 
rights violations and require that they be pumshed3 
Limited criminal sanction 
Given the problems with prosecution in a transitional justice setting, punishment must be 
re-theonzed Investigations are often met with few prosecutions and penalties In 
transitional environments normal understandings of punishment do not apply or are at 
least detached from the crimes Thus, in transitions there is often limited criminal 
sanction This is a kind of prosecution that does "not necessarily culminate in full 
punishment Investigations may or may not lead to indictments" (Teitel, 2000, p 47) 
This has been illustrated in many cases some cases in WWI and WWII, tnals in Southern 
Europe after military dictatorships, tnals of Latin American soldiers and generals, Africa 
3 The duty to punish is established in the following international agreements 
UN Charter, UN Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2 of International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, Geneva Conventions 1945 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 3 - 4 of the Geneva 
Conventions, Protocol II, Article 4 of Statute of ICTR, Jurisprudence of both ICTR and ICTY, Art (2) (e) 
of ICC Statute, Art I and 6 of Genocide Convention, ICJ in the case concerning the Application of the 
Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Cranes of Genocide, Article 2 and 7(1) of the UN 
Convention Agamst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, Preamble of Rome 
Statute of ICC which states that cranes against humanity should not go unpunished and it is the "duty of 
every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes" (Othman, 
2005, p 251-253) Others include International human rights and conventions Nuremberg Precedents, 
Genocide Convention, Hague Convention, Geneva Convention, 1977 Protocols (x2), International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (1992), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1996) (Mmow, 1998, p 34) 
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and Central Europe Sentences of generals and leaders are often commuted In Argentina 
for example, the generals of the Junta were sentenced and then pardoned by the President, 
followed by legislative acts which limited jurisdiction and enforced blanket amnesties 
(Teitel, 2000, p 48) In Chile, military officers were exempt from prosecution if they 
cooperated m the investigations of crimes under the dictatorship 
In fragile peace situations, limited criminal sanction has to be applied carefully 
because it has consequences If it is seen as too adversarial, it may set off a new round of 
violence This type of sanction serves an epistemic function It allows the investigation of 
a crime, the establishment that it happened and its condemnation but not necessarily full 
punishment It enables the construction of a shared past and though it is not a full 
sanction, limited criminal sanction operates on the idea that wrong-doing will still be 
denounced (Teitel, 2000, p 50) 
Punishment does not always have to mean a prison sentence—symbolic 
punishment has also been employed In transition, there is often symbolic punishment 
where wrong doing and perpetrators are stigmatized in ways such as, disqualifying them 
from public life, public positions, etc The symbolic punishment "relegates [past wrongs] 
to a predecessor regime" (Teitel, 2000, p 50), yet for some, limited penalties "suggest 
[ ] an implied recognition of a diminished blameworthiness" (Teitel, 2000, p ) 
Since transitional justice in the form of retribution through the avenue of trials is 
fraught with such problems, amnesties have been considered and quite often implemented 
as another mechanism of transitional justice 
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Amnesty 
Most transitioning regimes that have adopted a truth commission have also implemented 
some kind of amnesties for outgoing regimes and their members These amnesties come 
in various forms Blanket amnesties are unrestricted pardons that the outgoing regime 
may have awarded itself before the transition was allowed These amnesties are often part 
of transitions in which the outgoing regime is relatively strong and can afford to stop the 
transition if blanket amnesties are not agreed upon Restricted amnesties, on the other 
hand, offer immunity from prosecution for certain categories of crimes or from crimes 
committed withm a particular time period (Huyse, 2001, p 322-323) In South Africa, 
amnesty was offered to perpetrators for only political crimes, while in Chile the Pmochet 
regime granted members blanket amnesty from prosecution from crimes committed 
between 1974 and 1978, the most violent period under the Pinochet's rule 
It is not always feasible to punish all wrong-doers because there are so many The 
legal system may not be able to handle many cases or may be corrupt To avoid over-
burdening the legal system some perpetrators may be amnestied Moreover, pursuing all 
violators could create instability Latm Amencan presidents have often been all too aware 
of this fact As the Guatemalan President said m 1985, '"we're not going to be able to 
investigate the past We would have to put the entire army m jail'" (qtd in Lekha Snram, 
2004,p 11) 
In many emerging democracies, justice is scarified for peace Leaders in these 
democracies have argued that forgiveness is a necessary part of healing and that in post-
conflict contexts that are already highly divisive, prosecutions further advance this 
divisiveness When past regime members threaten retribution, amnesty might be the best 
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option New democracies might be fragile and a rebellious or resistive military might end 
the transition to democracy if prosecutions are pursued 
Sometimes even selective prosecutions can create problems as they did in 
Argentina, where they "split the military, and it generated further resentment against the 
military regime Many saw the strategy as mere scape-goating and the authority of the 
judicial system was undermined the courts were seen as an instrument of revenge rather 
than justice" (Lekha Snram, 2004, p 11) Amnesties are a tradeoff between political 
stability and prosecution That is, if the old regime members are given amnesty from 
prosecution, they will not oppose the new regime and may even offer limited support for 
it Thus, amnesty is pursued in the name of social peace 
However, it is argued that amnesties undermine and limit retributive justice that is 
important as redress for victims (Othman, 2005, p 256) In fact, a variety of international 
legal instruments oppose blanket amnesties A UN ECOSOC Resolution 1985/65, 
endorsed by the General Assembly is clearly opposed to granting amnesty to human 
rights violators Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee adopted General 
Comment 20 m the same vein, suggesting that it is the duty of states to investigate and 
prosecute acts of torture and grave human rights abuses Amnesties are viewed by critics 
as a "license to perpetuate the cycle of impunity and violence " (Rahman-Lamm, 2003) 
299-301) The Inter-American Commission has also "held that amnesties for grave 
human rights actions violated state duties under the American Convention on human 
rights to protect and ensure human rights as well as the victim's right to seek justice" 
(Teitel, 2000, p 55) Some authors have suggested that immunity from crimes suggests 
on-going collective social responsibility for crimes This failure to hold perpetrators 
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accountable may affect the legitimacy of the democratic order and its institutions such as 
the rule of law (Teitel, 2000, p 55) 
There are some crimes that cannot be pardoned by amnesty The prosecution of 
crimes against humanity has been ratified by the European Convention for Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 7(2)), which makes crimes against 
humanity exempt from retroactivity constraints that normally apply to criminal judgment 
(Teitel, 2000, p 61) Crimes against humanity do not have time limits on their 
prosecutions The UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity has noted that disqualifying crimes against 
humanity from statutory limits is justified because of the "'atrocity' of these crimes" 
(Teitel, 2000, p 64) 
Another reason that amnesty is implemented is for reconciliation Nagy argues 
that amnesty has been drawn "into the reach of [truth,] justice and reconciliation" where 
as it is traditionally associated with impunity (Nagy, 2004, p 1-2) However, other 
scholars have established that amnesty has been associated with reconciliation since 
ancient Greece, when the democrats offered pardon and banishment to those who 
collaborated with the oligarchs, so that Greek society could move forward in social 
harmony (Elster 2004) However, in the modern period, amnesty for reconciliation is 
criticized by victims and supporters of human rights because this claim is often made by 
former regime members who want impunity Laws of national reconciliation end up 
being amnesty laws Still, some argue that forgiveness is a necessary part of healing and 
that in post-conflict contexts that are already highly divisive, prosecutions further 
advance this divisiveness Thus, those who support such laws of reconciliation argue that 
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amnesty is a good option that allows societies to focus on the future instead of the past 
(Lekha Snram, 2004, p 11) 
It has also been suggested, especially m the literature on the South African TRC 
that without amnesties, perpetrators would not come forward and tell their side of the 
story, thereby limiting the kinds of truth a commission would be able to achieve Thus, 
truth commissions can offer amnesty exchange for testimony The South African 
Commission offered amnesty from prosecution to perpetrators in exchange for the full 
disclosure of the truth that would lead to healing for victims and reconciliation between 
opposing sides of society Nagy argues that the "grant of amnesty [did not] produce 
sufficient 'truth' for understanding and overcoming the violence of the past " (Nagy, 
2004, p 3) In fact, "the amnesty process produced a truncated 'truth' about apartheid 
violence that was insufficient to the task of overcoming the past" (Nagy, 2004, p 1-2) 
Nonetheless, because amnesties prevent and limit prosecutions, truth commissions search 
for alternative forms of justice (Huyse, 2001, p 323-327) These are reparatory and 
restorative justice 
Restorative justice 
Several proponents of truth commissions suggest that truth telling is a particular kind of 
justice in itself Others suggest that truth is "a prelude to another kind of justice" (Teitel, 
2000, p 81) This kind of justice is restorative justice In contrast to scholars of 
retributive justice, scholars of restorative justice suggest that this type of community 
justice dates back further than models of retributive justice as community dispute 
resolution mechamsms (Strickland 2004 2-3, Llewellyn and Howse 2002) Conceptions 
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of justice that may be considered a prelude to restorative justice include those dating back 
to Socrates, Jesus and the New Testament Socratic conceptions of justice and Jesus' 
teachings in the New Testament marked a shift in the thinking on retributive justice 
These two thinkers attempted to infuse conceptions of mercy and virtue into the 
retributive notions of punishment (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 4, 13, 241-42) 
Additionally, Nietzsche defends justice as a noble ideal and extols the idea of 
'forgiving and forgetting' as a strength His 
idea is that one should be so self-sufficient and satisfied with one's life that one 
just doesn't worry about the petty injuries inflicted by others The noble person 
does not reject revenge or retribution as wrong, but rather as unnecessary, as 
'beneath' his or her dignity (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 261) 
For Nietzsche, 
justice is 'a stronger power seeking a means of putting an end to the senseless 
raging or ressentiment among the weaker powers —partly by taking the object of 
ressentiment out of the hands of revenge, partly by substituting for revenge the 
struggle against the enemies of peace and order (Solomon & Murphy, 1990, p 
261) 
However, the term restorative justice first gained use in the 1970s It is a land of 
justice that arms to "repair harm that a cnmmal offense inflicts on victims, that offenders 
and communities" (Strickland, 2004, p i ) Restorative justice is concerned not with 
punishing but with correcting imbalances and restoring fractured relationship with both 
individual and societal healing and harmony In order to "repair the harm [caused by] the 
crime and prevent future harm," this kind of justice requires cooperation and dialogue 
between all parties to a crime, perpetrators, victims and communities Crime is 
contextuahzed "in a broader context" and its effects on all stakeholders is examined 
(Stnckland, 2004, p 2-3, Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 372) Further, this land of justice 
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aims to empower people by involving them in seeking solutions instead of leaving the 
solutions to the government Success is measured not by the numbers of wrongdoers 
incarcerated but by the quality of repair the process is able to accomplish to relationships 
There is a concern with restoring the "equilibrium that has been disturbed by a wrongful 
act" (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 373) 
For restorative justice equality is defined as "social equality between victim and 
perpetrator as members of society" (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 374) Crime is 
understood as an attack on "the status of the victim as an equal member of society" 
(Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 374) Punishment does not make "the perpetrator equal 
with the victim but something less" (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999, p 374) It is not just 
juridical equality that has been disrupted and needs to be restored but social equality 
Retributive theory aims to reestablish equality through punishment, while restorative asks 
which set of practices, context specific, can restore equality through dialogue 
It has been noted that the recent interest in restorative justice mechanism stems 
from recognition of "some limitations associated with the traditional Western legal 
system" (Strickland, 2004, p 3) Particularly since the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, the model of restorative justice has gained populanty in the 
field of transitional justice The TRC placed significant emphasis on this conception of 
justice This model of justice the emphasis is not so much on the crime itself but on 
restoring the victim-perpetrator-social relations (Geula, 2000, p 74) 
This conception of transitional justices sees truth as acknowledgement and justice 
as recognition Acknowledging and listing to people's stories and affirming they were 
wronged, striving to repair the damage done, it is a victim centered vision of justice 
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(Zehr, 2001, p 330) Proponents of restorative justice argue that amnesty is the 
compromise made to remove an unjust regime and prosecutions would yield less truth 
and provide, fewer opportunities for healing, closure and reconciliation 
Restorative justice must first, affirm and restore the dignity of victims, those who 
have been violated, second, hold perpetrators accountable, emphasizing the harm they 
have done, third create social conditions where human rights will be respected, and 
fourth, emphasize reconciliation, restore broken relationships, encourage reintegration, 
moral reconstruction and dialogue It is important to note that this kind of justice does not 
preclude punishing the guilty since punishment can also be a way to restore moral order 
Still forgiveness and reconciliation are privileged over punishment A critique of 
retributive justice has been that it requires a leap of faith or belief in the possibility of 
moral transformation and cannot provide easy answers to victims who want retribution 
(Kiss, 2000, p 79-90) 
Perhaps debates between retributive and restorative justice can be settled 
somewhat by understanding justice in the following manner "Justice demands that the 
offender be punished, be forced to make amends to the mjured party, and be restrained 
from doing further harm" (Mynck, 1965, p xxxvn) If this becomes our understanding of 
justice, we can then ask whether restorative justice aims "to make amends to the injured 




Reparations are part of restorative justice that aims to repair social connections and 
reintegrate offenders into the community There are economic and symbolic acts of 
reparations monetary payments, health and social services, memorials, restitution and 
repair, restormg stolen property, money and public apologies (Minow, 1998, p 91, Teitel, 
2000, 119) Reparations do not mean that once amends have been made that the 
"underlying events need not be discussed again" (Minow, 1998, p 93) Money cannot 
mend or remedy non-monetary harm and apologies may restore some dignity but they do 
not restore lives "Reparations provide a specific, narrow invitation for victims and 
survivors to walk between vengeance and forgiveness" (Minow, 1998, p 106) Restitution 
"returns the very property, bank account, artifact or work of art wrongly taken from the 
owner" (Minow, 1998, p 107) An apology requires full acceptance of responsibility by 
the wrongdoer (Minow, 1998, p 112), but it "cannot undo what was done and yet 'in a 
mysterious way this is precisely what it manages to do" (Minow, 1998, p 114) For some 
people forgiveness is dependent on an apology and victims must be given the power to 
accept or reject the apology (Minow, 1998, p 115) 
International law obliges states to repair then wrongdoings through reparation 
The right to reparations and restitution is affirmed in several documents declarations, 
conventions and documents by the United Nations and other international bodies 4 
4 The UN High Commission for Human Rights 45th Session, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Final Report, 2 July 1993 UN doc/E/CN 4/sub 2/1993/8 proposes the responsibilities of the 
state in this regard The Study suggests that there should be no statute of limitations on reparations, the 
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However despite it being an international obligation, reparation, how much, to whom, for 
how long, etc , is still debated at a national level m many transitional societies Those 
who oppose reparation suggest that it is a backward-looking exercise in contradiction to a 
state's forward-looking political agenda Reparation also raises the question of whether 
society bears collective guilt over past injustices or whether guilt should be 
individualized 
Historically one instance of reparation can be found in the bible It takes the form 
of a political shift from oppression to freedom Israelites in Egypt lived there for 400 
years under slavery subject to persecution In the Exodus story the Israelites found 
freedom, the Egyptians were punished and the Israelites eventually founded a nation 
This story is significant because it is biblical account of reparatory justice On the eve of 
the Exodus the Israelites are told to borrow clothing and objects of silver and gold from 
the Egyptians The Egyptians were snipped of their valuables and clothes that the 
Israelites were to put on their own sons and daughters This implied that 
the freed slaves had assumed the dress of their slave owners, in turn, leaving the 
owners naked as slaves The sequence harks back to the very origins of the term 
redress the stripping of the Egyptians and the 're-dressing' of the Israelites 
signifies more than a material settlement, it is a setting straight, a ceremonial 
redressing, a rehabilitation m the public eye (Teitel, 2000, p 120) 
The transitional justice processes after WWI and WWII also implemented 
reparations The Versailles treaty assigned to Germany "total war guilt" and made 
Germany responsible for reparations Collective responsibility was assigned to the whole 
state must not settle compensation claims without victim consent, and that reparations should be viewed as 
part of the democratization process to create a just society that protects human rights (Rights, 1993)) The 
General Assembly also adopted a resolution in 2006 on the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (http //www2 ohchr org/enghsh/law/remedv htm [accessed 
2/11/2010]) 
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country and Germany was told it had a 'duty' to repair its wrongs and make reparations 
to the Allies Sanctions that were applied to Germany were so heavy that the country 
could not make its reparations payments (Teitel 2001 122) The treaty imposed 
reparations but also recognized that Germany could not and would not pay them 
After WWII Germany was again required to accept financial responsibility for 
waging war through the 1952 Transitional Treaty (Teitel, 2000, p 122) Victims also 
demanded reparations because many had been robbed of their finances In this regard the 
1952 Luxembourg Agreements set out that Germany would pay reparations to the victims 
of Nazi crimes and to the state of Israel and its citizens These reparations signified that 
Germany was making amends These also influenced international law, which began to 
suggest that states should make reparations even after periods of internal state conflicts 
under the banner of citizen and civilian rights (Teitel, 2000, p 124) 
Latin American states have also been ordered to pay reparations to their citizens 
In a case brought to the Inter- American Court of Human Rights against the state of 
Honduras which failed to investigate the disappearance of a young man named 
Velasquez-Rodriguez in the 1980s, the Court ruled that states were obligated to 
investigate and punish human rights violations and to provide moral and material 
compensation for victims for any violations of the rights guaranteed by the American 
Convention on Human Rights The Velasquez-Rodriguez verdict "suggests that when the 
obligations of investigation and compensation are not fulfilled the violations are 
potentially ongoing and successor regimes are responsible" for fulfilling them (Teitel, 
2000, p 125) In light of the prevalent amnesty laws that impeded investigations m many 
Latin American countries, the Velasquez-Rodriguez was significant In light of such 
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amnesties, reparations—moral, financial or symbolic—force the state to acknowledge 
wrong-doing where punishment is not possible (Teitel, 2000, p 127) 
Reparatory measures and time 
Transitional reparations are often easier to obtain or give out after the passage of some 
time It takes years after a new regime comes to power for legal justice to be served As 
the predecessor regime moves further back mto the collective political consciousness, 
there is greater access to the records of the regime This allows greater opportunities for 
legal justice and reparations to be served (Teitel, 2000, p 127) The passage of time 
"implies change regarding the identities of not only the beneficiaries but also those doing 
the paying" (Teitel, 2000, p 139) Those domg the paying may not be those implicated in 
the wrong-doing personally and directly Dealing with past crimes raises the question of 
mtergenerational justice "what obligations [do] successor regimes owe victims of earlier 
generations and whether it is fair to lay this burned on the present or later generations" 
(Teitel, 2000, p 139) Sometimes, even though present or future generations are not 
responsible for the crimes, if they somehow benefitted from their ancestors committing 
the cranes, should they pay the victims? Predecessor policies may have benefitted certain 
segments of later generations Reparations are also used to restore a "state's moral 
credibility" (Teitel, 2000, p 140) "after the passage of time, reparatory acts become 
increasingly symbolic, often taking on the form of an apology" (Teitel, 2000, p 140) 
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Summary 
In a post-conflict situation, it is generally expected by victims and human rights 
advocates that some form of accountability will be pursued These groups expect the state 
to pursue a retributive kind of justice through the courts The retributivist argument holds 
that punishment must be pursued to restore the moral order of society, respect the rule of 
law and send the message that impunity will not be tolerated, deter future crimes by 
sending a message to perpetrators of the wrongness of their actions, and restore victims' 
sense of citizenship and belonging by acknowledging their suffering and respectmg then-
right to justice Additionally, international law has established the duty of states to punish 
wrong-doers This becomes not only a forward looking exercise in that it allows society 
to put the past behind it, but also legal proceedings that are publicized can serve a 
pedagogical function by educating society on the events of the past 
In a transitional setting, however, legal justice can be difficult to pursue because 
often judicial systems are compromised—they are either corrupt or unable to handle the 
large numbers of prosecutions that must be pursued due to insufficient resources For this 
reason, amnesties are common, and if justice is pursued, it is more likely that limited 
criminal sanction—prosecutions or investigations that may not result in indictments, is 
applied Truth commissions can offer a similar kind of sanction if they name perpetrators 
m their reports, but TRCs do not aim to offer retributive justice These commissions have 
redefined justice a reparative and restorative notion Restorative justice seeks to repair the 
harm caused to the victim, perpetrator and community by the crime It holds that a crime 
disturbs the victim's equal status as a member of society and arms to restore this 
imbalance This may be done through reparations—monetary or symbolic provided to the 
89 
victim by the state or the perpetrators themselves, it is a victim centered notion of justice 
that rests on establishing truth to serve as acknowledgement of the victim's pam and 
justice as recognition of the victim's dignity and equality It does not preclude 
punishment, but what is emphasized is healing and ultimately reconciliation 
Reconciliation and forgiveness 
Reconciliation is a part of a conflict resolution process that involves antagonistic attitudes 
and relationships between adversaries to be transformed from negative to positive Like 
truth and justice, it is also a contested concept with several layers and meanings attached 
to it Complete reconciliation is the "mutual recognition and acceptance, mvested 
interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust," shared beliefs in 
human nghts and respect for the law (Bar-Tal, 2002) 
When it comes to the question of who should be reconciled, Adelman argues that 
reconciliation between leaders and groups targeted for repression is not required or 
desired, but there is a "need to reconcile the majority and minority groups" because 
government wars where a particular group is targeted there are clear cut perpetrators and 
victims and largely one-sided violence (Adelman, 2005, p 287) For some, modern the 
goal of reconciliation is to remove violence as an option for resolvmg conflict and 
establish a peaceful co-existence (Adelman, 2005, p 288) In TRCs reconciliation is 
"both an outcome and a process" (Nesiah, 2005, p 273) It is a goal to work towards, is 
forward-looking and based on truth, and second, it is a path, a "less adversarial public 
hearings, a greater focus on reparations rather than sanctions restorative justice" 
(Nesiah, 2005, p 273) 
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There are several levels and agents of reconciliation There is collective individual 
and political reconciliation The discourse of healing at the individual level is applied to 
collective political reconciliation, but it may not necessanly apply "At individual level a 
strong case can be made for the healing effects of a story telling" (Skaar, Gloppen, & 
Suhrke, 2005, p 8) At the individual the aim is to heal the victim so that s/he can come 
to terms with horrific violence so that interpersonal healing between the perpetrator and 
the victim can occur At the collective level "reconciliation hinges on reintegration which 
is dependent on reconstruction of democratic institutions and the right of return for 
refugees and internally displaced people" (Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005, p 12) 
Reconciliation at the community level (the workplace, school, and community 
groups, etc) is more difficult because it requires healing the social fabric by encouraging 
a re-integration of perpetrators and victims into the community so that the conflicting 
groups can coexist This kind of reconciliation may require a reevaluation of the 
structures and institutions that make up society At the structural level there are 
beneficiaries and losers of the system because "economic disempowerment and political 
alienation" have often gone hand in hand with human rights violations so there exist 
groups who were 'losers,' that may have been oppressed but may not have been direct 
victims Thus, for collective reconciliation class and social structures and margmalization 
of minority groups must be re-examined (Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005, p 274) 
At the national level citizenship and nation building may need to be re-established 
or established from the start Finally, transnational reconciliation may also be part of 
states reconciliatory efforts These are attempts by nations to gain truth, 
acknowledgement and accountability on the treatment or involvement in crimes of other 
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nations For example, when East and South Asian countries tried to get Japan to 
acknowledge its use of comfort women from these countries during WWII 
Successful reconciliation has several requirements recognition, justice, redress, 
reconstruction, and repentance and/or forgiveness 
Recognition 
Victims need a space m which they are allowed to tell the truth about the harm they 
suffered and this harm is acknowledged and recognized Acknowledgement consists not 
only of what happened to victims but also recognition by conflicting parties of the other, 
the nval to exist peacefully and to accept its existence Recogmtion can take the form of 
public or state apologies, a commitment to never again repeat the violence, reparations, 
and memorials Recognition turns victims into survivors and reintegrates them back into 
society (Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005, p 276) 
Restorative Justice 
The relationship between reconciliation and tnals, purges, truth commissions, restitution, 
reforms, amnesty and amnesia is ambiguous An empincal demonstration of these 
relationships has not been done Reconciliation is based on the idea of restorative justice 
which, as established earlier, is focused on mercy, restormg relationships by building 




A focus on the perpetrator in retnbutive notions of justice keeps victims in the minority 
and keeps the demands of criminal justice Restorative justice includes offering redress in 
the form of reparations to victims This kind of redress evens the playing field, so to 
speak and turns victims into beneficiaries which changes the focus to social justice and 
recognizes the victimhood of the majority (Adelman, 2005, p 302-303) 
Reconstruction 
Social justice may require reconstruction in the form of institutional reforms to 
restructure the justice, political and economic systems so that all citizens have equal 
rights Additionally, reconstruction of hearts and minds is also required and this may 
require repentance and forgiveness 
Repentance and forgiveness 
A new relationship between victims and perpetrators is assumed to require forgiveness 
(Assefa, 2001, p 340), "[b]ut what does it mean to 'forgive"'" (Skaar, Gloppen, & 
Suhrke, 2005, p 6) Reconciliation is impeded if people do not forgive and rebuild trust 
and interpersonal security The idea is to '"acknowledge the violation, put it behind 
and not let the violation affect the relationship'"( Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005, p 
6) 
Forgiveness is based on a sense of restorative justice Some suggest that 
forgiveness is possible and central to reconciliation smce it is a "normal practice in 
private interpersonal relations and has important functions that cannot be achieved via 
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punishment" (Forsberg & Teivamen, 2004, p 12) While others note that forgiveness is 
not necessarily required for reconciliation, does not allow justice and entails forgetting 
(Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005, p 6) Issues such as the readiness of victims to 
forgive, and the willingness of the perpetrators to admit wrongdoing must be addressed if 
forgiveness is to be expected Some perpetrators are unwilling to accept guilt for fear of 
having to compensate their victims However, forgiveness involves a change on part of 
both the perpetrator and the victim 
On a societal level, forgiveness entails moving on from the past without 
forgetting, and allowing the wrongdoer to re-enter the community so that reconciliation 
can occur (Forsberg & Teivamen, 2004, p 12) Peter Digeser talks about political 
forgiveness He suggests that forgiveness does not necessarily require this change in 
attitude, it is "an lllocutionary act whose point is to relieve one party's indebtedness to 
another After the act of forgiving, we refuse to refer to past actions of the other as a 
justification of our behavior" (Forsberg & Teivamen, 2004, p 12) 
Additionally, some argue that forgiveness and mercy are based on non-malicious 
retnbution, that is, justice in the form of an 'eye for an eye' is not required for victims to 
forgive Mercy and forgiveness that enable peace, make political sense and restore the 
common good may require a lesser punishment or pardon (Villa-Vicencio, 1999-2000) 
For pardon to be granted, the perpetrator must first confess his crime The 
confession is directed both at one's conscience and at the victim whose "pardon or at 
least non-vengeance" is sought (Achour, 2002, p 124) The goal is to restore harmony 
withm oneself and between oneself and the victim This must be accompanied by an 
94 
admission of regret, which may or may not be followed by pardon (Achour, 2002, p 
123) If repentance is shown, punishment is suspended 
There is authentic and inauthentic repentance Authentic repentance is based on 
sincerity, while inauthentic repentance is "performed under constraint or out of material 
interest" (Achour, 2002, p 125) Repentance does not necessanly have to be accepted, its 
acceptance depends on the acceptance of the recognition of the wrong committed, 
acceptance of responsibility for the wrong committed and the intention and smcenty with 
which pardon is being sought 
There is a Hebrew term, tschuva that captures the above ideas, particularly one of 
mercy This is the idea of repentance and forgiveness, repentance and return That is, the 
perpetrator sincerely recognizes his/her sin, confesses this sin, corrects wrong caused by 
sin and is in turn offered forgiveness (Adelman, 2005, p 303) The crime or sin is not 
erased, and reconciliation is not necessanly achieved, but in empathy and understanding 
of the perpetrator, the crime is forgiven 
Restorative justice may contradict aims at reconciliation especially where 
retribution may increase social and political divisions/animosity Yet, although there is 
often pressure to forgive, victims cannot be forced to do so Finally, if retnbutive justice 
is not achieved, how else can accountability be ensured and can true reconciliation occur 
without retnbutive justice? 
Literature on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
provides insight and furthers the debate on these issues Forgiveness and reconciliation 
were intimately linked in the TRC In fact, its slogan was the "road to reconciliation " 
The truth about violence of the apartheid system was told "on the basis of a 'need for 
95 
understanding, but not for vengeance, a need for reparation, but not for retaliation, a need 
for ubuntu [common humanity] but not for victimization'" (Nagy, 2004, p 234) 
Reconciliation was encouraged through restorative, not retributive justice Thus, the 
restoration of social relations between victims and perpetrators held utmost importance 
Truth commissions generally hold that once knowledge and acknowledgement of past 
abuses is obtained, reconstruction of fractured social relationships can occur Yet there is 
debate in the literature as to whether reconciliation in South Africa has occurred or not 
(Nagy, 2004, p 324-26) One reason for this is the ambiguity surrounding what exactly 
reconciliation should look like and how it can be measured 
Although reconciliation can take place without forgiveness, the TRC continually 
evoked the discourse of forgiveness, specifically Christian forgiveness, due primarily to 
Desmond Tutu's own religious onentation As such, the TRC "strove to create conditions 
for forgiveness, remorse, and apology, but many observers [have noted that] a strong 
pressure to forgive was exerted upon the victims" (Nagy, 2004, p 332) Yet no burden 
was placed on the perpetrators to apologize The imposition of Chnstian forgiveness is 
indeed problematic Not all victims testifying before the TRC were Chnstian or held such 
beliefs about forgiveness Thus, the imposition of this kind of forgiveness suggests that 
all people must reconcile in the same way However reconciliation may very well be 
culturally specific, something not seemingly recognized by Desmond Tutu and the TRC 
(Rotberg, 2000, p 7) 
Truth commissions also suggest that all pain is equal For example the South 
African TRC made no distinctions of pain based on class, race, religious or political 
affiliation In fact, Desmond Tutu noted during one of the heanngs that,'" it is 
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wonderful for the country to experience—that black or white—we all feel the same 
pain'" (qtd m Wilson, 2000, p 80) The equalization of pam is often done by post-
conflict regimes to avoid taking sides m the conflict, yet victims may not feel that their 
pain is equal to their perpetrators' pam For example m South Africa, it may be that due 
to the racial nature of the violence blacks may feel their pam is greater than their white 
counterparts not only because of the system that oppressed them, but also because 
economically they are at a disadvantage 
Other critiques of the concepts of forgiveness and reconciliation as associated 
with truth commissions are the following First, since TRCs put unjust "psychological 
pressure on people who refuse to forgive" (Kiss, 2000, p 84), they fail to recognize the 
moral legitimacy of their anger Victims cannot and should not be pressured to reconcile 
with their abusers This may create further conflicts 
Further, TRCs do not recognize "moral hatred" or "righteous condemnation of 
wrong-doers and the refusal to reconcile with them" (Kiss, 2000, p 84) Indeed, the very 
existence of a TRC, an official mechanism that seeks to facilitate reconciliation is a land 
of denial of the legitimacy of such a moral hatred Fmally, some ask whether forgiveness 
is even relevant at the state level Perhaps it is personally helpful but at the social and 
political level it is irrelevant because individual persons forgive while states seek justice 
Summary 
Reconciliation is the healmg of relationships to establish mutual trust and recognition of 
the other It has several levels individual, collective (community) and political There are 
several elements of individual and collective reconciliation recognition—which requires 
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that victims be given a space to tell their stones and have these recognized through 
apologies and commitments to ensure the violence is never repeated, restorative justice— 
repairing relationships between perpetrator and victim through the re-buildmg of trust, 
redress—symbolic or monetary reparations to victims and/or their families, 
reconstruction of democratic institutions at the collective level, and finally repentance 
and forgiveness While some argue that forgiveness requires repentance from the victim, 
others suggest that forgiveness is possible without it However, it is argued that more 
often than not, TRCs place pressure on victims to forgive while no pressure is placed on 
the perpetrators to repent Further, TRCs have been accused of equalizing pain the pain of 
victims and their perpetrators in order to avoid being seen as biased 
Ultimately, reconciliation initiatives must balance the demands of truth and 
justice in a manner that takes into account the socio-cultural and political contexts in 
which these goals are pursued 
This concludes the discussion on the some of the issues associated with TRCs 
The following chapter will set the stage for examination of the context m which the TRC 
was pursued in Chile A brief overview of the histoncal background in Chile—the events 
that occuned that necessitated a TRC are provided followed by a discussion of the 
Chilean TRC and its goals 
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Chapter 5 
The Chilean Context and the Pinochet Regime 
Introduction 
Recognizing that Chilean history does not begin in 1970 with the election of Allende or 
even in 1973 with the installation of the military government, this chapter reviews the 
factors that set the stage for AUende's election and the military's subsequent takeover of 
power It is important to have an understanding of the socio-political events that set the 
stage for the TRC because reactions to the commission and its findmgs, and ultimately its 
impact in Chile were influenced by this history 
Chilean society has always been fairly fragmented It has consisted of several 
institutional cultures and sectors that played an important part in shaping the social and 
political landscape, both before and during the military government Among these were 
the following the popular sector composed of lower classes such as peasants, urban and 
rural working class such as the miners and urban shantytown dwellers, the middle sector 
made up of professionals such as teachers, bureaucrats, businessmen/merchants and 
mdustrialists, and the upper class comprised of landowners and political elites Intra- and 
mter-class divisions over wealth distribution, income, control of economic resources and 
political power were common (Oppenheim, 1999, p 6-7) This social and economic 
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fragmentation was mirrored in Chilean politics, particularly post-independence where 
several parties contested each other in the political arena The Chilean democratic 
tradition rested on the alliance between leftist, radical and right-wing parties and 
negotiations between these actors led to rule without direct military governance for much 
of Chile's history 
To minimize the social and political fragmentation, Chilean political and 
economic leaders have attempted vanous development strategies Economic development 
m the nineteenth century was export-driven, based on the growth of the mining sector 
During WWI the nitrate and copper exports m the twentieth century led to an increase in 
foreign investment in the country and by the 1920s there was significant foreign control 
of Chilean resources, particularly copper For example, "two US companies owned the 
three major copper companies in Chile" (Oppenheim, 1999, p 11) 
Politically, in the 1920s a growing middle class in Chile elected Arturo Alessandn 
as president Alessandn's presidency was responsible for establishing the 1925 
constitution, which created a presidential system m Chile The 1925 constitution, 
although modified over the years, was m place until 1973 (Oppenheim, 1999, p 12) 
After these changes were put into place Alessandn resigned, ushenng in several years of 
political instability for Chile This included several elections and eventually a military 
government from 1927-1930, which was followed by more "revolving door governments 
including a twelve-day socialist government headed by General Marmaduke Grove" 
(Oppenheim, 1999, p 12) In 1932 the 1925 constitution was restored and "Chile 
maintained a stable, constitutional democracy" until 1973 
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In the 1940-1960's, an inward industrialization strategy called inward 
industrialization, called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was implemented ISI 
called for structural changes in the economy, such as changing the pattern of large land 
owning which were unequal and mamtamed poverty (Oppenheim, 1999, p 7) ISI called 
for governments to (1) change unequal land distribution patterns through land 
redistribution policies, (2) enact protective legislation which would enable industrial 
development through government oversight, and (3) end economic dependency by taking 
over the means of production in order to transform the relationships of economic and 
political power 
During this period, Chile, like many in countries in Latin America, witnessed the 
insertion of its domestic politics into the superpower struggle, the so-called "Cold War," 
which, given the impetus of the contending interests and ideologies around the world, by 
its very nature entailed a polarization Conflicts between landowners and workers 
resulted in the development of socialist organizations Marxist ideology appealed to 
academics in the 1950s and 1960s as an alternative to the prevailing capitalist status quo 
and many of them became involved in the Umdad Popular (UP) under Allende (Agger, 
1996,p 38) 
From 1958-1964 Jorge Alessandn supported by the right, liberal, radical and 
conservative parties applied an orthodox capitalist model of economic development 
(Oppenheim 1999 22) Land reform was instituted under the United States (US) 
Alliance for Progress policy, which aimed to eliminate the Communist threat and another 
Cuban revolution This land reform was ineffective in re-distnbutmg land and changing 
the nature of class relations (Oppenheim, 1999, p 23) 
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During 1964-1979 Frei, with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) proposed 
moderate structural reforms by Frei including land reform to provide more land from 
large landholdings to peasants and changing the government's control over the copper 
industry (Oppenheim, 1999, p 23-25) The government bought out fifty-one percent of 
the U S interest m the copper companies in an attempt to give Chile control over its 
resources, but the biggest copper companies "remained m U S hands (Chuquicamata, El 
Salvador, and El Teniente)" (Oppenheim, 1999, p 25) 
A popular promotion program was started by the PDC to mobilize the poor, in 
hopes that mobilizing this sector would gam them the political support of this group, but 
this program only increased the expectations of the poor (Oppenheim, 1999) 
There was also internal discord withm the PDC which saw it split into a group 
that favoured a non-capitalist route to development under the leadership of Jacques 
Choncol which later aligned with other socialist Communist parties to form the Unidad 
Popular (UP-Popular Unity) which lent its support to AUende m 1970 (Oppenheim, 1999, 
p 26) 
These are the political, social and economic conditions under which AUende and 
his Unidad Popular came into power 
The Allende government 
In 1970, Salvador Allende became the first socialist leader to be democratically elected in 
the world Allende and his UP (Unidad Popular) government tried to implement various 
structural reforms such as land reform and nationalization of the economy, which would 
allow Chile to be transformed from a capitalist to a socialist state Allende's goal was to 
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create a power shift from the economic elite to the masses (Oppenheim, 1999, p 8-29) 
However, when Allende's government came into power, the Chilean economy was 
suffering a slight recession As such, the goal of the UP government was to decrease 
inflation, and increase economic growth (Oppenheim 41-42) To do this, worker's 
salaries were increased and prices for basic necessities were regulated to be low, so that 
people could to afford these basic goods However, m 1972, problems with this economic 
policy started to occur because the production of goods decreased, inflation increased and 
government revenue decreased because the nationalized industries did not make enough 
profit (Oppenheim, 1999, p 59) These difficulties led to several political problems for the 
UP, which in turn led to various causes of the 1973 coup Following Oppenheim, these 
causes can be divided into internal (those within the UP) and external (those involving 
other political actors, outside of the UP) 
Internal causes of the coup 
Since Chile had a tripartite political division, no one group had the majority in legislature 
or congress, therefore the UP, with less than forty per cent of the seats m congress, was 
forced to share power with other political parties This led to various constraints on the 
UP in terms of what political and economic policies they were able to implement 
Furthermore, there were ideological differences within the UP itself UP moderates in 
conflict with UP radicals over the best way to achieve a socialized state constrained 
Allende's ability to make decisions Finally, Allende's choice of leaders with a lack of 
knowledge about economics to devise and implement economic policy led to the UP's 
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mismanagement of the economy, creating dissatisfaction among the Chilean population 
(Oppenheim, 1999, p 92-98, Falcoff, 1989, p 253) 
External causes of the coup 
External causes of the coup included actions of the opposition parties, Allende's 
relationship with the armed forces and the actions of the U S government The 
opposition, resisted most UP policies that tried to create structural changes, and as a 
result, attempted to destabilize the Allende government through strikes and protests, and 
accusing Allende of not adhering to the Constitution (Oppenheim, 1999, p 97, Falcoff, 
1989, p 253) 
Allende's presidency was marked by social unrest Despite their historical 
relationship to politics, the Chilean armed forces generally saw themselves as apolitical 
and held themselves in high regard as protectors of Chile because they had played an 
instrumental role in nation building and had won many of the wars they fought in the 
nineteenth century (Alexander, 1978, p 288-289) This belief that the armed forces were 
the guarantors of order, stability and national security when civilians failed in this 
mission was further remforced by the social unrest Allende tried to maintain a healthy 
relationship with the army and to calm the institution, he tried to involve the armed forces 
m his government In November 1972 he appointed General Carlos Prats as Mmister of 
the Intenor, a post that dealt with handling internal security and that was akin to the post 
of vice-president Prats' appointment came about because of the national truckers' strike 
m October 1972 The truckers were opposed to the government's attempts to control the 
trucking industry, and although the strike began as a grassroots movement, it was soon 
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supported by the opposition The strike also served to demonstrate large public discontent 
with the UP government (Alexander, 1978, p 303-305) The strike and General Prats' 
post helped further accelerate the military's pohticization and strengthened its position 
within the political arena The post implied that the military had the power to regulate 
government policies that it did not agree with (Falcoff, 1989, p 255, (Kooning & Kruyt, 
2002, p 118) By June 29' 1973, many in the army had lost confidence in Allende's ability 
to govern (Weeks, 2003, p 40) but Prats felt that the army should be loyal to the 
President because any attempt by the armed forces to take over the government would not 
be without significant bloodshed and would '"drag down'" the armed forces (Weeks 
2003 40) However, Prats' position and those officers like him were a minority in the 
army "By August 1973, Prats no longer had the confidence of the army and was forced 
out as commander-m-chief His replacement was General Augusto Pinochet" (Weeks, 
2003, p 40-41) 
Finally, a third factor influencing the overthrow of the Allende regime was the 
influence of U S policy Chile (and the rest of Latin America) The Cuban Revolution in 
1959 ushered in an increased concern against the communist 'threat' in Latm America 
(McClintock, 1985, Petras & Morely, 1975) In this context the U S was concerned about 
Allende's victory and made various attempts to remove him from power These included 
plans to prevent him from assuming power, CIA encouragement of right wing elements 
of the military to orchestrate a coup and withdrawal of loans and credits to Chile (except 
to the armed forces), which were intended to destabilize the Chilean economy His 
policies, particularly the nationalization of copper, in which the Chilean state established 
control over U S owned copper mines, were a threat to the U S because they offered a 
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structural and ideological change which tned to limit U S and foreign capital and control 
of the Chilean economy and threatened to change trade patterns in the entire Latin 
American region, therefore posing a challenge to U S economic hegemony, if they had 
been successfully implemented (Petras & Morely, 1975, p , Petras & Morely, 1975, p 
15-16) 
Essentially the United States used a four-pronged approach to bring about a break 
down and the end of Allende's regime m Chile "diplomatic isolation, economic 
strangulation," covert destabilization and military aid (Kornbluh, 2004, p 87, Petras & 
Morely, 1975, p 14) The covert action program focused on non-Marxist opposition to 
the Allende, the armed forces, the Chilean public, media and other Latin American 
countnes to pressure the Allende government The CIA defined a aimed to create a coup 
climate that would provide the military with the justification to intervene While, 
economic action included strangulation through a trade and credit squeeze to create 
economic difficulties for Chile (Petras & Morely, 1975, p 15-16) Since Chile was 
already in debt before Allende came to power, this economic blockade of the Chile 
essentially strangled the Chilean economy leading to protests and strikes against the 
government All aid, except military was cut to Chile The Chilean military received 
significant amounts of aid in the form of funds and military equipment from 1971 to 
1973 5 Furthermore, the U S government trained the Chilean armed forces in various 
5 In mid-1971 the Chilean military received "$5 million in military credits as part of its 'pragmatic policy'" 
(Petras & Morely 1975 126) and m 1972 the U S began "subsidizing an anti-Allende newsletter aimed at 
the armed forces" (Kornbluh 2004 95) Pinochet also came on the radar of the CIA but his position in a 
coup remained somewhat unclear His wife and son were anti-Allende, some observers thought he would 
not lead a coup while others suggested he said that '"Allende has to go, step down or be eliminated"' 
(Kornbluh 2004 96) Pinochet signed on to the coup at the last minute Also in December 1972 Chile also 
received a "$10 million credit agreement for the Chilean military" (Petras & Morely 1975 126) The U S 
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counter-insurgency techniques They were taught to fight an internal "enemy" which was 
labeled as anyone who espoused socialist or communist ideologies, in opposition to the 
western capitalist ideology (Oppenheim, 1999, p 105-108) For the Chilean military 
these internal threats were members of the MIR (Moviemiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionana), a guerrilla group who espoused extreme socialist values, and other 
armed civilian groups The military became concerned about these groups who tried to 
destabilize the armed forces, and the government's inability to control them gave the 
armed forces more incentive to stage the September 11 1973 coup against Allende 
In August General Carlos Prats resigned as commander-in-chief of the army and 
stopped coup plotters Declassified documents reveal that by August 31 the army was 
"unitedbehind a coup " (Kornbluh, 2004, p 111) At 8 am on September 11, the Navy 
took over Valparaiso and announced Allende was being over-thrown The Carabineros 
did not manage to detain Allende at his home because he escaped and reached La 
Moneda, the presidential palace, where he broadcasted messages to "workers and 
students to come and 'defend your government against armed forces'" (Kornbluh, 2004, 
p 113) The army surrounded La Moneda while jets launched rocket attacks, killing his 
guards The military also fired at La Moneda and demanded that Allende surrender and 
"made a perfunctory offer to fly him and his family out of the country (Kornbluh, 2004, 
p 113) Allende was found dead from gunshot wounds at 2 p m and at 2 30 p m , the 
"armed forces broadcast a statement that the entire country was under military control" 
(Kornbluh, 2004, p 113) 
was concerned that Chile had expropnated Amencan company properties (Petras & Morely 1975 127) In 
May 1973, Chile was allowed to purchase F-5E military fighter aircraft 
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Chile's military regime 
Reasons given for the coup 
The overthrow of Allende's government was earned out on September 11, 1973 The 
junta leading the armed forces was composed of General Augusto Pinochet, head of the 
army, General Gustavo Leigh, head of the air forces, Admiral Jose Tombio Mermo, head 
of the navy, and General Cesar Mendoza, director general of the Carabineros (which 
were a militarized national police force) There were three ingredients in place for the 
coup to occur First, the unity of the right wing opposition under the National Party 
(Renovacion Nacional), second the statement in Congress in which the opposition 
declared the Allende regime to be illegitimate and third, the social turmoil due to bad 
economic circumstances fuelled m part by U S policy towards Chile (Kooning & Kruijt, 
2002, p 118) 
The coup was quick but violent Upon the takeover, which was earned out under 
the mando supremo de la nacion (supreme command of the nation) an internal state of 
war was declared, which allowed the armed forces to carry out brutal forms of violence 
against UP officials and UP civilian supporters All those the military thought were 
subversive and dangerous were arrested, detained and brutalized Civil liberties were 
suspended and though Chileans had become accustomed to political stnfe, many did not 
expect such high levels of violence Even politicians were unaware of the military's 
plans, many believed that after a short takeover, m which they promised to "restore what 
Allende had disrupted," the military would hand power over to civilian politicians 
(Weeks, 2003, p 41) To justify its takeover the military claimed that they had discovered 
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a plan for a Communist autogolpe, Plan Z, by the Marxists in which the communists 
planned the assassination of military and police officers and that as protectors of the 
nation, the coup was a pre-emptive action that was required As such no political or 
judicial institution would be respected in order to allow the military to carry out its 
mission of restoring order Plan Z is now thought to be a fabrication of the military 
because no existence of such a plan has been found (Weeks, 2003, p 167 footnote 42) 
In October of 1973, General Arnello Stark began a campaign called the "caravan 
of death" in Northern Chile Under this campaign, political pnsoners were found, tortured 
and killed The justification given by the armed forces for these activities was that these 
prisoners were prepanng to overthrow the military, and as such, had to be prevented 
(Oppenheim, 1999, p 122-123) 
Upon takeover the military junta outlined fourteen reasons for the coup m a 
decree titled "Order of the Day No 5 " In this order, it stated that the Allende 
government had "exceeded the bounds of legitimacy by violating fundamental nghts of 
liberty, of speech the nght to a worthy and stable existence" (Loveman & Davies, 
1997, p 182) Further, it accused the Allende government of encouraging hostilities 
between classes, not adhenng to the law, disregarding the congress, abusing its power, its 
failure to maintain a stable economy, and jeopardizing the country's internal as well as 
external secunty Finally, m this decree, the armed forces suggested that it was their 
"moral duty" to depose the government (Loveman & Davies, 1997, p 182, Alexander, 
1978, p 336) and restore national unity 
The goals of the military regime included eliminating all leftist political groups, 
thereby -de-politicizing the country, and replacing those groups with "new political and 
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economic institutions [and] different cultural values" (Oppenheim, 1999, p 118) 
Moreover, to give their takeover a "legal" aura, Decree Law No 1 was issued on 
September 11 In this decree the junta declared the following three things first it 
promised to restore Chilean nationality, second, Pinochet was declared president of the 
junta, and third they agreed to respect the constitution and laws of the Chilean republic It 
should be noted, however, that in this decree, nowhere was the declaration made that the 
junta would respect the nghts of congress As such, Decree No 29, issued on September 
13, declared the national congress dissolved and the announcement of a cabmet 
dominated by military personnel The only post not assigned to the military was that of 
minister of economics This decree allowed the junta to give itself power to govern and 
enforce laws (Alexander, 1978, p 340) 
The consolidation of power 
The consolidation of power phase took place from 1973 to 1977 Durmg these years the 
armed forces consolidated power through the use of torture and repression First the junta 
governed by decree, through which it outlawed all political parties and freedom of press 
Anyone suspected of having leftist sentiments was targeted for repression Thus, people 
were subjected to arbitrary arrests, deportations, placed in concentration camps, and 
subjected to extreme torture and death By 1975, 4300 people were held m concentration 
camps set up in Northern Chile, and by late 1976, 1400 political prisoners were held by 
the government (Alexander, 1978, p 344-345) In 1974, the junta established DINA 
(Direccion de Investigaciones Nationales), an intelligence and secret police force, 
responsible only to the president, and that had the power to make arrests and hold people 
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without warrants In 1974 the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights reported the 
existence of five torture centers (Alexander, 1978, p 346) In addition to these tortures, 
summary executions, mass raids, arrests and disappearances took place m other areas 
The repressive structure established by the regime consisted of the following 
agencies DINA - the Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces which functioned 
between 1974 and 1977, the Joint Command, which operated between 1975 and 1976 and 
consisted of DIFA (the air force intelligence service), DICAR (the armed police), SIN 
(the navy) and DINE (the army) These four intelligence bodies operated against 
Communists The air force had its own intelligence arms, SBFA and DIFA which 
operated from 1974-1975 and worked against the MIR The Armed Police, the SICAR 
was replaced by DICAR m 1974, was in charge of detention and surveillance The navy 
had SIN in Valparaiso and SIRE m Concepcion both of which were charged with 
operating against the MIR "Each directorate or intelligence service worked 
independently until late August 1975" when the government decided to co-ordinate and 
centralize intelligence (Agger & Jensen, 1996, p 52) 
By 1974, about 10 000 people had lost their lives and by 1976, an estimated 2000 
people were said to be "disappeared" (Alexander 348-349) In 1977, DINA was 
dissolved due to pressure from the United States, but it was replaced with CNI (National 
Centre for Information), which performed functions almost identical to those of DINA's 
(Oppenheim, 1999, p 127) Since DINA and the CNI were responsible only to Pinochet, 
some authors have argued that he was able to use these intelligence orgamzations to help 
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consolidate his power withm the junta 6 These forces were used to eliminate any 
opponents or officers not supportive of Pinochet and his policies Moreover, since the 
army was more powerful than the other three units of the armed forces, Pinochet was able 
to secure the title of President of the Junta, a title that was supposed to rotate between the 
four members of the junta (Alexander, 1978, p 341-342) 
Two other factors led to Pinochet's strong hold on power First he took advantage 
of military commitment to hierarchy and authonty On September 21, 1973, he issued a 
decree that granted him power to rid the armed forces of any officers who were disloyal 
to him and promote those who continued to profess their loyalty Second, he was able to 
draw upon Chile's respect for the presidential system of government To this end, the title 
6 However, Kooning and Kruijt (2002) and Barros (2001) argue, in contrast to other authors that though 
Pinochet had acquired and consolidated significant amount of power, the regime was not a personalist 
regime and that Pinochet's hold on power has been overstated These authors argue that, it was first a 
military regime because "constitutional and legislative power always rested with the military junta until the 
very last day" (Kooning and Kruijt, 2002, p 119) The junta drafted legislation and approved constitutional 
changes and "functioned under the rule of unanimity, requiring the consent of all top military chiefs" 
(Kooning and Kruijt, 2002, p 119) Although the military was involved in all levels of government, 
civilians were also added to various levels to staff of advisory committees Additionally, there was still a 
distinction made between the military as a government and the military as an institution Most of the 
military was assigned to traditional national defense role The commander-in-chief was to lead the military 
institution while the president was to lead the government The majority of the officers were part of the 
institution and defense activities and "only the top chiefs of the armed forces, who constituted the military 
junta, overtly deliberated on policy and the deliberation of the regime's future" (Kooning and Kruijt, 2002, 
p 120) This maintained a "hierarchy discipline and obedience in the armed forces However, even though 
such organization attempted to keep internal dissent at bay that did not mean that it did not exist Barros 
argues that Pmochet's attempts to personalize powers were resisted by other members of the junta which 
tried to restrict his ability to influence or control the other branches of the armed forces as he did the 
military For example, air force commander General Leigh and Navy commander Admiral Merino 
"defended their positions in the junta and protected their command structures from any army interventions" 
and they may have agreed to a limited role in the execute m exchange of autonomy over their own branches 
(Barros, 2001, p 12, 22) Members of the junta did not also agree on the political and economic policies 
implemented by the military regime For example, m 1978 General Leigh, commander-in-chief of the air 
force gave an interview to an Italian newspaper m which he called for a return to democracy within five 
years (Barros, 2001, p 18) and blocked important economic reforms on privatization 
Given these debates, ultimately, this thesis holds that even though there may have been checks and 
balances in place and dissent from other branches of the armed forces, since Pinochet occupied both the 
commander-in-chief role and the role of President, he was able to acquire significant power as evidenced 
by this direct control over the repressive apparatus, which as previously has been established, led to a 
significant number of human rights violations 
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of "President of the Junta," worked to his advantage, because eventually, he was named 
President of the Republic (Valenzuela, 1991,p 41) 
Additionally, the armed forces developed a system of rules that defined how the 
military government operated and laid the groundwork for a new constitution in 1980, 
which was written by right-leaning intellectuals supportive of military rule and led by 
Jaime Guzman 
There is debate in literature to what degree Pinochet was able to consolidate 
power While Kooning and Kruyt (2002) and Barros (2001) argue, in contrast to other 
authors that though Pinochet had acquired and consolidated significant amount of power, 
the regime was not a personahst regime because checks, balances and opposition within 
the junta existed to limit his control, Alexander, Valenzuela, Uggla and others argue that 
Pinochet was able to acquire a significant degree of power particularly through the 1980 
constitution 
Pinochet's political model had three phases of political transition that took place 
between 1977 and 1985 First, instead of adherence to the constitution of 1925, Chileans 
would adhere to the junta's institutional acts Second, 1981 would see the start of 
transition to civilian rule with a strong civil-military government, in which the junta 
would exercise its power, and third, m 1985, "constitutional normality would reign" 
(Oppenheim, 1999, p 133), and elections would be held every eight years 
In 1977 the 'Chacanllaos Plan' was outlmed by Pinochet This was a timetable for 
transition to a civilian rule, "a process that would begin in 1980 and ultimately culminate 
in a 'protected democracy'" (Weeks, 2003, p 42) This plan struck a balance between 
factions of the military that believed there should be a quick return to civilian rule and 
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those who thought military rule should be indefinite After this plan was announced, 
DINA was disbanded and the CNI created In 1978 an amnesty law which disallowed 
prosecution for any crimes committed until that year was put into place (Weeks, 2003, p 
43) 
In 1980 a new constitution was written This constitution called for Pinochet to 
remain president until 1989, at which time a plebiscite would be held to keep him in 
power until 1997 The President had the power to make changes to the legislature, such 
as "the ability to dissolve the lower chamber and to exercise important prerogatives in the 
areas of economic and social policy" (Uggla, 2005, p 56), Nine out of thirty-five senators 
would be named by the armed forces or the supreme court (Uggla, 2005, p 56-57) The 
Constitutional Court also was given significant powers such as to outlaw groups and 
political parties that were deemed "totalitarian" and the power to force legislators "out of 
office" and "censure motions by legislators" (Uggla, 2005, p 57) The military was 
granted "the most formidable power" (Uggla, 2005, p 57) Under the constitution it was 
"impossible to dismiss the commanders of the armed forces during their tenure of office" 
(Uggla, 2005, p 57) It also stated that from 1981-1989, the junta would assume both 
legislative and judicial functions A National Security Council consistmg of the 
representatives of the four branches of the armed forces, the President and two civilians, 
was also created and cemented the idea of the military as the guardians of the nation The 
constitution gave soldiers the right to vote, yet limited freedom of speech The 
constitution was voted upon by the Chilean people and although there was a great deal of 
opposition to the constitution, two thirds of the Chilean population voted for it, while 
only thirty percent voted against it (Falcoff, 1989, p 98-299, (Oppenheim, 1999, p 132-
114 
137) Pinochet also called for a national referendum on his rule and gained 75% of votes 
m favour of his rule (Weeks, 2003, p 42) 
The 1980 Constitution legitimized the regime by providing a legal basis for its 
existence and ensured the kind of legacy the regime wanted for the political future of the 
country (Uggla, 2005, p 57) A plebiscite wrought with electoral irregularities was held 
to ratify the constitution, which was passed with 67 percent of the vote in favour of 
passing the constitution The Constitutions preserved military influence and autonomy, 
made Pinochet commander-in-chief of army until 1997, gave Pinochet the power to name 
the judiciary and stack the senate with military supporters with nine senators 
Implementation of Economic and Political Policies 
The goal of the military government was to reorganize the political and economic order 
Phase two of the military regime, lasting from 1977 to 1981, concerned the 
implementation of these economic and political policies The junta's repressive policies 
allowed it to implement neoliberal economic policies without any opposition At the time 
of the coup, the military was faced with high inflation, low production, scarcities of 
goods, and was unable to make its balance of payments, defaulting on its foreign debt 
The economic team, often referred to as the "Chicago Boys," because they had all been 
educated that the University of Chicago in the U S , espoused a free market ideology, 
which was evident m the economic policy of the junta (Alexander, 1978, p 399-400) 
The military also increased funding for the armed forces through legislation stating that 
ten percent or a minimum of $180 million from CODELCO's copper earnings would go 
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to the Superior Council of National Defense CODELCO had been nationalized by 
Allende so this meant that a significant portion of funds went into the military's budget7 
These economic policies suffered some setbacks and economic decline but on the 
whole they were successful in establishing the neo-liberal direction of the economy and 
granted "the military significant domestic and international legitimacy" (Kooning & 
Kruyt, 2002 121) However, these policies had consequences that had negative effects 
on the standard of living of working class Chileans and ultimately led to protests against 
the regime From 1981-1982, the military regime entered its third phase During this time 
period, it had to deal with the failures (from the point of view of the working class) of its 
economic policies These policies had several important effects Privatization led to the 
concentration of wealth (in terms of number of businesses and area of land owned) m a 
few groups Although government tried to stimulate foreign exchange and investment, it 
became clear that this strategy left Chile vulnerable to cycles in foreign trade The shock 
treatment led to increased inflation, mcreased price levels, frozen wages, unemployment 
greater than twenty percent, increased interest rates, an increase in the number of 
bankruptcies of Chile's important banks and a negative GDP for Chile These drastic 
economic costs also led to severe social costs Due to the high unemployment and 
increased price levels, people, especially the working classes, could not afford basic 
goods, leading to a decreasmg standard of living (Alexander, 1978, p 400-404) 
However, since it was government policy not to interfere in the economy, it took the 
regime more than a year to respond to the crisis During this time opposition to the 
military regime began to develop 
7 Personal Interview, Researcher at FLACSO 
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Mobilization against the regime 
The fourth phase of the military regime, lasting from 1983 to 1986, consisted of 
resistance and mobilization against the regime This opposition took the form of "Days of 
National Protest," during which grassroots organizations tried to protest the military's 
rule These protests were repressed by Pinochet, but they proved that Chileans had a 
desire for democratic rule Pmochet, however, continued to conform to the 1980 
constitution (Oppenheim, 1999, p 13 9-140) 
In 1986 there were large demonstrations against Pinochet and even an 
assassination attempt on his life This led the military government to declare a new state 
of siege under which 1500 people were arrested In January 1987 the state of siege was 
lifted and in March non-Marxist political parties were allowed to exist again The 
opposition to the regime included human rights orgamzations, labour and civic 
organizations and political parties such as the Christian Democrats The political parties 
realized that the only way to defeat Pmochet in the October 1988 referendum on his 
continued rule would be to form a coalition Thus, the Concertacion de Partidos por el 
No (Coalition of Parties for No), a centre-left coalition, composed of the Christian 
Democrats, the Socialist Party and the Radical Party, was formed This coalition 
mobilized 55 99 percent of Chileans to vote "No" m the 1988 referendum which called 
for Pinochet's continued rule (Government of Chile Plebiscite 1988 Total Totales 
Nacionales) The rejection of Pmochet's rule led to democratic elections in December 
1989 The parties that contested the elections mcluded the Democracy and Progress 
Coalition made up of the nght-wmg parties such as National Renewal (Renovacion 
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Nacional, RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (Union Democratica 
Independiente, UDI) parties and headed by Hernan Buchi Buc, the Progressive Union of 
the Centrist Center, a center-right party headed by Francisco Javier Errazunz Talavera, 
and the Concert of Parties for Democracy (the Concertacion) headed by Patricio Aylwin 
Azocar Aylwin and the Concertacion won the election with 55 17 percent of the votes in 
December 1989 based on a platform that promised to address the human rights violations 
that had occurred under the military regime (Government of Chile, Eleccion de 
Presidente 1989 Total Nacional) This marked the beginning of the transition 
Transition to democratic rule 
Chile's transition can be characterized by what democratization authors, O'Donnell, Scott 
and others have called a transition by transaction, or what Huntington called 
transplacement These are transitions m which the out-gomg authoritarian regime loosens 
hold of political power and one m which the regime and incoming governments negotiate 
pacts which often include a guarantee of roles for the armed forces and no investigations 
into prior crimes The incoming government of Aylwin had several actors and the balance 
of powers between them to contend with Pmochet and his complete control of the 
military, right-wing opposition parties, the judiciary that largely supported Pinochet and 
human rights organizations that demanded justice 
The transition was highly controlled by Pinochet and the military The conditions 
of the transition were that the democratic parties had to accept the 1980 Constitution 
Since the Christian Democrats and the Concertacion could not effectively pursue 
constitutional reform after pursuing office, they, along with the right-wing party RN 
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(Renovacion Nacional), negotiated changes to decrease the authoritarian nature of the 
constitution before the election After the 1988 referendum, Carlos Caceres was put in 
charge of the Ministry of Interior, who came to see the reforms "as a means to an end" 
which "were to ensure that the transition was orderly and to avoid forcing the regime out 
of power ahead of the timetable He also wanted to make certain that the constitution 
would not become an issue in the upcoming elections" (Uggla, 2005, p 58) 
The military's concerns were that it's autonomy, the 1978 Amnesty Law and 
1980 Constitution be respected Negotiations over reform proposals took place and 
eventually the following reforms were agreed upon equal civilian and military 
representation on the National Security Council, respect for political pluralism, 
constitutional amendments to matters unrelated to the armed forces were allowed a sixty 
percent majority and articles concerning human rights were rewritten to ensure stronger 
protection of such rights In July 1989, the constitutional changes were put to a 
referendum that garnered 86 percent of votes in favour of the changes (Uggla, 2005, p 
65) 
However, the military refused negotiate over its political role and autonomy, the 
"destruction of secret police archives," Pinochet's role as a senator for life in congress 
along with eight others, and over representation of the political right in the electoral 
system (Wilde, 2000, p 480) The Chilean military, unlike others m Latin America 
(Argentina, for example), left government in a relatively good standmg with its social and 
political support base intact Upon its exit from government, the military still had the 
following powers Pinochet was head of the army for eight years until 1998, a strong 
National Secunty Council (NSC), non-elected senators and an electoral system that gave 
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Pinochet allies m Congress, the President was not allowed to appoint commanders-in-
chief, he had to "chose from among the five most senior generals and admirals only and 
appointments [were] for a fixed four-year term" (Kooning and Kruijt, 2002, p 124) and 
dismissal was only for extraordinary reasons and with the consent of the NSC The 
military chiefs were allowed to "challenge civilian leadership without fear of punitive 
action from elected officials they may convoke the NSC and censure these elected 
officials, and they may overpower the President m the selection of senators and court 
members" (Kooning and Kruijt, 2002, p 124) This is the context in which civil-military 
relations existed in Chile after the transition 
Additionally, the new government also had no control of the Senate, 
where nine of the forty-six members were not elected, but rather, were designated 
to ensure a conservative, majority coalition Therefore the new government had to 
compromise with at least one of the right-wing political parties every time it 
proposed a new legislative or constitutional change (Kirtz, 1995, p 459) 
As such it was forced to leave the 1978 Amnesty Law in place because it did not 
have the political power to pass a change m the legislature Further, another actor m the 
transition, the judiciary, was sympathetic to the right and the military, such that "[t]he 
Supreme Court applied the broadest interpretation possible to the amnesty law, making it 
difficult even to investigate the truth" (Kirtz, 1995, p 460) 
However, since Alywin's electoral platform was based on addressing human 
rights, his government could not avoid dealing with questions of investigations and 
accountability for the violations of these rights without alienating the sectors which had 
voted it into power The only problem was that if the newly elected government was 
politically constrained If it pressed too hard on these issues, it feared that because 
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Pinochet was still in charge of the military, the democratic transition would be threatened 
by the possibility that the army could break its own rules and interfere in the political 
process once more As a result of these competing interests, the Concertacion adopted the 
idea of acknowledgement as its policy The coalition believed that full disclosure of truth 
would achieve moral objectives that the government felt would be its basic and 
unavoidable obligations prevent future HR violations, compensate survivors and bring 
about reconciliation in a highly polarized society It is in this context that the National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNVR, the Rettig Commission) was formed in 
1991 
Summary 
Amidst the changing nature of class and political relations in Chile, Salvador Allende to 
become the world's first democratically elected socialist leader in 1970 Allende's goal 
was to create a democratic transition to socialism and in this regard he implemented 
various social and economic policies that led to the social and political polarization of 
Chilean society This polarization led to the overthrow of Allende and his socialist 
government on September 11,1973 The junta leading the armed forces, led by General 
Pinochet, declared an internal state of war which allowed the armed forces to carry out 
brutal forms of violence against UP officials and UP civilian supporters In October of 
that year, General Arnello Stark began a campaign called the "caravan of death" in 
Northern Chile Under this campaign, political prisoners were found, tortured and killed 
(Oppenheim, 1999 p, 122-123) 
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During the 1973-1977 period the armed forces consolidated power through the 
use of torture and repression carried out by various intelligence agencies By 1980 the 
military government had implemented a new constitution which gave the military and the 
president (Pinochet) great powers It also helped set the stage for the transition to 
democracy which Pinochet and the military agreed to after Chileans voted "No" m a 
plebiscite on Pinochet's continued rule This resulted in democratic election in 1989 with 
Patricio Aylwm of the Concertacion coalition becoming President The transition was 
highly controlled by Pinochet and left the democratic government very little room to 
pursue its policies, particularly in the area of human rights Aylwin's election promises 
included pursuing accountability for the human rights violations earned out under the 
military government However, an amnesty law passed m 1978 by the military and the 
judiciary's lack of willingness to prosecute perpetrators made judicial prosecutions 
impossible at the time Constrained by the political circumstances the government 
decided to pursue accountability in other ways, namely through a truth and reconciliation 
commission it implemented in 1990 
The following chapter will discuss the commission in terms of its goals, findings 
and outcomes, followed by a discussion, based on firsthand interview data, of its short 
and long-term impact on truth, justice and reconciliation in Chile 
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Chapter 6 
The National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 
The National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNVR), more commonly known 
as the Rettig Commission after its chairperson, Raul Rettig, was formed by Presidential 
decree in April 1990 to investigate disappearances and torture only if they lead to death 
Aylwm had to form the commission by decree because the parliament was controlled by 
the right wing, which would never have allowed him to pass the formation of the 
commission by law As a result, the commission had no legal powers Some m the human 
rights community wanted a parliamentary commission, but it has been suggested that a 
parliamentary commission would have had representation from various parties in Chile, 
and since the nght-wmg was a majority m parliament, the report issued would likely have 
been a watered down, negotiated repot (Enscalo, 2000) This chapter reviews the goals, 
mandate and findings of the commission so that the reactions to it and therefore its 
success and impact can be understood m the following chapter 
The Commissioners 
The commission had eight members with various political persuasions They included 
Raul Rettig, the Chair of the Commission, an esteemed jurist and ambassador to Brazil 
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under Allende, Jaime Castillo, a human rights activist and prominent Christian 
Democrat, Jose Zalaquett, a human rights activist, and lawyer, Laura Nova, an attorney 
associated with the center-right, Ricardo Martin Diaz a former supreme court judge who 
wrote a seething critique of military court proceedings, Gonzalo Vial Corea, a historian 
who served as Minister of Education under Pinochet, Jose Luis Cea, a professor of 
constitutional law who was part of the negotiating team for Renovacion Nacional party 
during negotiations to democratic rule, Monica Jimenez, a grass roots mobihzer for 
PARTICIPA an organization funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, and 
Jorge Correa, the executive secretary of the commission whose job it was management of 
the commission's work The commission also had over sixty staff members including 
seventeen lawyers, six social workers to provide support to victims and families dunng 
and after the hearings, six support staff, eighteen law school graduates and law students, 
four researchers and documentation specialists, four computer specialists and four 
secretaries on its staff While staff was hired on contract and paid for their work, 
Commissioners were not paid Commission expenses, however, were covered by 
government funds through the Ministry of Justice (Rettig Report, 1993, Enscalo, 2000) 
Goals of the commission 
Over a period of nine months, the purpose of the commission was to disclose the truth 
about the human rights violations committed by armed groups between September 11, 
1973 and March 11,1990 The commission mvestigated "instances of disappearances 
after arrest, executions, torture leading to death committed by government agents or 
people in their service as well as kidnappmgs and attempts on the life of persons earned 
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out by private citizens for political reasons" (Rettig Report, 1993) It aimed to establish 
how these violations occurred and "gather evidence that would make it possible to 
identify the victims by name and determine their fate or whereabouts" (Rettig Report, 
1993, p 21) 
The goals of the Rettig Commission were in line with what authors such as 
Hayner, Kiss and Mmow have established are goals of TRCs In short it hoped to 
establish a record of the past, act as a space for victims to voice their truths through 
testimony which would enable a power shift from focus on perpetrators to focus on 
victims that could enable them to re-assert their dignity, act as non-judicial mechanisms 
of accountability in which larger collective responsibilities are determined, serve an 
epistemic function with the hope that future abuses would be prevented based on the 
assumption that when people know better they will do better, and finally enable 
forgiveness and reconciliation 
Methodology of the commission 
Although the commission had a very specific mandate as to what crimes it could 
investigate, it was "empowered to carry out whatever inquiry and measures it judged 
appropriate, including requesting reports, documents, or evidence from government 
authonties and agencies" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 29 ) Government officials and bodies 
were required to comply with the investigations carried out by the commission as well In 
June 1990, the victim's relatives were given opportunities to "register their cases, and to 
make an appointment to meet with the Commission" all over the country where regional 
commission offices were set up for hearings (Rettig Report, 1993, p 30) Offices were 
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also set up overseas m embassies and consulates so that exiled family members of victims 
could tell their stones to the commission The commission collected lists of victims who 
had died from the armed forces, police, labour unions, human rights groups and other 
organizations that had collected such data 
Upon registering their cases, family members were asked to provide information 
on agencies that may have collected information about their disappeared relatives during 
military rule, evidence was then requested from these agencies on these cases Over four 
thousand complaints were received and after eliminating errors and duplicates, over 3, 
400 cases were examined Each lawyer was assigned a law school graduate and worked 
on two hundred cases 
The commission started taking testimonies from victims' family members in 
Santiago m July 1990 Each session of testimony lasted a minimum of forty-five minutes, 
was attended by on commissioner, a lawyer, social worker and law school graduate 
Information that was gathered at these sessions included names of witnesses, details of 
court proceedings, the mvolvement of human rights organizations, and the harm the 
families had suffered as a result of the crimes (Rettig Report, 1993, p 13-17) 
After the interviews with families and human rights organizations had been 
conducted, the commission also began gathering evidence from government agencies In 
this regard, it requested information on births and deaths from the Civil Registrar's Office 
and the Electoral Registrar, with both agencies offering their full cooperation with the 
commission Additionally, whenever it could, it obtained copies of any judicial 
investigations that had taken place Hospitals, the Chilean Police, and General 
Comptroller's office were all contacted to corroborate any evidence mentioned in the 
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documentary evidence Of the two thousand plus requests sent out for information the 
commission "received a response m approximately eighty percent of the cases" (Rettig 
Report, 1993,p 33) 
The Commission also contacted all branches of the armed forces in cases that 
implicated their involvement In cases where the armed forces did turn over information 
to the commission, "it proved valuable for determining what had happened " However, m 
many cases the commission incurred difficulties in obtaining information from the armed 
forces In most of its replies the Chilean Army responded that 
in keeping with the legislation m force and its own by-laws, the evidence on 
such events that might have existed had been burned or destroyed when the 
legal period for doing so had passed In other cases the response was that the 
institution did not have any evidence or could not respond unless the 
Commission provided further information The Chilean Police almost always 
responded to such requests by indicating that the documents from that period 
had been legally burned In most cases they indicated that they had made some 
investigation to find the requested information, but these efforts proved 
fruitless except in a small number of cases On other occasions, the police 
answered that the evidence was part of a judicial investigation, and they 
invoked legal provisions currently in force to justify not sending it The Chilean 
Air Force sometimes provided the evidence requested, m other cases, however, 
it said that it did not have records of the events or that they had been legally 
burned The Chilean Navy replied to all the Commission's requests and sent 
material that proved very useful for the investigations In some cases, it replied 
that it did not have evidence on the situations about which inquiries were bemg 
made (Rettig Report, 1993, p 33-34) 
There were also attempts to gam access to records from the war tribunals under 
the military regime The navy and air force offered their cooperation in this regard by 
providing copies of sentences or trial records, but the Army claimed that these records 
had been burned m a fire started by terronsts on army property None of the branches of 
the armed forces provided information on the activities of their security agencies on the 
grounds that they were prohibited from discussing the activities of these organizations 
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(Rettig Report, 1993) When asked to provide internal investigation reports about armed 
forces personnel who had been subjects of terrorist attacks, the navy provided full 
cooperation by sending all reports, the air force supplemented such reports with their own 
information while the army sent reports in which rulings had been made m cases where 
its members had been killed, and the police did not provide such reports at all claiming 
that such information "had been legally burned or that they had already been sent to the 
courts" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 34) 
When the commission had detailed evidence of unnamed uniformed personnel 
involved in a case, requests were sent to the armed forces and the police to identify such 
officers The police refused to provide such information on the grounds that it was illegal 
for them to do so, but eventually only provided the names of retired officers, while the 
navy and an- force "responded by giving the requested names of officers in charge of 
particular units" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 35) When the commission could identify 
specific individuals by name, they were invited to appear before the commission to 
provide their version of the events that transpired One hundred and sixty members of the 
armed forces and police were invited to testify before the commission Most officers on 
active duty refused to testify for various reasons they claimed they did not have 
knowledge about the events m question, they had already provided information to the 
courts, or they simply chose not to give the voluntary testimony Only "[o]ne member of 
the police who was on active duty and one in the air force indicated their willingness to 
offer testimony A considerable number of policemen and one air force officer agreed to 
answer questions m writing" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 35) Many retired officers and 
officers m the investigative police did choose to come forward willingly 
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From October 1990 to January 1991, the commission made decisions on the 3,400 
individual cases by discussion until an agreement had been reached m each case Cases m 
which the commission's inquiries or request for information were left unanswered the 
commission recommended that the government continue investigations into these cases 
Finally, all the evidence gathered by the commission that would aid investigations 
into the human rights violations was immediately sent to the courts as outlined in the 
Presidential decree 
Content and organization of the report 
The commission released a three-volume report, two of which have been translated mto 
English The focus of this thesis is the English language version of the report The two 
volumes are organized mto four parts The first part details the concepts, methodology 
and work of the commission 
The second part details the political and historical context of the coup, the legal 
and institutional framework of the military regime, and the history of the military regime 
which is divided into three periods September 1973 to December 1973, 1974-1977 when 
the security and intelligence services such as DINA and CNI functioned, and 1978-1990 
during which CNI operated, the 1980 Constitution was formed, and the preparations for 
transition occurred The second part also consists of a discussion on the war tribunals and 
the behavior of the courts towards human rights violations 
Part three of the report, which is contmued in the second volume, consisted of a 
detailed timeline of the individual human rights violations that occurred m each region of 
Chile This section describes violations by the state, private citizens and non-state groups 
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and describes reactions to the human rights violations by various sectors in Chilean 
society 
Also examined is the impact of such violations on the families of victims Part 
four of volume two outlines proposals and recommendations for reparations, and 
suggestions for preventing future human rights violations and consolidating a human 
rights culture in Chile (Rettig Report, 1993) Finally, volume three, which was not 
translated into English, contains the names and details of the disappearance or death of all 
the victims whose cases the commission examined 
Findings of the commission 
The commission investigated 3, 428 cases and out of these it was able to make a decision 
on 2, 920 cases From these 2, 920 cases, 2, 115 were named victims of human rights 
violations, 164 victims of political violence bringing the total number of victims to 2, 
279 In 641 cases the commission decided it could conclude with certainty that the 
individuals had been killed for political reasons Further, 508 cases were received which 
fell outside of the commission's mandate and 449 in which there was insufficient 
information to carry out an investigation (Rettig Report, 1993, Appendix) Of the 
concrete decisions made on the 2, 920 cases, the commission ruled that government 
agents were responsible for 95 percent of those disappeared and killed Total killed m 
war tribunals, protests, alleged escape attempts and executions by torture was 50 5 
percent, while total number disappeared after their arrest was 45 2 percent 
Patterns of arrest, detainment and torture were discovered by the investigations 
earned out It was found that specific groups were targeted over various periods of time 
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Most of those targeted belonged to the Socialist or Communist parties, MIR 
revolutionary group Civilians who held no political affiliation were also targeted, 
sometimes because of their profession—academics and students, or because they held 
opposing views to the military The commission noted that the pattern of killings it 
discovered held the aim of 'cleaning up' society Many of the crimes were attributed to 
the intelligence services with DINA being held responsible for most of the 
disappearances and repression The Naval Intelligence Service (SIN) was held 
responsible for disappearances in the coastal areas, while the Air Force Intelligence 
Service (SIFA/DIFA) and the police (Carabineros and Intelligence Police) were held 
responsible for cooperating with these services Civilians were also found to be recruited 
for work in these agencies Based on its investigations, the commission concluded that 
torture and disappearance were a matter of state policy To ensure that such human rights 
violations never again occur in Chile, the Rettig Report made several recommendations 
for reform and reparations 
Recommendations of the report 
The recommendations for reparations and reforms made by the Rettig Report were fairly 
comprehensive In terms of reparations for victims, the report argued that restoration of 
victim's dignity and reputation was important because under the military regime victims 
had been shamed, called criminals and terrorists—accusations that may not have been 
true The truth commission was the first step in fulfilling this recommendation because it 
was the first time victims could tell their stories and have their disappeared family 
members respected 
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Symbolic projects for reparation such as memorials, parks, the creation of a 
National Human Rights day, monuments commemorating victims on both sides of the 
conflict were also important so as to build a collective memory of the events that 
occurred Exemption from mandatory military service for children of the disappeared was 
also suggested The state was called to implement material reparations in the form of 
pensions for family members, health care to address the physical and mental health needs 
of family members, housmg, and education for children of the disappeared The 
development of legal and administrative measures to enable families to deal with the 
disappeareds' legal status were recommended, so that families could deal with 
inheritance, property ownership, marital properties and the marital status of the spouse 
left behind once the disappeared was declared dead Free legal assistance to families 
wishing to have their disappeared relative declared dead was recommended 
The establishment of & National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
to oversee the above functions was recommended This Corporation was to provide 
support to victims who had testified before the commission, continue investigations into 
cases the commission could not solve, as well as register and support victims who came 
forward to register new cases by providing legal, medical and financial assistance to 
victims The Corporation was also put m charge of overseeing the implementation of the 
symbolic and financial reparations the Commission suggested 
To prevent future human rights violations, the commission recommended many 
specific reforms m the legal and judicial system The report suggested that the national 
legal framework be modified to take mto account international legal norms and that Chile 
should ratify any international agreements on human rights and repeal any laws 
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incompatible with international law In particular it suggested a re-exammation of the 
amnesty law and the constitution which it declared flawed, for any legislation that 
disrespected human rights Concerning judicial reform, legal training by law schools 
should provide education on human rights, and the juridical appointment system to 
should be reformed to allow for an independent and impartial judiciary The military 
judiciary should be independent, given human nghts education and have its jurisdiction 
limited only to military crimes Habeas corpus also needed to be improved because this 
was not at all respected dunng the military regime 
Reforms to the police, armed forces and secunty services in terms of human rights 
education, redefinition of national secunty with respect for human nghts, a re-evaluation 
of the concept of due obedience, and the integration of the armed forces and police into 
general Chilean society were suggested The commission also recommended that an 
institution such as an ombudsman for human nghts be created in Chile to ensure that 
human nghts are respected by the government and its institutions Finally, the 
commission noted that it was the government's responsibility to implement human nghts 
education, both formal and informal, so that a human nghts culture could be consolidated 
in Chile (Rettig Report, 1993) 
Summary 
Formed by presidential decree in 1990, the National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation (CNVR), or the Rettig Commission, after its chairperson the esteemed 
junst Raul Rettig was made up of eight respected commissioners representing different 
political persuasions and academic backgrounds The commission was given the task of 
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investigating cases of torture which had led to death and disappearances, but was 
provided with no judicial powers to compel testimony or assign guilt It had nine months 
in which to complete its work which included gathering testimony from victims and their 
family members from all parts of Chile and abroad The investigative process included 
collecting testimony from victims as well as requesting information from human rights 
organizations that collected evidence of crimes under the military regime and from the 
secunty agencies themselves Although information from human rights organizations was 
easily obtained the secunty services—the armed forces and the police were not as 
forthcoming with their evidence often noting that information had been destroyed legally 
or that they were prohibited from discussing intelligence activities Nonetheless, the 
commission managed to investigate 3, 428 cases of disappearances out of which it made 
decisions on 2, 920 cases Those cases on which it could not come to a decision, the 
commission recommended that the government continue investigations through an 
investigatory body to be set up after the completion of the commission's work The 
commission discovered a systemic pattern of torture and disappearance in the country and 
concluded that government agencies were responsible for ninety-five percent of those 
disappeared and killed Finally, the commission made recommendations for symbolic and 
monetary reparations for victims and for the reform of the country's institutions such as 
the judiciary, constitution and human rights laws 
The truth detailed in the report received vaned reactions among Chileans These 
and the impact of the report are discussed in the following chapter 
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Chapter 7 
Responses of Chileans to the TRC 
Having reviewed the literature data on truth commissions and their aims in a transitional 
setting in Chapter 4, the conditions that led to the set up of a TRC in Chile in Chapter 5, 
and the mandate and goals of the commission itself m Chapter 6, this chapter now turns 
to an evaluation of the impact and success of the Chilean TRC based on interviews with 
Chileans In-depth official interviews (30 interviews) lasting 45-60 minutes were 
conducted with members of those groups deemed to have influence on human rights 
policy formation Interviews were conducted with human rights groups, families of the 
disappeared groups, human rights lawyers, politicians, and government officials, 
members of the judiciary, academics, journalists, and the military8 
The sample may not be representative of all Chileans, but these actors were 
interviewed because they are the groups who initially had influence in the Chilean 
government's decision to pursue a TRC and continue to influence human rights policy, 
therefore their understanding of truth, justice and reconciliation are important factors in 
whether they support initiatives support any government policies that favour these goals 
To maintain the confidentiality of these sources, most of them have not been named If available and 
consent was given, their political or social affiliation has been cited in the footnotes The few exceptions to 
this are cited 
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To review, in this research success is measured by whether and to what degree the 
"commission fulfilled the duties assigned to it (Braham, 2007, p 17) and impact is the 
"sort of empirically verifiable effects a truth commission has m the transitional context" 
(Braham, 2007, p 19), these impacts maybe short or long-term It is difficult to quantify 
and operationahze measurements of philosophical concepts such as truth, justice and 
reconciliation and this research does not aim to do that Instead, in relation to truth, 
justice and reconciliation impact will be examined as follows concerning the impact of 
the TRC on truth, justice and reconciliation this research asks, has there been a change in 
the understanding and perceptions of these concepts since the TRC report was released to 
the present? Thus impact is measured m terms of whether a change in attitudes among 
those in charge of or influence over policy making occurred Additionally, with respect to 
the impact of the TRC on justice, have judicial prosecutions increased over time? Since 
baseline data on perceptions before the TRC took place are not available, a retrospective 
examination is necessary Thus, the perceptions at the time of the commission report's 
release are used a baseline m order to measure the change and therefore, impact 
The chapter is orgamzed as follows First, the immediate impact of the results of 
the Rettig Report in terms of the reactions of various sectors is discussed Then, the long-
term impacts in terms of the events relatmg to truth, justice and reconciliation that 
occurred in the years following the report are detailed Finally, there is an evaluation of 
what these impacts reveal about the Chilean case in relation to the literature on TRCs and 
the mandate of the Rettig Report The summary-conclusion to this chapter will then 
assess whether based on the aforementioned data, the Chilean TRC can be considered a 
success 
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Immediate impact of the Rettig Report 
As detailed in an earlier chapter, the literature has established several roles of TRCs, one 
of these is that these commissions can serve symbolic functions in society This was 
certainly the case in Chile For victims to have their stones heard for the first time since 
repression had become state policy was a very powerful moment for victims because it 
marked the first time the state took them senously 9 This—having then stones heard— 
was perceived by some as the first reparation for victims The release of Rettig Report 
was the first tune there had been any acknowledgement of torture, disappearances and 
repression as a policy of the dictatorship from the state Those who wanted to deny the 
facts could no longer deny them 
The report received little public attention and unlike the Argentine or Brazilian 
reports was not published as a book, instead the full report was published as special 
excerpts or editions in the state paper, La Nacion (Hayner, 2002, p 37) This excerpt was 
sold out and had to be repnnted Though there were several reports and debates in the 
media about the report, public attention to the report was minimal 
Each sector responded to the report differently The armed forces, judiciary and 
right wing were all cntical of the report, while the left, human nghts organizations and 
the church embraced the report Families of the victims welcomed the report, but noted 
the limitations of the truth it offered 
After the commission's report was released on March 28, 1991, it was reported in 
the Chilean press that the armed forces called a National Security Council meeting to 
9 Personal interviews with victims and human nghts organizations 
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discuss the report (Criticas y Elogios a mformes del Ejercito y Armada, 1991) The heads 
of the Navy, Air force, Carabineros and the Military made known their views on the 
report to the civilian authorities, the Home Minister and the Minister of Defense at the 
NSC meeting Retired officers called the report a partial and unjust analysis of the events 
that occurred in Chile and all branches of the armed forces and the Carabineros (Police) 
published their reactions to the report as statements in the newspapers 
Reactions to the report 
The armed forces perspective 
The army published its rejection of the report in the newspaper, La Epoca (Ejercito 
respondio al Informe del al Comision Rettig, 1991) It was published under Pinochet's 
name and held that there was a misunderstanding of the coup, which the army understood 
as an action of national restoration {accion de restoracion nacional) In a 22-page 
statement it accused the commission of trying to establish responsibilities without having 
the legal basis to do so It argued that even without naming names, the commission was 
so specific in determining locations and circumstances that it was possible for anyone to 
make assumptions about the people presumably responsible for the acts described in the 
cases described by the report The statement offered counter-arguments m a pomt-by-
pomt manner to facts with which the army disagreed 
In their version of the truth, the armed forces placed the blame for the entire 
conflict on the Unidad Popular (UP) and argued that the Commission only considered the 
violation of human rights during September 11, 1973 to March 11, 1990, but did not 
consider the violations of human rights (confiscation of properties, land, and businesses) 
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or the governance problems that took place during 1964-1973, and especially those 
fuelled by Unidad Popular The army claimed that the Unidad Popular wanted to install a 
Communist, totalitarian regime through a civil war fought with a paramilitary army with 
aid from Cuba For this reason, the army believed it was fighting an internal enemy and 
simply defending Chile 
The army denied that any human rights took place during the period 1973-1990 It 
declared the Rettig Commission irresponsible for presenting a truth based on alleged 
violations and ignoring the good the military believed it had done for the country As 
such it rejected the assumption of responsibilities for the facts detailed in the commission, 
particularly those which implicated the high command Pinochet said repeatedly that the 
army felt no need to apologize for protecting the nation and carrymg out its patriotic duty 
and he would not allow any of the soldiers under his command to be prosecuted for 
alleged violations 
The army maintained that it was an apolitical institution that did not align with 
any political sectors to further political aims or agendas It noted that the only reason it 
intervened m Chilean politics was because it was asked to do so by civilian authorities 
and used as evidence statements made by Aylwm and Frei in 1973 stating the coup was 
necessary in preventing the UP from implementing their political agenda The army 
statement denied altering the judicial system but defended introduction of various legal 
norms as necessary for democratic changes m Chile 
The statement also rejected many of the report's recommendations, particularly 
those requiring the restoration of dignity to victims because in the army's view these 
groups were responsible for causing the crisis which polarized Chile It was also agamst 
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providing exemptions for victims children from obligatory military service because this 
service was legally mandated in a constitution that it held should apply to all citizens 
equally 
On the topic of reconciliation, the Chilean military claimed it supported 
reconciliation as articulated by the President, but that reconciliation could not occur 
based on what it considered to be a biased truth For the military, 'nunca mas' was taken 
to mean that the military hoped that never again m Chile would there be a socialist-
Communist experiment like the Unidad Popular The army maintained that it re-
established social peace and democracy in Chile 
The Navy held a position similar to the Army's, while the Police and Air Force 
acknowledged the work and general conclusions of the commission, they also refuted the 
idea that there could be one single truth 
On March 28, 1991, the Admiral Jose Martinez Busch, head of the Chilean Navy 
published a response to the Rettig Report in the newspaper Much like the Army's 
statement, this statement provided the background and justification for military 
intervention m the violence in Chile Busch noted that the report was incomplete in some 
areas of its analysis because it did not take into account the severity and extent of the left-
wing violence Like Pinochet's statement, he also disputed various parts of the report and 
suggested the country faced an internal war at the time of the military takeover Although 
Busch agreed that the loss of human life can cause irreparable damage for society and it 
is important that Chileans understand the past, they must also understand the role of the 
navy was to protect security and the homeland 
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He further argued that since the commission was not a judicial body it was 
without rights to determine guilt Moreover, since the testimony provided to the 
commission was voluntary, it was not subject to counter-interrogation and could not be 
challenged in a court of law Therefore, it was possible it was politicized and possibly 
motivated by revenge He rejected the TRC's conclusion that torture had occurred on 
naval ships, like the Esmeralda and maintained that the report was impartial, lacked ngor 
and did not complete its objective The military only intervened in politics because the 
population demanded it put an end to the internal civil war 
The police statement by General Rodolfo Stange acknowledged the hard work of 
the commission and expressed respect for and the desire to participate in the President's 
mission for reconciliation However, he also argued that the though the Carabmeros were 
committed to justice and reconciliation for all Chileans, the commission was not 
objective and one was not bound to accept its truth Stange suggested the truth it revealed 
was incomplete because it did not consider that the Carabmeros also suffered as victims 
dunng the periods from 1970-1973 and from 1990-1991 (Carabmeros advirtio que 
considera mconvemente exponder la institutcion a "un juicio politico", 1991) 
Moreover, according to Stange it was impossible to determine the absolute truth 
about the violations it detailed He lamented that all the blame for the violence was bemg 
placed on the armed forces, which he maintained broke their history of non-interference 
in politics to protect the nation Stange also noted that the Carabmeros rejected any 
legislative reforms proposed by the commission that would weaken police ability to 
function in fighting crime The Carabmeros rejected the acceptance of individual and 
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collective responsibilities for any of its members, active duty or retired, until criminal 
liabilities were established by the courts 
Finally, the Air Force, like the Carabmeros was a little more moderate than the 
Army in its view of the commission In his response to the Rettig Report, the 
commander-in-chief of the air force, General Fernando Matthei, stated that he agreed 
with the histoncal analysis of the social, political and economic events leading up to 1973 
that the report made because it would be difficult to understand the situation in Chile 
without such an analysis Matthei's statement expressed the Air Force's regret at any 
losses of human life, both civilian and military, and reiterated that as the commander-in-
chief of the Air Force he would fully respond to that which happened under his command 
as required by the law and that he supported the goals of reconciliation established by the 
president and wanted Chile to be a healthy democracy (General Matthei, 1991) 
Additionally, retired General Gustavo Leigh, one of the original members of the 
Junta and former commander-in-chief of the Air Force also offered his opinion on the 
report He broke with other retired generals from the military and navy who had disputed 
and rejected the report stating that though he felt the report had errors and omissions, he 
agreed with the remarks made by Aylwin on the research conducted by the commission 
and that he assumed full responsibility for any actions the an- force took under his 
command (General Leigh assume su responsibilidad, 1991) 
The armed forces were not alone in their assessment of the TRC as a biased 
investigation mto the human rights violations The right wmg and the judiciary who had 
supported the military regime also released statements critical of the TRC 
142 
Reactions of the right-wing and the judiciary 
In the initial reactions to the report, the President of the Union Democrata Independiente 
(UDI), the right-wing party that had supported the military regime, Julio Dittborn, said 
that although some of the facts described were inaccurate, the UDI accepted them as 
described, noted the seriousness of the violations Additionally, Jaime Guzman, a right 
wing senator from the UDI appeared to express empathy with the victims stating it was 
natural for the families of the disappeared to want to know the fate of their detained and 
disappeared relatives However, overtime the UDIs position became more hard-lme and 
Guzman and Dittborn noted that the historical and legal content of the report was partial 
and biased and as such the report was not the whole truth, According to them that 
responsibilities for the violent aftermath of September 11, belonged to those in the 
Unidad Popular (UP) who created conditions for the civil war The right maintained that 
the report was far from creating reconciliation and therefore the amnesty law that aimed 
for reconciliation should be respected (La Derech opto por juicios divergentes, 1991) 
The President and Vice-President of the other right-wmg party, Renovacion 
Nacional (RN), that had supported the military government, Andres Allamand and 
Miguel Otero, noted that the violation of human rights must be condemned since they 
have no justification Allamand recognized the validity of the army and navy's opinion 
but did not agree with the two institutions that the report did not have historical and legal 
validity Like the armed forces, however, he agreed that the context of the violence, 
namely the extreme ideologies which led to the military intervention, needed to be 
studied Otero however, argued that the Rettig Report was simply one version of the truth 
and not the whole truth He further noted that Chileans must be careful not make human 
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rights violations synonymous with the armed forces The two men suggested that the 
nation should support the armed forces desire for reconciliation (La Derech opto por 
juicios divergentes, 1991) 
The reactions of the Supreme Court can also be classified with the hard line right 
positions m that it took on a very defensive approach to the conclusions of the report, but 
did not deny the facts The Supreme Court had been stacked by Pinochet with members 
who were loyal to him and so the institution issued a document outlining its opinions on 
the report in which it called irregular and biased against the courts It claimed the 
commission had a political objective and orientation The Court held that the report was 
not the whole truth as it claimed to be (Corte Suprema Redacto Severa Replica a la 
Comision Rettig, 1991) 
Reactions of centre and government 
The centre position was defined largely by the government and the Christian Democratic 
Party (PDC) and laid out in a speech by Aylwm on March 4, 1991 in which he presented 
the report to the nation and publically apologized to the victims for their suffering He 
reiterated that reconciliation and healing of the wounds created by the violence in Chile 
could only occur based on truth and justice He noted that the truth revealed by the TRC 
was impossible to ignore and stressed that it should not be considered an "official" truth 
because the state did not have the right to impose any particular truth upon its citizens, 
but that this truth should be recognized, as should the idea that violations of human nghts 
have no justification even during a time of war He made an appeal to all Chileans to 
accept the Rettig Report's version of the truth, respect the victims, and asked the armed 
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forces to cooperate with justice by providing any information they had on the 
disappeared 
Aylwin also spoke of the need for reconciliation and forgiveness but argued that 
in order to forgive one must know who to forgive Additionally, the he called for the 
harm done to the victims to be repaired The first step in this was his apology to the 
families of the victims He said, "In my role as President of the First Republic, on behalf 
of the entire nation, I apologize to the families of the victims" (Translation my own, 
Aylwin, 1991) He asked the armed forces, police and anyone who had taken part m what 
he called "excesses committed" to recogmze the pam of the victims and work to reduce it 
because reconciliation was a collective responsibility 
Finally, on justice, Aylwin stressed that it was important to determine the 
whereabouts of the disappeared and identify those responsible for the crimes committed 
In this regard, he noted the Rettig Report was mcomplete so the task of identification and 
punishment of perpetrators was up to the courts He thus requested the courts to open 
investigations into these crimes before applying any amnesty laws 
Leftist political parties 
The left position was comprised of the Communist Party (PC), the MIR, the 
Socialist Party (PS), and the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Radical Party (PR) 
None of these parties disputed or criticized the contents of the report The Communist 
Party and the MIR acknowledged the importance of the Rettig Report in informing 
Chileans about the repressive practices of the military government, but they also 
criticized the report for its limited mandate, noting that the Report had to be only the 
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beginning in the search for knowledge about the human rights violations which were not 
limited to disappearances alone but also torture, political imprisonment, and exile They 
suggested that the reports failure to name perpetrators signaled the continuation of 
impunity The Left also criticized the continuation of Pinochet as commander-m-chief of 
the army and the government for allowing key members of the Supreme Court to 
continue in their posts after enabling the military regime's repression The socialist party 
senator Jaime Estevez thought Pmochet's response to the report was insensitive given the 
suffering many have expenenced The Party for Democracy (PPD), the Socialist Party 
(PS) and the Radical Party (PR) all fully supported Aylwin and the Rettig Report and 
hoped that the knowledge gained by Chileans through reading the report would ensure 
that these kinds of violations and violence never again occurred in Chile (UDI de acuerdo 
con la Corte Suprema sobre mforme Rettig, 1991, (Senadores Opman Sobre Informe 
Rettig, 1991) 
Among civil society organizations who responded to the report were human rights 
organizations, groups of the families of the disappeared, and the church 
Human rights organizations and victims 
Human rights organizations and Families of the Disappeared and Executed agreed 
with the findings of the report but felt it was only a first step m bringing out the truth of 
the human rights violations The mam criticism these groups had about the report and the 
commission was that the commission had a limited mandate and because of this it only 
told half of the truth of the events that took place under the military regime The 
commission only considered crimes of torture that led to disappearances and deaths, it 
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did not consider other cases of torture that did not result in death Victims who had been 
political prisoners, tortured and released were also expecting an investigation and justice, 
but did not get it under the Ay 1 win or Frei governments10 
Another complaint these groups had was that the Commission was weak because 
it had no legal powers and because of this the report did not name the perpetrators or 
compel them to testify n Although some members of the commission had wanted to 
name perpetrators because it would have been a kind of sanction which would enable 
courts to open investigations into the cases, Raul Rettig and Jose Zalaquett argued that 
since the commission was not a judicial one, it had no power to assign guilt—only courts 
could do this The commission's adherence to the letter of the law provided it with 
legitimacy Further, the government was hesitant to alienate the armed forces and feared 
that if the commission had been given powers to assign guilt, the Comptroller's Office or 
Constitutional Court would have rejected the President's decree establishing the 
commission Aylwin was concerned that if his decree was rejected the search for truth 
would be more complicated It was reported after the report's release that a list of 
perpetrators names was given to the President in a sealed envelope and were to be 
released by 2016 to the public The commission's files in which names are named are 
held at the Aylwin Foundation and are inaccessible to lawyers 12 
Families of the Disappeared also argued that the Rettig Report did not provide 
sufficient information that enabled them to determine the whereabouts of their relatives 
10 Personal interviews with lawyer from Comite de Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo (CODEPU) and 
with lawyer, Hugo Gutierrez 
11 Personal interview with two lawyers, one from CODEPU, and one from the National Corporation for 
Reparations and Reconciliation 
12 Personal interview with lawyer from CODEPU 
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and demanded that the armed forces release any information that could help relatives find 
their loved ones (Interviews with victims, Families of the Disappeared) However, even 
though the report did not offer enough truth, an official acknowledgement that their loved 
ones died at the hands of state agents had an important impact on many families 
On the topic of reparations, the Families of the Detained and Disappeared Group 
(AFDD) said that measures of reparation cannot exist without the full truth (Famihares 
"Nuestra Problema no obtuvo solucion alguna", 1991) Additionally, they noted that 
though reparations did not erase the crime or take away the pain many families suffered 
(AFDD, 1991), they would be accepted by the families because it was a sign that the state 
recognized the "integrity and personal dignity of the Detained and Disappeared" (AFDD, 
1991, p 127) Families also wanted the amnesty law annulled so that investigations could 
begin in the courts and that reconciliation cannot occur in society until impunity 
continued to exist 
The Church 
The Church generally had a less critical view on the Rettig Report The Vicana de 
la Sohdaridad praised the report as making a positive contribution to truth It noted that 
the recognition of the violations and the acceptance of responsibility for these acts by the 
state were important acts of reparation and the first step m helping Chileans understand 
the past It asked those Chileans, particularly the armed forces, with information about 
the disappeared to come forward and requested that all Chileans should share m the 
responsibility to achieve reconciliation Regarding justice, the church pledged support to 
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the families in obtaining judicial justice, but asked people to forgive and not engage m 
acts or personal vengeance 13 
Influence of the Rettig Report 
After the assassination of right wmg, UDI Senator Jaime Guzman on April 1st, 
public attention turned to concerns about left-wing violence and the report's release was 
overshadowed It also forced the government to put on hold a human rights education 
program consisting of abridged version of the report that it had planned to go along with 
the full report14 The Guzman assassination effectively allowed the political class in Chile 
to put a hold on further discussions on human nghts violations In a March 1991 poll, 
ninety-one percent of those polled viewed Aylwin's speech positively, sixty-nine percent 
felt that the report did not contain the whole report, while seventy percent felt that the 
report was not a solution to the human nghts problem, eighty percent favoured judicial 
investigations and only 42 5 percent of the people polled by the El Mercurio news paper 
felt the report contributed to reconciliation (Kirtz, 1995, p 474) 
The impact of the report on the judicial investigations was that it allowed for open 
criticism of the judiciary and the Supreme Court which may have helped influence the 
chances of investigations and enabled lawyers to pursue legal cases with the evidence the 
commission had gathered indicating that crimes had occurred Additionally, since all of 
the evidence the commission gathered was passed on to the courts, many judicial 
investigations that started m the years following its release were based on the 
13 Personal interviews with Church leaders at the Vicana de la Sohdandad and at Fundacion de Ayuda 
Social de las Iglesias Cnstianas (FASIC) 
14 Personal interviews with CODEPU lawyers 
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investigations of the commission 1S Not only has the Rettig Report's collection of 
evidence been used m the Chilean courts, it has also been used in international cases 
against the state of Chile in the Inter-American Court, as well as in the investigation of 
Pinochet's responsibility for crimes in Spanish Judge Balthazar's case against Pinochet16 
Additionally, the Rettig Report was referenced in a second truth commission that was 
established by the Chilean state m 2004, the Valech Commission The Valech Report 
used the Rettig Report as a foundation of the history of the conflict It does not delve mto 
the details of historical and political factors that led to the installation of the military 
regime, instead, it notes that these details have already been established in the Rettig 
Report and directs those seeking a more comprehensive understanding of the background 
of the conflict to read the Rettig Report17 
For some of the commissioners, lawyers and other staff of the commission, as 
well as the victims, the commission, particularly the interview process made a large 
impact One commissioner, Laura Nova described the process as "cathartic" because 
people had a chance to tell their stones for the first time This not only helped the victims 
because it gave them a voice and official space in which their stones were dignified and 
taken senously for the first time, but also the commissioners who were sometimes 
surpnsed at the horror of the stories they heard (Enscalo, 2000, p 198-199) 18 
Chilean academics, lawyers, human nghts activists and victims agree that the 
although it did not garner the sustained mterest that it should have, Rettig Report was 
15 Personal interview with lawyer at National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
16 Personal interviews with lawyers at CODEPU 
17 Personal interview with lawyer at National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
18 Personal interview with Chilean academic 
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extremely important in Chile because it was the first time that the Chilean state 
recognized that crimes and human rights violations had occurred under the dictatorship It 
established that these kidnappings and killings were cnmes in accordance with 
international law and allowed these crimes to come into the public domain and become 
public knowledge Before the moment of the report's release, many Chileans did not 
know or want to believe that such atrocities had occurred in Chile After the report was 
released no one m Chile, even if they supported the military regime, could deny that 
violations of human rights had occurred, the report gave victims an official document 
which they could refer to at any time that said "this is what happened " Thus, the report 
prevented society from closing the chapter on and forgetting the past 
One of the most important measures in the release of the Rettig Report was 
Aylwin's televised apology to the victims This was significant because, as one human 
rights lawyer said Chile is a "country where we do not ask for forgiveness for anything"19 
Thus, hearmg the President acknowledge their testimonies was a historic moment and 
incredibly symbolic for victims because their dignity had been recognized in front of 
their fellow citizens by the head of state 
Most interviewees for this research agreed and much of the literature on the 
Chilean commission has established that the mandate for the commission was very 
strongly influenced by the work of Jose Zalequett's work on how societies should deal 
with transitions In both his oft-referenced article and personal interview for this research 
he laid out a framework that calls for a pragmatic approach to dealing with cnmes That 
is, societies must take into consideration the balance of powers dunng a transition and 
19 Personal interview with lawyer at National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
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then examine what means are available to address the problem of human rights 
(Zalaquett, 1991-1992) Zalaquett is an advocate of human rights policies that allow for 
complete revelation of truth in a manner consistent with human rights laws and norms 
prevent future violations and make reparations for the harms suffered He also firmly 
believes that commissions of inquiry that have no judicial powers should not name names 
because only courts after a thorough judicial investigation can assign guilt This 
pragmatic approach of the Rettig Commission made an impact on the Aylwin regime—it 
gave the Aylwin government an identity with regards to how it would treat human rights 
"justice and truth in so far as possible" was the phrase often repeated by government 
officials This is because the government was so worried about threats from the military, 
particularly Pinochet causing another coup Pinochet is known to have declared that he 
would not let any of his soldiers be prosecuted21 (Rosenberg, 1995) 
Finally, the Rettig Report's recommendations had a significant impact for victims 
Though, human rights organizations criticized the Aylwin and subsequent Chilean 
governments for not fully implementing all of the recommendations made by the 
Commission, the Aylwin government did implement recommendations about reparations 
and memonal projects The government created a National Corporation of Reparation 
and Reconciliation under the Ministry of Interior by decree which was in charge of 
continuing the investigative work of the Rettig Commission and providing material and 
symbolic reparations Chile developed a fairly comprehensive program of compensation 
20 Personal interview with Jose Zalaquett 
21 Personal interview with lawyer at National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
22 Personal interview with lawyer at National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation and with 
lawyer at CODEPU 
152 
for victims which included life-long pensions, compensation for prison time and lost 
income, educational benefits for victims' children, exemptions from mandatory military 
service for victims' children, and a national network of medical and psychological 
services that victims could access (Kirtz, 1995, p xxvu) Through its investigative work 
the Corporation discovered remains of victims and facilitated their return to their 
relative 23 The Aylwin government and subsequent governments, particularly the Lagos 
government created several symbolic memorials in Chile such as Villa Gnmaldi, the 
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National Cemetery, the renaming of streets in honor of September 11 and others 
Some victims and human rights lawyers have noted, however, that though the 
government provides funding for the creation of these monuments, taking them senously, 
thus maintaining memory is left only up to the victims because hardly any politicians or 
major public officials attend opening ceremonies for these projects24 Another problem 
with the commission was that because it took place so soon after the military government 
left power, fewer people came forward to testify and share their stones than would have 
if the commission had taken place after some time Many people were afraid to come 
forward with their stories and testimonies and crimes investigated by other human nghts 
organizations after the commission ended its work were not included or accepted by the 
commission Further, those victims whose names are not on the Rettig Commission's 
official list, and who came forward after the commission completed its work often have a 
more difficult time applying for and receiving reparations 
Personal interview with lawyer at National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
Personal interview with lawyers at CODEPU and interviews with victims 
Personal interview with lawyer at CODEPU 
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One the one hand the report provided an officially recognized list of victims 
which was absolutely invaluable, yet on the other, this works to the disadvantage of other 
victims who then have to prove their victim-hood Thus, the report has become 
authoritative account of violence but sometimes to the detriment of those who did not 
come forward in 1991 because they were afraid to do so at the time 
Finally, in terms of and influence on the creation of a human rights culture, the 
Rettig Report's impact is debatable Some Chileans interviewed for this research said that 
it had a strong impact because it came at a critical time and made people aware of what 
human rights violations were, but that its effects were overshadowed by the assassination 
of Jaime Guzman shortly after the report They argue that the Rettig Report has 
contributed to the consciousness and awareness of human nghts violations because even 
the right wing and the military have embraced the discourse on human rights and point to 
a December 2004 a military ceremony for new cadets where the keynote speech was on 
human nghts by Jose Zalaquett Yet, others suggest that at the beginning the report did 
not have a large impact because even though it was praised by victims and their families, 
it was not accepted by the military and the authors of the violations 
As mentioned above, the report did not receive as much attention as the 
government would have hoped Since the only widespread distribution was through an 
excerpt in the national newspaper, many Chileans did not read the report—not 
Oft 
necessarily because it was too long, but because it was too painful Hearing and reading 
about such painful practices and experiences forces one to re-examine relationships— 
family, friends, colleagues who may have participated it such practices are all put into 
26 Personal Interview with lawyer at National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
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question and people perhaps did not want to acknowledge or re-examine their role or 
responsibility in the violence and repression People often do not want to confront such 
heavy questions, so, although no one could deny that violations and repression occurred, 
it was easier at the time of the release of the Rettig Report for many people to turn away 
from the human rights debate 
In general, the development of a human rights culture m Chile has been slow and 
difficult It is hard to ignore that many Chileans have a poor understanding of what 
constitute human rights, they associate having human rights violations with torture, 
threats to life and unjust imprisonment, and violations of human rights are associated 
with the military regime and with the past Thus, in their view, smce the Chilean state no 
longer uses a policy of torture or repression, they feel human rights are being respected 
and honored by the state Additionally, at the time of the release of the Rettig Report, any 
talk of human nghts was associated with the left, so many people were hesitant to take on 
human nghts education because they did not want to be labeled "Marxists " A broad 
understanding of human nghts associated with a democracy has not fully occurred in 
Chile Rights to housing, food, healthcare, education, equal treatment under the law, etc , 
are not necessanly associated with human rights Though this is changing, it makes the 
work of human nghts organizations working on issues other than those of political 
repression, very difficult 
Personal observations of Chilean society 
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Long-term impact of the commission 
The theoretical framework of this thesis defined the temporality of transitional 
justice That is, there are several penods of transitional justice immediate, protracted and 
second wave transitional justice To review, with immediate transitional justice, judicial 
proceedings begin durmg the initial transition period and end within five years 
Protracted justice is that in which proceedings begin immediately but go on indefinitely 
until a resolution is reached Finally, second wave justice is that which starts immediately 
but is followed by a period of inactivity which may be years or decades after which 
justice proceedings are launched once more (Elster, 2004, p 75-76) Though Elster limits 
his notion of temporality to justice—legal proceedings, this research extends his 
conception to truth and reconciliation efforts m Chile as well Thus, the term 'transitional 
justice proceedings' here refers to the process of truth, justice and reconciliation seeking 
as a whole Based on the research data collected, Chile can be said to have followed a 
protracted path to transitional justice The immediate transitional proceedings began with 
the Rettig Report which started the process of revealing truth which later had 
consequences for both justice and reconciliation 
This section will examine the long term influence (defined as twenty years later— 
from the tune of the release of the report to the present time) of this report on truth, 
justice and reconciliation in Chile 
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Truth 
The successive governments after Aylwm have also had to deal with the human 
rights issue Two initiatives have been taken by three different governments over the last 
20 years that have propelled the quest for truth further The first came under President 
Frei whose government followed Aylwm's 
In its early years m power, the Frei government ignored the issues of human 
rights, even going so far as to announce that the transition was over 28 It was largely with 
Pinochet's arrest m London in 1998 that the government began addressing the human 
rights problem with the Mesa de Dialogo, a round-table discussion between the 
government, human rights community and the military, which was designed to foster the 
release of more information from the military 
Mesa de Dialogo 
During the early stages of Pinochet's arrest m London, the Frei government 
initiated a series of roundtable dialogues, the Mesa de Dialogo, m August 1999 The 
Mesa was a set of roundtable discussions to encourage the military to divulge information 
on the disappeared Representatives of each of the branches of the armed forces, human 
rights lawyers, activists, government officials and academics met, discussed and 
negotiated the human rights problem It was given a period of 2 years One Chilean 
academic noted in a personal interview that this roundtable had a precedent m Chilean 
Personal Interview, Researcher at FLACSO 
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history - after periods of political conflict opponents would come together to the table in 
hopes of reconciliation, which usually meant pardon and amnesties for both sides 
The objectives of the Mesa were for the participants to collaborate on truth, 
justice and reconciliation and dialogue with respect It was the first time that all sides had 
come together to discuss the human rights problem At the Mesa, the armed forces 
promised to provide information but with the provision that those who were willing to 
provide it should be protected with confidentiality and immunity from prosecution The 
air force and the army also wanted a time frame with in which disappearances could be 
considered deaths and therefore the Amnesty Law applied (because up until this point the 
courts had started interpreting disappearances as continued kidnappings, therefore as 
ongoing crimes subject to investigation and arrest) They maintained that abuses not a 
policy of the regime, but abuses of power by individuals and even so in the context m 
which the violence occurred 1 e ) military was dealing with a state of internal war The 
military wanted the focus on individuals not institutions 29 
In March 2000 the Mesa produced a document outlining common agreements 
made During this time, Pinochet came home to a ceremonial welcome from the military, 
and an embrace from General Izurieta, head of the army, which angered the government 
and other civilian participants in the roundtable discussion process 
In June 2000 the all parties at the Mesa came to a final agreement that the armed 
forces would provide information on the cases of the disappeared It was rumored in the 
media that the air force ordered officers to provide in writing any information about the 
29 Personal interview with military representative at the Mesa 
30 Personal interview, interviewee requested complete anonymity 
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cases they remembered and these were sent to the army who was accused of changmg the 
information before handing it over31 
Additionally, it was later found that the information the military had provided 
was false, the locations of mass graves revealed remains that turned out to be animal 
remains This furthered distrust of the military on the part of the human rights 
community32 
Though the Mesa did not lead to greater truth in terms of information about the 
whereabouts of the disappeared and could be seen as a failure in this regard, the value of 
the discussions was that for the first time the armed forces were willing to acknowledge 
that some abuses had occurred Though they insisted that these were individual cases, it 
was a step forward in the acknowledgement of the violence and a shift in their position 
from when the Rettig Report was released m 1991 At that time they had denied that any 
human rights violations had occurred at all 
The second initiative came under the Lagos government which also had to deal 
with the Pinochet problem after Frei Lagos was more proactive in dealing with the 
human rights issue—his government created the Valech Commission, a second truth 
commission to investigate those who were politically imprisoned and tortured There is 
widespread agreement that under Lagos, Chile "made the most impressive progress on 
human rights issues as well as justice reform and freedom of expression" (Jose Miguel 
Vivanco qtd in New York Times, 2006) 
j l Personal interview with lawyer at the National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
32 Personal interviews with lawyers, victims, and academics 
159 
Valech Commission 
The Chilean case demonstrates that reporting and investigating of the truth in 
Chilean society cannot be completed with one truth commission, especially one that was 
limited in its mandate In this vein and m the process of reconciliation, healing and 
acknowledgement, in September 2003 the Lagos government created, by decree, another 
truth commission on torture The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and 
Torture (Nacional Sobre Prison Politicay Tortura) or the Valech Commission, was m 
operation from September 2003 to June 1, 2005 The commission was comprised of six 
men and two women, Maria Luisa Sepulveda who served as the executive vice president 
of the commission, five lawyers Miguel Luis Amunategui, Luciano Fouilhoux, Jose 
Antonio Gomez, Lucas Sierra, Alvaro Varela, psychologist Elizabeth Lira and headed by 
Bishop Sergio Valech Its mandate was to record the violations of civil rights and 
political torture between September 1973 and March 10, 1990 committed by state agents 
and services The report identified victims and made recommendations for reparations It 
was released m two parts, the first in November 2004 m a televised address by President 
Lagos, the second part released in 2005 was an investigation of about 1000 cases that had 
not been covered in the first report due to time constraints 
The response to the commission was significant In six months, 35 868 persons 
registered their cases with the commission, which heard 114 to 240 testimonies a day 
throughout the country (United States Institute of Peace, Bacic & Stanley, 2005) The 
Valech commission released a 3 volume report and like the Rettig Commission, 
concluded that torture was widespread in the country so much so that up to 94 % of all 
those arrested and detained were tortured 
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Eight chapters of the report were devoted to testimony detailing the practices of 
torture used throughout the country According to the report torture was state policy and 
there existed 1, 132 detention centers which included police stations, military facilities, 
schools, hospitals and houses set up for the purpose of torture Out of the 35, 868 cases 
investigated, "33, 221 individuals were proven to have been detained, these victims had 
spent an average of 180 1 days in pnson Out of this group, 27,255 people were officially 
registered as victims of torture" (Bacic & Stanley, 2005)33 Most (87 5%) of these victims 
were male while 12 5% were females Electric shock was one of the most common 
methods of torture as was sexual abuse for females 
Like the Rettig Commission, the Valech Report also recommended monetary 
(pensions, education and health benefits) and symbolic reparations In 2005 life-long 
pensions of $200 per month, free education, housing and health care were given to 28, 
459 victims or their relatives The Valech Commission's contribution to expanding the 
truth of events that occurred under the military government ushered a significant shift in 
the position of the armed forces, particularly the military, on human rights 
Reactions of the armed forces to the Valech Report 
Under General Juan Ermlio Cheyre, the Chilean army underwent an evolution in 
its views on human nghts In 2003 on the 30th anniversary of the 1973 coup, Cheyre 
released a statement on the army's position on the coup and the human nghts problem 
33 Additionally, the second report investigated an additional 1,204 cases Similar to the findings of the 
Rettig Report, the commission found that "the worst penod of torture occurred immediately after the coup, 
as more than 18,000 (67 4%) people were tortured between September and December 1973 Another 5,266 
(19 32%) people were tortured between January 1974 and August 1977 and the remaining 3,625 (13 3%) 
victims suffered torture between August 1977 and March 1990" (Bacic & Stanley, 2005) 
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He referenced the army's Mesa de Dialogo statement noting that in that statement the 
army had already acknowledged that excesses had occurred He stated that these had no 
justification and the army would commit to complying with the courts with the condition 
to respect to who were "condemned without due process" (Cheyre, 2003, translation my 
own) He expressed the need for social peace, but stated explicitly that he was not and 
had no desire to be a political actor or have the military involved in politics under his 
command Cheyre reiterated that the army was an institution that belonged to and served 
all Chileans and with this he defined a new mission for the army as one that acts 
professionally m the matters of defense, international cooperation and the development of 
the nation The army, he noted was there to support citizen needs He also expressed a 
desire for reconciliation and stated that attacking the military "of yesterday" does damage 
to the military of today which is a different professional institution 
In November 2004, upon the release of the Valech Commission's report on 
human rights violations, Cheyre released another statement about the army's position on 
human rights In this he noted again that the Chilean army was modernizing and situated 
the army's past behavior in a particular context the logic of confrontation m the Cold 
War He argued that the Chilean army was drawn mto the Cold War ideology and acted 
in a manner which it believed was just and in the protection of Chile He did, however 
state unequivocally that this contextuahzation of the military's actions provided 
absolutely no justification or excuse for the violations of human rights He stated that his 
aim was not to downplay the army's behavior, but must it be understood in the context of 
the whole truth which must include historical context In this statement he noted that the 
army was instituting a program of human rights education withm the force 
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He noted the importance of truth and justice in overcoming divisions that affected 
Chileans Most importantly, however on behalf of the military Cheyre accepted 
institutional responsibility for the violations of human rights He said 
The Chilean army took the difficult but irreversible decision to assume 
responsibilities that fall on it as an institution for the punishable and morally 
unacceptable events of the past It has also repeatedly acknowledged the faults 
and crimes committed by personal directly under its command, it has censured 
them, pubhcally criticized them and permanently cooperated with the courts so as 
to contribute whenever possible to truth and reconciliation At the same time it 
has expressed its sympathy for the suffering of the victims of these violations, 
recognizing that the treatment they received is not consistent with the permanent 
and historic doctrine of the institution It does not justify these violations with 
respect to which it has made and will continue to make concrete efforts to make 
sure they are never agam repeated (Cheyre, 2004, translation, my own) 
Cheyre referenced the army's cooperation the Valech Commission and accepted the 
contents and conclusions of the Valech Report In his other public lectures and 
pronouncements Cheyre recognized that in present day Chile the army is hard-pressed to 
find any allies who will dissolve it of its responsibilities for its past actions or excuse 
them He recognized that the military had to deal with the dichotomy that as a rational 
manager of legitimate force, it cannot excuse or ignore that some of its members violated 
the rights of citizens and that this kind of behavior cannot be tolerated 
At the same time Cheyre denied that an institutional policy of human rights 
violations and noted that the assumption of institutional responsibility by the army should 
not be taken as an admission of collective guilt because mdividual guilt cannot be diluted 
in the collective The army as a whole would not accept guilt for individuals within the 
institution who broke from its doctrine to commit crimes 
Moreover, he argued that there are no legal precedents for establishing collective 
punishment, responsibility must be individually assumed However, he did acknowledge 
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that the institutional heritage of the army was used m the commission of these cnmes and 
that the principles guiding the army and its command structure failed He admitted that 
the army takes responsibility for its institutional decisions on September 1973 and the 
years following, but it should not have exposed its staff to activities of organizations such 
as the DINA and the CNI, which did not act in accordance with military doctrine for such 
a long period of time He noted that truth, justice and reconciliation are necessary but 
reconciliation does not have to mean impunity or erasing the past Under Cheyre the 
army has pubhcally rebuked any of its staff that acted illegally and encouraged any staff 
that has information about the fate of the disappeared to come forward and contribute to 
the truth 
The Families of the Disappeared called Cheyre's "Nunca Mas" an important step 
but noted that it should be followed by the release of information on the disappeared 
Despite these important steps in assuming responsibilities, the army continues to insist it 
has handed over all the information it has "including its admission that more than 150 
bodies were thrown into the sea from helicopters, firmly tied to heavy objects such as 
track rails to ensure they would sink" (Chile Government, Army and Police Take 
Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses) Other human rights organizations feared that 
Cheyre's acceptance of responsibility would be "used as an effort to avoid prosecuting 
offers involved" in human rights violations, but so far this has proven not to be the case 
as human rights cases continue in the courts (Chile Government, Army and Police Take 
Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses) 
Following the release of Cheyre's statement, the Director of the Investigative 
Police of Chile, Arturuo Herrera Verdugo asked for forgiveness for the human rights 
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violations committed by his institution He acknowledged the police's participation in the 
crimes and said that as the Director he noted that he and his institution had to accept the 
truth and consequently asked forgiveness from their fellow citizens and said that the 
Valech Report offered an opportunity for reflection and learning and hoped that never 
again would his institution repeat the errors of the past (Investigaciones pide perdon por 
violacion a DD HH durante regimen military, 2004) 
However Cheyre's statement was not immune from criticism from some former 
members of the army for taking institutional responsibility and from other branches of the 
armed forces who felt that Cheyre's statement forced them to also take a position on the 
human nghts abuses The Carabmeros responded by noting that their mstitution had been 
cooperating with the courts for years and as such had made efforts at national 
reconciliation through transparency, truth and the expulsion of any officers who were 
involved m human nghts cases (Violaciones a derechos humanos Pohcia de 
Investigaciones pide perdon, 2004) 
The navy on the other hand continued their policy of denial Admiral Miguel 
Vergara related to the press that although the navy did not rule out the possibility that the 
events detailed in the Valech Report occurred, as an institution it had no record of these 
events He added that if the report was accurate and violations did take place on the 
Esmeralda naval ship, he acknowledges them and offers his regret, but of the troops 
under his command, none were involved in human nghts violations 
The Air Force found itself stuck between the Navy and Army's position It did not 
offer comments on Cheyre's speech, but did note that since 1991 when General Matthen 
accepted the findings of the Rettig Report and accepted responsibility for the personnel 
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who committed the crimes, the force has been making efforts towards reconciliation 
(Fuerzas Armadas marcan sus diferencias, 2004) 
President Lagos praised the army for taking responsibility and lauded the step as 
an indicator of the army's integration into democratic Chilean society On the Valech 
Report, he said it was a difficult report to read, but that the report prevents society from 
sweepmg the past under the rug The right wing, the UDI, "downplayed the significance 
of the report" (Franklin, 2004) The right, consistent with its position on the human 
rights question since the transition, noted that the report's conclusions must be 
understood in the context in which the events occurred (Franklin, 2004) Others, such as 
former military generals, such as Guillermo Garin feared the report would only "worsen 
wounds" and not contribute to healing m Chile 
The release of the Valech Report enabled other reforms to be implemented in 
Chile One of these was a constitutional reform of the 1980 Constitution in 2005 which 
removed several restrictive clauses such as one which allowed non-elected senators to 
become senators for life, and one that prevented "the civilian president from sacking 
Armed Forces branch commanders" (Reuss, 2001) 
Also, in 2005 Michelle Bachelet was elected President Bachelet's election was 
significant not only because she was the first female president of Chile but also because 
she was a survivor of the military's repressive policies against her family Her father, an 
air force general under Allende was tortured and killed by the military and she and her 
mother survived arrest, torture and detention at one of DINA's most notorious prisons, 
Villa Gnmaldi Bachelet's government had to deal with the issue of Pinochet's death She 
ultimately decided that he would not receive a state funeral because it "would "violate 
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[her] conscience," and Defense Minister Vivianne Blanlot was the only member of 
government to attend" the funeral She also "reminded Chileans that they should not 
forget Pinochet's human rights abuses" (Housholder, CHIP website) and as far as human 
rights were concerned, even though courts are responsible for justice, more could always 
be done in terms of achievmg greater truth and in this vein she created the Institute for 
Human Rights which would allow other victims to come forward and register their cases 
of torture and imprisonment (Meneses, 2007) This body was chaired by Bishop Valech 
and the staff of the Valech Commission and classified 4, 000 new cases for reparations 
Another follow-up mechanism that was created by Bachelet in January 2010 as a 
symbolic form of reparation was the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago 
(United States Institute of Peace) to commemorate the victims and further human rights 
education among Chileans 
Also before leaving office, her government also re-opened the Valech 
Commission in February 2010, to accept new testimony related to torture, detention, 
executions and killings until August 2010 This initiative combines the domains of both 
the Valech and Rettig Commission and allowed more cases to be registered By April 
3,000 cases had already been registered by the Commission The move was lauded by 
family members of victims with Lorena Pizarro, President of the Group of Families of the 
Detained and Disappeared noted that" '"Without a doubt it's important It's crucial that 
the victims of state terrorism, such as the direct family members of those who lost their 
lives or were made to disappear, have the right to give their testimonies and be 
recognized by the state as victims of the murders that occurred in this country'" (Witte-
Lebhar, B (2010) So far, the new right-wing government of Sebastian Pmera, has 
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decided to allow the work of the Commission to continue, furthering the process of truth 
seeking 
However, no matter how much truth and justice have been achieved compared to 
what was thought to be possible and compared to other post-transitional societies, for 
victims there is still and perhaps always will be in Chile, the demand for more truth and 
more justice For victims the truth means the whole truth, that is exact information about 
their disappeared relatives—what happened to them in custody, how they were killed and 
where their bodies were disposed of In fact the slogan for the Families of the 
Dissappeard Group is "Donde estan^"(Where are they?) At protests or memonals, family 
members hold pictures of their disappeared loved ones with this slogan printed on the 
picture As mentioned above, though victims appreciated the truth revealed by the Rettig 
Report, many felt the report was a political project and convenience which revealed a 
social truth for societal satisfaction Many victims feel that a more satisfactory truth is 
revealed in the judicial process which not only reveals facts about the crimes but also 
offers reparation m the form of punishment For families of the disappeared, and victims 
who were tortured truth without justice is not enough, legal justice is the only antidote to 
their grief and they refuse to table the issue of prosecutions34 
The military and the Chilean government on the other hand, would like to close 
the chapter on human rights Today, military officials hold that the truth is difficult to 
achieve or discover after 30 years because most of the officers who participated in the 
events or were on duty during that time of conflict have passed away or are unwilling to 
talk about the problem Moreover, getting at the whole truth is not possible, a task which 
34 Personal interviews with victims and human rights lawyer, Hugo Gutierrez 
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makes complete justice even more difficult (Interview with General in Charge of Mesa de 
Dialogo) The military also maintains that though human rights violations are 
unacceptable and as an institution has taken responsibility for these violations, the 
conflict which led to them must be examined in the context of history—that is, the Cold 
War and polarizing ideologies that had taken a hold of political and social life Many m 
the military's current generation also believe that information on the arrests, torture and 
disappearances does not exist because they have been told all such information was 
destroyed As such, providing victims with the truth of what they want ("donde estan?") 
is a difficult task for the institution 35 
Justice 
There are several ways m which the Rettig Report has contributed to justice in 
Chile As with truth, the passage of time has yielded greater justice 
First, although the Rettig Report did not name names, it did assign guilt to key 
figures in the regime in a manner that it is nearly impossible not to know who the 
commission is referring to For example, though soldiers are not named m the report 
regiments, barracks and locations are mentioned, so it would be possible if one earned 
out additional investigations to determine the names of staff at these locations Further, 
indirect responsibility is assigned to Pinochet and the head of the secret service In 
discussions of who DINA was responsible to, the report says "Although the DINA was 
formally under the authority of the junta, in practice it reported only to the president of 
35 Personal interviews with Lieutenant Colonel at the Chilean War Academy and with the military 
representative to the Mesa de Dialogo 
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the junta and later the president of the republic" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 617) or 
" formally the DINA was under the authority of the junta, but m fact it reported to the 
president of the junta and the army commander-in-chief The DINA put itself directly 
under the supreme authority in this fashion so as to be protected from investigation or 
interference" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 621) The head of DINA is assigned responsibility 
in the following manner "It is also known that the head of the DINA and other DINA 
agents visited Colonia Digmdad and seem to have had cordial relations with its leaders" 
(Rettig Report, 1993, p 640) or "Each week the heads of the various intelligence services 
met at the building to exchange pertinent information The head of the DINA was present 
at these meetings" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 629) and "Enclosed with that response was a 
document signed by the head of the DINA authorizing him to be taken from his prison 
site" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 725) It is clear who the report is talking about m these two 
cases because everyone in Chile knew the President of the Republic and commander-in-
chief of the military was Pinochet and that the head of DINA was Manuel Contreras This 
indirect assignment of responsibility angered the army and particularly Pinochet 
(Ejercito respondio al Informe del al Comision Rettig, 1991) 
The report was assigned responsibility for complicity in the human nghts 
violations to the judiciary, media, professional organizations and political sectors which 
enabled human nghts violations to occur by not speakmg out against them and m the case 
of professionals and their organizations chidmg professionals such as doctors for 
participating in torture and lawyers and civil authonties for creating legal mechanisms 
that made torture possible 
170 
Though institutional condemnation of the Supreme Court was, as previously 
described, met with great hostility, over time the court acquiesced to the 
government's instance that before the 1978 Amnesty Law be applied, a full 
investigation be earned out to determine who was being pardoned The courts 
eventually bypassed the amnesty law through a re-interpretation of 
disappearances as on-going kidnappings, which meant that the enmes were 
current and on-going and could be prosecuted (interviews with lawyers, Judge 
Guzman) There were approximately 800 tnals in the courts m the early years of 
the Aylwin administration (Hunter, 1998, p 311) 
Initially the military reacted to these trials negatively by showing force m the 
streets of Santiago in what was called a Boinazo where army troops marched m Santiago 
Aylwin "interpreted the show of force to mean that the Concertacion had indeed pushed 
the military too far" (Hunter, 1998, p 311) and readjusted his demands for justice for the 
human nghts violations In this vein he proposed a law in August 1993 called "Ley 
Aylwin" which called for "a speedy conclusion [to the tnals] and foreclose the possibility 
of new ones emerging" (Hunter, 1998, p 311) Aylwm's own coalition rejected the law 
for being too "lenient on the armed forces" (Hunter, 1998, p 311), so the tnals contmued 
In the early days of the transition, the largest victory against impunity for human 
rights organizations and victims came on November 13, 1993 when Manuel Conterras, 
former head of DINA since its inception, was sentenced to seven years in pnson for the 
murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffat in Washington, DC, one of the only cases 
that Pinochet had exempt from the Amnesty Law He appealed the decision and was 
released on bail, but in May 1995 Supreme Court Judge Adolfo Banados sentenced 
Contreras and DINA's former Chief of Operations Pedro Espinoza "to seven and six 
years of pnson respectively" (Derechos Chile - Chronology, 1995) Public opinion 
supported the sentences, with "65 8 percent of Chileans who were polled m July 1995 
agreeing that "the generals should serve time" (Hunter, 1998, p 312) Pinochet, 
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determined to protect his officers from prosecutions but aware of public opinion at the 
same time tried to distance the army and himself from the convictions However, in June 
1995 just before Contreras and Espmoza were going to be arrested and taken to prison, a 
group of army and naval officers helped the two men escape and refused to turn them 
over until the Frei government agreed to put a stop to investigations into human rights 
violations (Hunter, 1998, p 311) 
During this time the Frei government engaged m negotiations with the military in 
which the armed forces demanded the government close the chapter of human rights 
trials, but which resulted in a special prison built just for Espmoza and Contreras (Hunter, 
1998) Under these negotiations Frei introduced that a special court be created to try 
human rights cases giving priority to concluding cases of the disappeared withm two 
years The proposal received harsh criticism from the leftist parties, human rights groups 
and families of victims and was blocked by the Socialist Party before it even went to the 
floor m Congress After this standoff with the military, the Frei government took a 
cautious approach to the human nghts problem and almost allowed it to disappear from 
its agenda As much as the administration tned to ignore the issue, it was forced back into 
the public sphere with the arrest of Pmochet in London m 1998 
The Pinochet case 
Based on interviews with Chilean lawyers, judges and academics, what follows is a 
discussion of the Pinochet case and its impact on justice in Chile 
In January 1998, the secretary of the Communist Party, Gladys Mann filed a case 
against Pinochet m Chile which came to Senior Judge Guzman This shocked to Chileans 
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because up until this point no one had dared to present cases against him in the courts 
This disbelief was further mcreased when, on October 16, 1998, Pinochet was arrested in 
London on an arrest warrant issued by Judge Guzman as part of a case presented by 
victims against him m Spam This was a groundbreaking moment m Chile He was 
charged with torture, disappearances, kidnapping, and conspiracy to murder Pinochet 
was one of 38 Chileans against whom these charges were laid The arrest demonstrated 
that that Chile was still deeply polarized 
The left, victims and human rights activists were overjoyed because it was exactly 
what they had been waitmg for—if justice could not be done in Chile, it would be done 
abroad The right wmg was angry that he had been arrested, they felt that other countries 
had no jurisdiction on over Chilean citizens for crimes committed on Chilean soil Some 
publicly supported Pinochet while others publicly distanced themselves from him (I e 
presidential candidate Joaquin Lavm, who visited Pinochet m London, but publicly 
distanced himself from the General in Chile) Generally the reaction on the right was that 
his arrest was a conspiracy, most people were initially hesitant to believe that he could be 
a criminal 
The Frei government scrambled to respond to the Pmochet arrest Government 
officials stated that it was wrong that he was arrested abroad, that London and Spain were 
infringing on Chile's legal and political sovereignty They argued that Pmochet was old, 
in poor health and should be returned to Chile because justice could be done m Chile—as 
a Chilean citizen he should be tried m his home country The government staked its 
international reputation on the fact that he could and would be tried at home Margaret 
Thatcher even issued a statement in support of Pmochet and the Chilean governments 
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request to bring him home In fact, analysts argue that the only option the government 
had was to say that Chilean courts would try him because it would have been very 
difficult for England to justify his release based solely on the fact that he was an old man 
and in poor health36 
Ultimately he was extradited to Chile by British courts and when he was brought 
home the cases against him had to go ahead As such, when he returned to Chile in March 
2000 the cases against him multiplied These included both human rights cases and cases 
of corruption and fraud The human rights cases, particularly the one presented by Gladys 
Mann, fell to Judge Guzman, who noted that while Pinochet was in London Guzman sent 
him a list of seventy-five questions he wanted answered and Pinochet replied to all the 
questions with one line that he was not responsible for the crimes that were being 
attributed to him Regardless, when Pinochet returned to Chile, his immunity (which he 
had granted himself by naming himself senator for life and through the amnesty laws) 
was lifted and after an examination by his doctors (who did not declare him unfit but did 
declare he had mild to moderate dementia) Guzman decided he was fit and indicted him 
The advantage of Pinochet bemg brought back to Chile in March 2000 was that Chileans 
started learning about what had or had not done Judges of their own nationality began 
investigating him and therefore they could not claim that this was an intervention of 
foreign states into Chilean affairs, the Pinochet could not be victimized in that way As a 
result, over the years Pinochet's reputation was destroyed m Chile He became politically 
irrelevant—nght wing parties and politicians who once supported him started distancing 
themselves, even the military (at least publicly under Cheyre) began distancing itself 
36 Personal interview with Judge Guzman and lawyers from CODEPU 
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from him Due to the corruption cases agamst him people started to doubt him, they 
thought if he lied about stealing money perhaps he had also lied about the human rights 
violations His arrest forced many sectors such as the right, to acknowledge widespread 
human rights abuses, and forced the nght into consider addressing the human rights issue 
Pinochet's arrest was problematic for the military also because it seemed to lift 
attention from the modernization that the new commander-in-chief, General Ricardo 
Izuneta, who had been appointed to the high command in March 1998, was trying to 
implement 
The military was angered by Pinochet's arrest, and all branches of the armed 
forces made public pronouncements of their support for him and demanded his return 
Dunng the first years of the Pinochet case, the army continually proclaimed support for 
Pinochet, even using the media to make its displeasure of the general's prosecution 
known The indictment and order of arrest for Pinochet in December 2000 caused 
military dissatisfaction so it asked the President to call a National Secunty Council 
(NSC) meeting and implied that if Lagos did not do so the military chiefs would Lagos 
voiced his opinion that the NSC should not exist and that "the judiciary should not be a 
part of the NSC agenda" but called (and later delayed) the meeting "until the Supreme 
Court decide upon an appeal of Pinochet's order of arrest" (Kooning & Kruyt 2002, p 
129) Eventually the military accepted Lagos' stance that it let "the judiciary work 
without interference" (Kooning & Kruyt 2002, p 127) 
The arrest and changing public opinion signaled to the army that it was becoming 
increasingly isolated so Izuneta tned to be more cooperative or at least put forth an image 
of cooperation He was willing "to provide courts with the names of all army officers 
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working in the former CNI" and he accepted the invitation to be a part of Mesa de 
Dialogo Izuneta also asked one general, General Ramirez to "resign his commission" 
after he was indicted "for his responsibility in the assassination of a major union leader in 
1982" (Kooning & Kruyt 2002, p 129) The military also accepted, albeit "reluctantly, 
the Supreme Court's decision to strip Pinochet of immunity from prosecution" (Kooning 
& Kruyt 2002, p 129) 
When Pinochet refused to show up for a medical examination ordered by the 
court, General Cheyre, by then new commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and other 
commanding generals visited him and expressed to him that the if he did not cooperate 
with the courts or the judges' investigations the army would not support him He often 
found himself under house arrest and was never declared innocent by the courts 
Since Pinochet's arrest the numbers of other cases in the Chilean courts have 
increased significantly 
The transitional justice literature based on victim needs holds that without justice 
reconciliation cannot occur In this regard, the following section examines to what degree 
reconciliation has occurred in Chile 
Reconciliation 
Reconciliation is still a contested concept in Chile The Rettig Report hoped that the truth 
would lay the foundation for reconciliation to occur but reconciliation was not its explicit 
goal, nor was what this reconciliation would look like defined or articulated m any of the 
policy positions the government took 
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Victims have always connected reconciliation to justice and particularly to 
punishment For victims there will be no reconciliation with the perpetrators until 
appropriate punishments are meted out 
Reconciliation is hard to measure or quantify, but there are different levels and 
indicators of reconciliation that we can consider There is reconciliation between the state 
and its citizens, the state and victims, the state and military, between political parties, 
among general society and between perpetrators and victims 
Certainly the latter, reconciliation between perpetrators and victims, has not yet 
occurred and will most likely not occur until there are one or two generational changes 
Even then, the idea of remembered victimhood (where victimhood is passed down 
through memories among families, much like with Holocaust victims) has occurred to 
some degree in Chile and blocked this level of reconciliation37 For victims reconciliation 
is associated with impunity and they are hesitant to reconcile with the perpetrators until 
they have received the full truth about their disappeared relatives and justice for the 
human rights violations they suffered How much truth and justice are enough to forge 
reconciliation is a question that is difficult to answer 
As far as reconciliation between political parties, political reconciliation has 
occurred in Chile Political elites on all sides realize and accept that despite their 
differences, to make democracy work they must work together, the question of human 
rights has been left to the judicial system and does not occupy political debate (Interview 
Carlos Huenes and conversations with victims) 
Personal observations of Chilean society and victim-youth interaction 
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Reconciliation between the state and the military has occurred overtime as 
evidenced by changes in civil-military relations over the years The relationship between 
the military and the Aylwm government from 1990 to 1994, was tense at best because 
Pinochet was still the commander-in-chief of the army and very adamant that no changes 
to the constitution he left behind and his soldiers not be prosecuted The military tried to 
secure guarantees of the powers they had acquired while in power while at the same time 
the civilian government tried to assert its authority over the military leading to highly 
confrontational relations 38 
For the most part, President Aylwin viewed military reactions to civilian 
challenges not as final ultimatums but as tactical bargaining maneuvers designed 
to protect the institution's position withm the democratic order Hence, he did 
not concede immediately to signs of military discontent (Hunter, 1998, p 309) 
Aylwin took several actions to ensure civilian authority over the armed forces 
The first confrontation that occurred between Pinochet and Aylwin took place when 
Pinochet proposed a list of generals to be promoted and Aylwin refused the authonzation 
of a general who had an extremely bad record on human rights Pinochet took the 
decision to the Constitutional Court and argued that the President was bound to take the 
choices into consideration The Court, however, ruled in favour of the President, which 
"clearly established limits to the enormous power of the commander-in-chiefs of the 
armed forces, and restored a minimum bargainmg resource for the President" (Kooning 
& Kruyt, 2002, p 124, Hunter, 1998, 309) The military's internal security functions 
were also minimized when the Interior Ministry regained control over the Carabmeros 
who had been under the Ministry of Defense for seventeen years The government also 
38 Personal interview with researcher at FLACSO and Lieutenant-Colonel at the Chilean War Academy 
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limited army participation m a new anti-terrorism agency called the Oficma 
Coordinadora de Segundad Publica (Office for the Coordination of Public Security) 
Defense budgets were decreased from 11 34 percent in 1989 to 8 99 percent of the 
national budget m 1994 This was a significant achievement since before leaving office 
the military had secured a law, the Organic Law of the Armed Forces which secured 
guaranteed the military budgets not fall below 1989 levels and a percentage of the copper 
earnings be dedicated to military budgets 39 
The Aylwin government also passed a reform that "confined the National Security 
Council to an advisory role and eliminated the military's majority status on the council" 
(Hunter 309) Constitutional reforms regarding the military, such as Presidential ability to 
dismiss military commanders, were harder for Aylwin to make because the members of 
the political right in Congress vetoed his proposals Before the release of the Rettig 
Report, Pinochet called his troops to be ready to march in December 1990, however, 
more professional sectors of the army, the navy and air force dissented and the army was 
forced to adopt a low-profile approach until and after the release of the Rettig Report 
However, by May 1993, Hunter notes that civil-military tensions resurfaced and "on-
going trials (approximately 800) distressed the officer corps deeply" (Hunter, 1998, p 
310) Alywrn's efforts to calm the military by limiting human rights trials were rejected 
by his own coalition and his government ended on tense terms with the military, 
particularly where the human rights question was concerned 
Investigations on corruption involving the military and Pmochet's son also began 
in Congress The military felt frustrated with the civilian leadership and by these 
39 Personal interview with researcher at FLACSO 
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investigations, but at the same time needed the administration to approve budges, 
equipment purchases and international training Moreover the Minister of defense 
pressured for Pinochet's resignation "The army reacted to this perceived hostile 
environment by staging acts of protest in defiance of civilian authorities, forcing 
concessions from the government These acts, supported by the other armed services, 
consisted of unannounced military exercises, with full billeting of the forces, publically 
displaying defiance" (Kooning & Kruijt, 2002, p 126) The government negotiated, 
reassured the military about budges and shelvmg investigations mto Pinochet's son's 
financial connections with the army Opposition did not allow any reforms to the 
constitution that the government proposed but the government did not budge on military 
promotions and human rights investigations 
In 1994 Frei came to power, for the first part of its rule, the Frei administration 
declared that the transition to democracy was over and that it was time for the 
government and nation to look to the future The government followed a policy of 
accommodation when it came to the armed forces The defense minister under Frei, 
Edmundo Perez-Yoma "developed an excellent relationship with Pinochet, so much so 
that Pinochet rated him the best minister in the cabinet and awarded him an official army 
decoration m a special ceremony" (Kooning & Kruijt, 2002 p 127) This policy of 
appeasing the military meant "the maintenance of status quo on practically all civil-
military fronts" (Kooning & Kruyt, 2002 p 127) However there was discontent with the 
policy of appeasement when Pinochet decided to take his senate seat in March 1998, with 
the right-wing parties in charge of congress 
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During this time the government continued decreasing defense expenditure which 
fell from 8 99 percent in 1994 to 8 65 percent in 1995 and continued a precautious 
approach to the human rights issue with tensions arising with Pinochet and the army over 
the sentencing of Contreras and over the arrest of Pinochet in October 1998 However, 
once there was a change in the high command of the army, the relationship between the 
military and the civilian government did shift Frei appointed General Ricardo Izurieta m 
March 1998, who had been an undersecretary of war under Pinochet in 1989 He had the 
lowest seniority of the five officers from whom Frei was allowed to pick a new 
commander-in-chief Izuneta's new mission for the army was to professionalize and 
modernize the institution and move it away from direct involvement in political affairs 40 
No sooner was he in command, did Izurieta have to deal with the crisis of 
Pinochet's arrest m London When Pinochet was first arrested, there were fears of a coup 
among some sectors of society Izurieta was quick to quell these fears but still gave the 
army's support to Pinochet, saying, the army "would use 'all its forces to bring the 
captain general (General Pinochet's honorary title) back to our national territory as soon 
as possible ' But he added, significantly, that the military would act 
'through government channels'" (Davidson, 1998) When Pinochet was returned to Chile 
by Bntish authonties the army organized a reception for him that was attended by several 
supporters and members of the right wing political parties, the UDI and the RN, an act 
that was repnmanded by civilian authonties in the Concertacion government Izuneta 
also declared, "the Armed Forces would 'lend their permanent support and solidanty m 
Personal interview with Lieutenant-Colonel at the Chilean War Academy 
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all eventualities' to their mentor He openly aligned the military to Pinochet's nghtwmg 
supporters in the parliamentary opposition" (Saavedra, 2000) 
Raul Troncoso, the Interior Minister under Frei "expressed [the government's] 
unhappiness with the Army's decision to organise a reception on behalf of Pinochet It is 
absolutely rational that Pinochet's supporters go to the airport to receive the general, but it 
is something else to have an official reception organised by the military We feel it is 
inappropriate given the situation'(Saavedra, 2000) 
While the government had publicly decried the army's celebration and solidarity 
with Pinochet, behind the scenes there was closer cooperation with the army on securing 
Pinochet's release from British authorities Frei promised the armed forces that Pinochet 
would be returned to Chile before his term ended and delivered on his promise "with 
seven days to spare" (Saavedra, 2000) Another sign of cooperation between the military 
and the government was the ability of the government to get the army to agree to the 
Mesa de Dialogo 
The government of Ricardo Lagos was more committed to the human rights 
problems than the Frei government (even though at times there was pressure on Judge 
Guzman by the Lagos administration to drop his investigations of Pinochet) Lagos 
expressed his displeasure for the army's lack of respect for civil authorities to Izuneta 
several times and civil-military relations under Lagos-Izuneta were not always smooth 
In 2002, Lagos appointed a new Minister of Defense, Michelle Bachelet, who despite 
being a victim of the military regime made several positive comments about the military 
in her first few months in office and established a positive relationship with the armed 
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forces Lagos also appointed a new commander-in-chief, General Juan Emiho Cheyre 
who had been educated and lived abroad and was willing to work with the civil 
authorities His goal was to develop a professional army, subordinated to civilian 
authorities Aside from a few instances where Cheyre was criticized by civilian 
authorities for criticizing the human rights case proceedings as 'slow' (El Mercurio 
September 21, 2004), under Cheyre the military largely refrained from commenting on 
political affairs For example, the army's publication, the "Memorial el Ejercito has not 
published any articles analyzing the military's role in Chilean politics, which was a staple 
of articles in the 1990s" (Weeks, 2007, 11) In sum, relations between Lagos and Cheyre 
have been descnbed by many as good 
Civil-military relations under Bachelet were influenced by progress made under 
the Lagos administration, namely the military's shift m view on responsibilities for 
human rights violations and the 2005 constitutional reforms which removed several 
authoritarian elements of the 1980 constitution, (Weeks 2007, 8) This meant, the 
Bachelet government was "the first that [did] not have to spend a significant portion 
of its energies in undoing all that was "tightly tied up," which was left by the military 
regime" (Argentine Ambassador qtd in Weeks, 2007, 9) "The message was that the 
constitutional reforms had erased the problematic aspects of military autonomy, and 
consequently the Bachelet government need not get distracted from its core policy goals" 
(Weeks, 2007, 9) Also, just as Bachelet was entering office, there was a change in 
command m the army General Cheyre was replaced by General Oscar Izuneta There has 
not been much analysis on relations between Izuneta and the Bachelet government but 
41 Personal interview with Lieutenant-Colonel at the Chilean War Academy and researcher at FLACSO 
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what data there is, indicates that there was a cordial relationship between the two 
institutions In 2006 Izuneta expressed the desire to see all pending human nghts cases 
come to an end so that the Chilean transition to democracy could be declared complete 
The armed forces have now found civilian support for their desire to see human 
rights cases completed within a time frame, namely from presidents Aylwin and even 
Lagos 
Though it sees itself as cooperatmg with the courts, the army tries to distance 
itself from these cases as much as possible This was evidenced in the sentencing of 
retired General Raul Iturriaga, a high profile member of the military regime who 
was sentenced to five years in prison for kidnapping, but m 2007 issued a 
statement of protest and went into hiding He received little public support other 
than from the Group of Retired Generals and General Izuneta immediately 
distanced himself and even said publicly the case was problematic for the army 
(Weeks, 2007,10) 
By all accounts the relationship between the Bachelet government and the 
military has been one of the best smce the transition took place Though the military still 
has autonomy in the areas of military justice, intelligence and budgets, it can be said the 
in general the military leadership is now in a position that is subordinated to civilian 
authorities 
These changes in civil-military relations ranging from extremely tense to almost 
complete subordination are indicative that reconciliation at a political level—between the 
state, political authorities and the military has occurred m Chile 
What do these effects and impacts reveal about the Chilean case in relation to the 
literature on truth commissions and transitional justice7 The following section offers a 
brief analysis in this regard 
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Evaluation of the Rettig Report 
To turn now to the central question of this thesis based on the above data this section 
will evaluate whether the Chilean TRC accomplished its duties and whether it can be 
considered a successful TRC In this regard what follows is an evaluation how the TRC 
accomplished its mandate with respect to truth, justice and reconciliation 
To review, the mandate of the commission was to establish a truth on the "most 
senous human nghts violations committed" (Rettig Report, 1993, 24) which were defined 
as disappearances after arrest, executions, torture leading to deal and political violence 
committed by pnvate citizens The commission's task was to collect evidence that would 
make it possible to identify victims and then- whereabouts, recommend reparations for 
victims and legal and administrative measures to prevent future violations, prepare a 
report based on the evidence collected and present this to President and the public 
Truth 
The TRC did complete its mandate in regards the establishment of truth As the literature 
on truth and reconciliation indicates, there are varying levels and kinds of truth in 
transitional societies In Chile, the Rettig Report dealt with histoncal, narrative or 
personal and moral truths which detailed one part of the violations that occurred m Chile 
Moreover, the truth revealed was a truth based on a particular kind of evidence 
documentation from human nghts organizations, testimonies from witnesses and where 
possible, albeit m a limited manner, documentary evidence from the secunty services 
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However comprehensive the commission tried to be in its quest for the historical 
truth, what was discussed in the report was only a part of the truth The commission's 
history largely begins in the 1970s, although it briefly considers a period in the 1950s in 
which it framed the polarization Chile in the context of the Cold War and the Cuban 
Revolution's influence m Latin America which was augmented by the adoption of 
different ideologies for social and political reform by political sectors With this 
framework the report essentially implies that Chilean society only became fragmented 
from the 1950s onwards It does not consider that politics m Chile had a contentious 
element smce at least the 1920s, when Chile went through a penod when new social and 
economic voices were emerging that made governance difficult without negotiations 
between the right and left parties 
The Commission also does not examine m any great detail the social and 
economic fragmentation present in Chile that led to the nse of the working and middle 
classes and that gave Unidad Popular and a call for an alternate model of social and 
economic development Additionally, there is no analysis of how political parties 
engaged with each other prior to the 1970s, an omission which could lead anyone 
unfamiliar with Chilean history to believe that prior to the influence of the Cuban 
Revolution and Cold War ideologies in the 1950s, Chilean politics were harmonious 
This was clearly not the case, as evidenced by the revolving door governments and 
dictatorship in 1931 of General Carlos Ibanez The report also does not consider why the 
military government implemented a policy of repression that targeted leftist groups, 
except to state that the ami of the repression was to eliminate and "clean" society of those 
who held anti-government views The analysis does not delve into the possibility that 
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repression was possibly put m place to remove these opposition voices so that the 
government could easily reverse Allende's development policies and implement a free-
market, capitalist economic policy Nor does the Commission's historical analysis 
consider the armed forces' role in Chilean politics prior to the military coup 
Despite this incomplete consideration of history, the historical truth, along with 
the narrative and moral truths the commissions established were important in Chile 
because under the military dictatorship's policy of denial, historical facts needed to be 
brought out into the open Publicizing this history based on the narrative and moral truths 
of victims removed the element of secrecy from the crimes of the dictatorship and 
brought them out into the public domain, re-dignified the victims and re-established their 
sense of citizenship These personal truths have been important in Chile because they are 
transformed into documentaries, memorials, literature, drama and other forms of art that 
help forge a collective memory for society What is important, also, is that the moral, 
personal truths that were the foundation of the Rettig Report allowed factual and legal 
truths to be established through the courts enabling accountability and justice 
As mdicated by the impacts of the report detailed earlier, the TRC turned 
knowledge of crimes into acknowledgement, it became the definitive account of the 
crimes of the dictatorship and gave Chileans human rights language—it served as the 
starting point from which Chileans could begin discussing human rights This is 
evidenced by the widespread attention the period of the dictatorship receives in literary 
and scholarly work One cannot visit a bookstore in Chile without encountering aisles and 
shelves dedicated to the topic of the Pinochet years, human rights and the transition 
However, even though over time it has become the reference point from which almost all 
187 
official discussions of human rights take place none of the sectors who vehemently 
criticized it upon its release have acknowledged that they were wrong m their criticisms 
and rejection of the report42 Nonetheless, the judiciary, initially hostile to the report's 
condemnation of its complicity in the military government's repression, routinely uses 
the evidence collected by the commission in its judicial investigations 
Justice 
It was not in the mandate of the Rettig Commission to assign individual responsibilities, 
but the commission did address the issue of accountability It assigned accountability for 
the violations to the secret services, professional associations, judiciary, media and 
indirectly the head of the secret services and the President The release of the report had 
implications for questions of accountability at a social level Many of the interviewees 
interviewed in Chile for this research expressed that the events described m the Rettig 
Report were difficult to face for Chileans because not only were they painful to read 
about, but acknowledging them meant examining one's own responsibility in enabling a 
culture of violence which may have included providing support and obedience to an 
authoritarian regime, spying on neighbors, ignoring violations that occurred and other 
such responsibilities One person spoke of the idea that there existed "something on the 
Chilean consciousness" 43 This idea of burdened collective conscious is similar to Kant's 
notion of collective responsibility There is a narrow conception of personal 
responsibility in Chilean culture which has traditionally been a culture of avoidance 
42 Personal interview with Alex Wilde 
43 Personal interview with lawyer at the National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
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There exists an idea that "you are only responsible if you pulled the trigger this 
collective personal responsibility is hard for us [to accept]"44 Kant argues that in order 
to ease this collective burden guilt must be individualized All the lawyers interviewed 
spoke about the importance of establishing individual responsibilities for this very reason 
However establishing these individual responsibilities has been very difficult Initially, 
when the Rettig Report sent its evidence to the courts, the courts were overwhelmed with 
information on over 2000 cases—it was impossible to prosecute all these right away 
However, there were judges who received the information and evidence with enthusiasm 
because the Rettig Report had done for them what they had been unable to do under the 
dictatorship, that is, investigate crimes 45 
As previously established, the process of assigning guilt m Chile has had two 
stages the first, before Pinochet's arrest and the second after his arrest m 1998 Before 
Pinochet's arrest cases were filed but the process of getting convictions was slow—as the 
Manuel Contreras case indicates, the Aylwin and Frei governments took an overly 
cautious approach to these prosecutions, always afraid that they would anger Pinochet 
and the armed forces The judicial process was held hostage to the negotiations the 
governments were so willing to conduct with the army over putting an end to 
prosecutions After 1998, however, there was the 'Pinochet Effect' and the 'Garzon 
Effect '46 The Pinochet Effect took hold world-wide dictators and heads of state were no 
longer immune from prosecution no matter where they travelled, while with the Garzon 
Effect, named after the Spanish Judge Garzon who issued Pinochet's arrest warrant in 
44 Personal interview with lawyer at the National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation 
45 Personal interview with Judge Guzman 
46 Personal nnterview with Roberto Garreton, human rights lawyer 
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London, judges m Chile discovered that it was possible to embark on the path of justice, 
thus small changes began occurring m the Chilean justice system and the number of cases 
filed and thus prosecuted increased m Chile 
Judges, particularly Judge Guzman used the Rettig Report as a starting point and 
began investigating cases in a different manner Guzman realized that the armed forces 
and police were economically and socially divided—officers were in the middle class, 
while ordinary soldiers were often from the lower, working classes and it was the soldiers 
who did the "dirty work"—the killing, burying, and disposing of bodies because they had 
no other choice but to obey orders in order to remain employed Guzman negotiated with 
these officers and soldiers he told them that if they revealed the whole truth that he 
would not indict them under the due obedience principle because they were following 
orders What he found was that under this bargain more soldiers and officers were willing 
to speak to him truthfully and he obtained the most information than he ever had m his 
previous investigations He was able to discover information about the mechanics of 
repression and the crimes that occurred Guzman tried not to mdict those who had 
received orders and could not decide to disobey them, only higher officers who the ability 
choose to disobey orders were indicted 
Guzman noted the difficulty of obtaining information from the military—the 
institution often responded to his requests for information by saying that information is 
destroyed every five years due to safety reasons Guzman speculates that it is possible 
that records of the crimes could be burned but that it is hard to believe that all written 
material is destroyed so frequently because records are the basis for the history of a 
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nation, not to mention the fact that the very existence of security and intelligence services 
depends on gathering and recording information 47 
The military, however, publicly maintains that it is willing to cooperate with 
judicial proceedings and that under Cheyre officers have been ordered to cooperate with 
the courts 48 Regardless, Guzman believes that there is probably no judge in Chile who 
has been able to obtain any written records from the army 
Despite this obstacle, judges have been able to indict many officers, especially 
under the Caravan of Death cases 49 There are over 400 human rights cases m process in 
the judicial system and few judges are willing to apply the amnesty law to these cases50 
Once the impetus and will is there, individual legal responsibility is perhaps one 
of the easier kinds of accountability to assign because the law can clearly assign guilt 
However, when it comes to other kinds of guilt such as moral, political, collective and 
metaphysical guilt, responsibilities are much more difficult to determine Nonetheless it 
is important to assign these responsibilities because otherwise the message sent to 
society is that the torturer, victim, beneficiary and the bystander are all equal in their 
participation in the cnmes There cannot be a moral tie if one is to build a society that has 
a deep respect for human life and human nghts for every smgle citizen regardless of 
social status51 The Rettig Report's condemnation of professional associations (lawyers 
and doctors who supported the regime), civilian technocrats of the regime, the media and 
47 Personal interview with lawyer at the National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation and with 
Judge Guzman 
48 Personal interviews with Lieutenant-Colonel at the Chilean War Academy and military representative at 
Mesa de Dialogo 
49 Personal Interview with Judge Guzman 
50 Personal unterview with Roberto Garreton, human nghts lawyer 
51 Personal unterview with Roberto Garreton, human nghts lawyer 
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the judiciary for ignoring and supporting violations was an attempt at assigning political 
and moral responsibilities 
On these collective responsibilities, according to the political right, when there are 
varying levels of responsibility in society, amnesty is necessary so that reconciliation can 
occur The military and the rest of the armed forces also agree pardon and amnesty are 
essential tools for reconciliation It is not surprising that the military would hold this 
view given that a) they were responsible for the large majority of the violations and b) 
amnesties in the form of agreements for peace have long been used in Chile as a means 
for moving forward from conflicts 
In 1844 an agreement of peace between the Spanish and the Indigenous 
communities was enacted to end the conflict between these two groups The 1897 civil 
war resulted in the first process of truth seeking after which a 500-page report was 
published revealing the perpetrators of the war These perpetrators were charged but 
amnesty two amnesty laws were enacted in the name of peace to serve reconciliation 
Then again, after the 1931 dictatorship of Carlos Ibanez, a commission was set up to 
investigate the actions of the dictatorship, but again there was a turning of the page no 
prosecutions or sentences were handed because another amnesty was enacted53 The idea 
behind these agreements was to arrive at a kind of equal impunity for both sides All 
other goals (justice and truth) have traditionally been subordinated for the goal of peace 
This is mirrored culturally and socially in private relationships among Chileans Once a 
conflict occurs and is resolved, all parties agree never to revisit the wrong again The 
52 Personal interview with military representative at the Mesa de Dialogo 
53 Personal Interview with Chilean academic 
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culture in Chile associated peace with impunity or what one academic interviewed called 
"equitative impunity "54 This did not mean one forgot the wrong, it simply meant that the 
wrong was never verbalized again Given that amnesty, peace and reconciliation have a 
long history of association, the idea that reconciliation requires truth and justice is a 
relatively recent on in Chile 
To advance reconciliation, the Rettig Report recommended reparatory justice The 
implementation of these reparations as well as the legal justice that has been possible 
mdicates that the Rettig Commission has achieved success over time with respect to its 
goal of offering victims some measure of justice 
Reconciliation 
As a whole, the Rettig Report's contribution to reconciliation is more difficult to assess 
based on the data collected in this research Though political reconciliation has occurred 
and there have been clear advances in civil-military relations from tense at the time of the 
transition to cordial at the present time, it is unclear whether the Rettig Report and the 
truth that it established has contributed to these changes It may be that even without a 
TRC civil-military relations would have advanced as democracy became more 
consolidated in Chile Certainly at the time of its release the Rettig Report was a 
contnbuting factor to increased tensions between the Aylwin government and the military 
under Pinochet's command 
What the commission has contributed at the collective and political levels is that it 
enabled the state to offer recognition to victims Not only have they been given 
54 Personal Interview with Chilean academic 
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reparations—forms of redress which the literature on TRCs establishes are elements of a 
reconciliation process, but also this official recognition has enabled victims groups to 
ensure that they are consulted on any policies pertaining to issues of human rights 
violations from the dictatorship period This could be seen as recognizing the citizenship 
of this group, re-integrating them into the social fabric from which they were once 
included and furthering their participation in a democracy 
Some reconstruction, the other element of reconciliation has occurred at an 
institutional level—the 1980 Constitution underwent reform, judicial reforms have been 
implemented and the army has adopted human rights education programs in its training 
Social reconstruction however is still occurring 
In terms of larger society, twenty years after the transition has occurred, victims, 
those who were tortured are a relatively small percentage of the population and so the 
human rights violations that occurred during the military government are largely only the 
concern of the few groups that continue to focus on this issue 
Among the general population there is now agreement that violations occurred, 
that the perpetrators should apologize and justice should be meted out, there is not a 
particular concern with the dictatorship and human rights violations 55 Given the other 
more immediate problems like economic inequalities, education reforms, the Mapuche 
indigenous lands questions, etc , human rights from the dictatorship period are problems 
that the average Chilean only considers occasionally 
Nonetheless, Chileans are hesitant to discuss the topic of the Pinochet years m 
everyday personal conversation This is an indication that the polarization that led to the 
55 Personal interview with Carlos Huenes 
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fragmentation of personal and social relationships has not fully healed and mter-personal 
trust is still low The psychological effects of repression are not healed just because a 
generally shared understanding of the past has occurred Many Chileans remarked in 
interviews for this research that it is still difficult for Chileans to have genuine friendships 
with individuals who hold political opinions on the opposite spectrum than one's own 
This distrust is even more pronounced among victims who are hesitant to trust anyone 
outside of their previously established social and political circles 56 These social tensions 
also came to the surface during Pinochet's arrest and death when many of his supporters 
paraded the streets to welcome him home and six years later, mourn his death These 
protests and marches sometimes resulted in clashes between those who supported 
Pinochet and those who did not want to see him being given such reverence m Chilean 
society These social tensions have not particularly addressed by the state What is 
lacking in Chile m the discourse on human rights violations is discussion and debate on 
the co-existence of perpetrators and victims Even the TRC did not adequately address 
this problem What is clear from interviews with victims is that even though there has 
been increasing levels of truth and justice which they appreciate, some are unwilling to 
forgive and reconcile with perpetrators, for some of these individuals, truth and justice 
have not cooled a desire for revenge57 
Given all this, perhaps the lesson to be drawn from the Chilean case is that 
reconciliation is a long-term project and cannot directly be achieved with one truth 
commission or even two, as the case has been in Chile Most Chileans interviewed 
56 Personal Experiences with victims 
57 Several personal interviews with victims, families of the disappeared 
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stressed the idea that reconciliation cannot occur unless some degree of forgetting is 
involved—many interviewees remarked that only when generations change and wounds 
are not freshly remembered, will true reconciliation be possible 
Summary 
The criteria for determining the success of a commission in this paper, as defined 
in the theoretical framework was whether and to what degree a TRC "fulfilled the duties 
assigned to it" (Braham, 2004, p 17) Based on the evaluation of pnmary and secondary 
data of the impacts—short-term and long-term of the TRC, this thesis concludes that 
concerning truth and justice the Chilean National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation, known as the Rettig Report, did fulfill its duties It was charged with 
providing Chileans an account of the events which occurred under the military 
government, thereby establishing factual and narrative truths based on victim testimonies 
Initial reactions to the release of the report were varied the military, right wing, and 
judiciary rejected the report while the Church, human rights organizations and victims 
recognizing its limitations, welcomed the report since it was the first time human rights 
violations had been acknowledged by the state 
The Commission was also decreed to provide recommendations for reparations 
and institutional reforms, which it did and which the Chilean state then implemented to 
varying degrees These were the immediate impacts of the commission, which took place 
relatively soon after the Commission ended its work in 1991 For example, the National 
Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation was formed in 1992 and the judicial 
system also began investigating crimes as soon as the Commission turned over its 
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evidence to the courts and handed out high profile sentences in 1993 Under President 
Frei, there was a brief period of time when the human rights question was placed on the 
back burner of politics, but once Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 due to a case 
against him in Spain, the long-term impacts of the commission's work became clear The 
evidence collected by the Commission was used to build the Spanish case against him 
and once he was extradited back to Chile, the cases against him and other perpetrators 
increased exponentially 
Pinochet's arrest brought to the surface the social and political tensions that the 
Chilean state had not acknowledged adequately since the Rettig Report was released To 
decrease the tensions between the human rights community and the armed forces, the 
government started roundtable discussions, the Mesa de Dialogo, in which the military 
agreed to provide information about the whereabouts of the disappeared Though this 
information turned out to be false, the process resulted in the military acknowledging that 
violations did occur under the military government 
The military further shifted their stand on human rights violations under General 
Cheyre in 2004, when under President Lagos the Valech Commission released its report 
detailing a pattern of torture under the military government General Cheyre issued a 
statement in which the military accepted institutional responsibility for the human rights 
violations and offered the military's cooperation with the courts 
With respect to reconciliation, the commission's mandate was to create the 
conditions for reconciliation to occur In this respect, thought complete and genume 
reconciliation has not occurred at the social level m Chile, political reconciliation, 
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between political parties and between the state and armed forces, has occurred, thus the 
commission can claim moderate success in this area as well 
In general, since the commission was able to fulfill its duties both immediately 
after the release of the report and over the last twenty years, the Chilean TRC is 




The focus of this thesis has been an evaluation of the Chilean TRC's short and long-term 
impacts in order to answer the question can the Chilean TRC be considered a success7 
These commissions are understood in a framework of transitional justice because not 
only are they tools of transitional justice but the literature also frames them as such 
Modern transitional justice theory has been influence largely by the Nuremberg 
trials which took place after WWII These trials held to account twenty-two Nazi officials 
for the crime of aggression In addition, non-criminal accountability was assigned 
through denazification and purges of public officials undertaken by the German state 
What the Nuremberg process did for international law was to differentiate just from 
unjust aggression, define crimes against humanity, expanded the notion of criminal 
liability to limit the impunity enjoyed by a head of state defense, and implanted in the 
international consciousness and international law questions about the moral obligations of 
states and the international community to citizens bemg subject to atrocities Transitions 
from dictatorships and civil wars in Europe, Africa, and Latin America beginning in the 
1970s also forced the international community to confront the question how do 
199 
transitional states deal with crimes and atrocities committed under the previous regime? 
The concept of transitional justice aims to address this question 
Transitional justice has been defined in three major ways Some authors such as 
Teitel define it as a kind of legal justice that is implemented dunng a time of political 
change (Teitel 2003 9) The International Center for Transitional Justice does not 
consider justice dunng transition a special kind of justice but instead defines it broadly as 
justice that is adapted to a transition to serve as a response to widespread human nghts 
violations that recognizes victims and aims to promote peace, democracy and 
reconciliation (ICTJ 2009) The ICTJ recognizes that this kind of justice can take place 
over many years The United Nations has an operational definition that focuses on 
mechanisms which can be used to achieve the goals of justice in a transition These tools 
include both judicial and non-judicial processes which states can use prosecutions, 
reparations, institutional reforms, and truth commissions (Guidance Note of the Secretary 
General 2010 2) 
Transitioning regimes hope to address several goals establish peace and 
democracy, legitimize the new regime, establish facts about and acknowledge the 
violence under the previous regime, punish offenders, promote healing and 
reconciliation, recognize the suffering of the victims and restore their dignity, and restore 
the rule of law so that such violations can never again occur 
Truth and reconciliations can help states achieve all these goals Whether a TRC 
or other transitional justice mechanism is implemented depends on the balance of powers 
at the time of transition and the kind of transition that occurred In coming regimes must 
balance the expectations of many stakeholders in the democratization process out-going 
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regime members, the armed forces, perpetrators, victims, and beneficiaries of the 
wrongdoing Those opposed to the transitional process or feel threatened by any policies, 
particularly those regarding judicial accountability that the m-coming government may 
implement, can threaten the democratization process 
The incoming democratic government of Patnco Aylwin and the Concertacion 
coalition in Chile in 1990 was exactly concerned about this balance of powers that 
existed at the time of the transition Chile underwent a strictly negotiated transition to 
democracy Although the Alywin government was able to secure some changes to the 
authontarian 1980 constitution created by the military under Pinochet's control, the nght 
wing still had control of the senate and the military still retained a significant degree of 
autonomy Additionally, Pinochet was still head of the military once the democratic 
government came into power, but before leaving government the military had enacted an 
Amnesty Law in 1978 which prohibited prosecutions for all crimes up until that point 
Pinochet was adamant, some have even said threatening, that no officers and soldiers 
under his command be tried for any human nghts violations Furthermore, the judiciary 
had been stacked with supporters of the military regime by Pinochet and was unwilling to 
pursue prosecutions The Concertacion was afraid that if it tned to fulfill its election 
promises of bringing to legal justice human nghts violators, the military would stage 
another coup, putting an end to the hard-won democratic elections As a result, the 
government began to consider alternatives to legal justice As such, Aylwin and his 
government decided to follow the example of Argentina and implement a TRC 
Truth and reconciliation commissions are temporary bodies set up to investigate 
patterns of human rights violations They can be state sanctioned or set up by non-
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governmental organizations and have involvement from international actors such as the 
United Nations The aim of officially sanctioned TRCs is to create an official record of 
the past that will serve to acknowledge victims' suffering so as to re-dignify them in the 
eyes of the public, and lay the basis for a collective history to be established The hope is 
that truth will eventually lead to justice and lay the foundation for reconciliation The 
Chilean commission was also implemented with these goals m mind 
The Rettig Commission, made up of nine commissioners with varying political 
associations, was given nine months to complete its investigations into torture and human 
rights violations leading to death, execution and disappearances The commission 
concluded that patterns of arrest, torture and disappearance existed and that the security 
services were responsible for most of the violence that occurred The report also made 
recommendations for reforms and reparations for victims 
Though victims and human rights organizations criticized the Commission's 
mandate and the fact that the report did not assign responsibilities, they welcomed the 
chance to tell then* stones, have then- experiences officially recognized, and accepted 
measures of reparation that the government implemented They noted that the Rettig 
Commissions should be only the first step in the truth telling process and that 
reconciliation could not be achieved until legal justice assigned individual 
responsibilities 
The armed forces rejected the conclusions of the report, claiming it to be biased 
and an incomplete consideration of the past The military refused to accept 
responsibilities and denied that violations had ever occurred The armed forces were 
supported in their views by the judiciary, which had been criticized in the report for 
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complicity m the crimes committed under the military regime Eventually though the 
judiciary began making use of the evidence sent to the courts by the Commission to 
prosecute perpetrators to enable legal justice for victims These proceedings increased 
after Pinochet's arrest m London The cases against him in Spam as well as in Chile were 
also based on evidence collected by the Rettig Commission 
Pinochet's arrest revealed that polarization among different sectors still existed in 
Chile and that the military was dissatisfied with prosecutions of its personnel To ease 
tensions between the military and the human rights community, the Frei government 
organized a series of round table talks, the Mesa de Dialogo, which brought together 
members of the human rights community and the military to discuss the human rights 
issue The military agreed to provide what information it had on the whereabouts of the 
disappeared Though this information turned out to be false, what was significant about 
the talks is that for the first time the military admitted that human rights violations did in 
fact occur under its rule This was a shift from its earlier denials 
Another significant event which caused a shift in the military's position on human 
rights violations was the publication of the Valech Report in 2004 Under Lagos, a 
second truth commission was created to investigate the cnmes the Rettig Commission did 
not all cases of politically motivated arrest and torture that did not result in death Out of 
the over 35 000 cases it mvestigated, the commission concluded that over 27 000 
Chileans had been arrested and tortured and that torture was a systematic policy under the 
military regime The Valech Report used the Rettig Report as its starting point—referring 
the reader to this first report for a comprehensive account of the history leadmg to the 
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violence which took place m Chile and like the Rettig Report made recommendations for 
reparations for victims of torture 
Human rights organizations generally responded positively to the report, 
welcoming the expansion of the truth established earlier with the Rettig Report The 
military's reaction was also significant By this time there had been a change in 
leadership and the commander-in-chief, General Cheyre issued a statement in the press in 
which he accepted institutional responsibility for the violations which occurred dunng the 
Pinochet years of military rule, on behalf of the military and promised that never again 
would such violations occur m Chile It took thirteen years from the publication of the 
Rettig Report for this shift in the military's perspective on human nghts violations to 
occur 
Individual personal reconciliation between victims and perpetrators has not 
occurred, but within larger society there seems to be less focus and concern with human 
nghts—most Chileans were not victims of arrest or torture are not concerned with the 
question of human nghts in their daily lives The human rights problem is left to the 
domain of the victims groups who refuse to reconcile with perpetrators until the complete 
truth of the whereabouts of their disappeared relatives is revealed and full legal justice is 
served At the political level, however, reconciliation has occurred between political 
parties and the state and military 
The implementation of the TRC in Chile early in the transition served to mark an 
important distinction between the old (military) regime and the new incoming one the 
state shifted from one which denied human nghts to its citizens to one which unmediately 
began putting into place policies to respect these nghts and offer what measure of justice 
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that it could to those who had suffered While it is difficult to make generalized 
conclusions about truth commissions based on one case, what the Chilean case 
demonstrates is the temporality of transitional justice in the case of a strictly negotiated 
transition in which truth, justice and reconciliation seem unlikely m the early years, time 
and distance from the authoritarian regime make truth, justice and reconciliation more 
likely It also shows the truth, justice and reconciliation are long-term processes—these 
goals may not all be accomplished with one commission As in the case of Chile, more 
than one commission may be required to achieve a comprehensive truth about past 
events, particularly since commissions have limited mandates to begin with Further, 
even though reactions to it initially varied, the Rettig Report enabled Chilean society to 
participate in a discourse of human rights The commission fulfilled its duties and 
mandate both immediately upon its release and over the long-term by laymg the 
groundwork for future reforms to occur and serving as a continual reference point for 
these reforms For this reason, it can be considered an example of a successful TRC 
Given all this, what can this conclusion about the Chilean TRC and the data 
supporting it commission reveal about truth commissions m general? There are 
essentially two conclusions that can be drawn from the data presented m this research 
First, the Chilean case reveals that based on the completion of its own mandate which had 
both short and long-term impacts, the TRC has been an example of a successful 
management and resolution of social conflict It was an effective response that enabled 
the state to redress the injustices of the military regime and enable Chilean society to 
move forward 
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Second, the study reveals that in managmg this conflict, the TRC largely served 
the political class it provided the government with a tool with which to address the 
human rights problem and fulfill its election promises to victims to address human nghts 
The TRC also gave the government a language to discuss human rights in a manner that 
entailed asking victims to look forward By implementing a TRC which it hoped would 
foster victim healing and reconciliation through story-telling that acknowledged their 
pain and have some measure of reparation offered However, this was limited to only 
those who were subject to the crimes the TRC's mandate covered For those victims 
whose suffered crimes not part of the mandate, no acknowledgment occurred which 
limited healing This created a tension between remembering and forgetting and thereby 
prevented reconciliation at the individual levels—victims are not ready to forgive and 
forget and moreover, maintain reconciliation will not occur until full justice is served and 
there is a generational change in Chile Given that the arms of TRCs are to address 
victims' needs for truth, justice and particularly healing, and this did not occur in Chile, 
what was the utility of the TRC7 
The TRC enabled the polity of Chile to depohticize the violence that occurred to 
facilitate closure for larger society and enable the polity of Chile to function In this way 
the TRC conferred legitimacy to the new regime The government can be said to have 
used truth commission to create and maintain stability through reconciliation which asked 
citizens to look to the future instead of focusing on the wounds of the past Who did this 
stability serve? The Chilean state prioritized stability out of fear that out-going regime 
members, Pinochet and his army, would threaten democracy, This helped perpetuate 
impunity as perpetrators were initially allowed to escape legal justice name of peace 
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Future research 
Due to the limitations of time, funding and scope—this research having been 
conducted for a Masters degree, the groups interviewed in this research were limited to 
those who influence policy making human rights organizations, victims, the military, 
politicians, lawyers, the judiciary and academics The impact of the commission and its 
success was determined based on the perceptions these groups held about the TRC 
Future research on the Chilean case may consider interviewing a larger sample of 
Chileans—ordinary Chileans to determine their understanding of the impact of the TRC, 
particularly with regards to whether or not it has been effective in creatmg a collective 
memory that these individuals draw on 
Given the definitional ambiguity suffered by the transitional justice framework 
and this study's conclusion that the Chilean TRC did not fully serve its goal of 
reconciliation for victims, scholars can question the utility of transitional justice and 
TRCs If TRCs do not serve the goals they have set out for victims, what is their value? If 
it is to serve the political class, create stability and legitimacy, studies can be conducted 
that examine their function in this regard For example, researchers can ask, whether and 
how TRCs actually help states create the stability required for democratization To make 
generahzable conclusions about TRCs, comparative research may also need to be 
conducted over the broad range of cases that have occurred 
Since TRCs have become such popular mechanisms of late for states to address 
goals of transitional justice, their instrumental value must be understood that so that when 
implemented it is clear what goals and groups in society they serve 
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Appendix A 
Detailed Findings of the National Commission on Truth 
and Reconciliation (Rettig Report) 
Many of the deaths in the cases under the commission's mandate that occurred in 
the period between September and December 1973 were committed by military 
operations and were of people who had no affiliation with a political organization 
Killings in this period were aimed at "cleaning up" society, those who held ideas and 
participated in activities the regime considered 'dangerous' were targeted for execution 
Mass graves of executed individuals, such as those in Pisagua which were discovered by 
the commission m 1990, were common throughout the country 
The commission placed the responsibility for the polarization before September 
11,1973 on actors on all sides of the political spectrum In its analysis competmg views 
of social and economic development led to the conflict The Rettig Report noted that 
some, on the left, such as the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) advocated that a 
power shift and ideological change in government could only occur through armed 
actions, and while there were elements in the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP), that 
maintained armed conflict was inevitable, there were others in the socialist coalition such 
as the Communist Party, the Worker and Peasant MAPU, most of the Radical party, and 
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President Allende, who rejected violence and advocated for socialist change through 
democratic and peaceful means 
Similarly, there were groups on the right such as the Tacna group, which 
advocated armed resistance to the socialist movement These groups, along with the 
Fatherland and Liberty Nationalist Movement (Libertad y Patna) called for a military 
coup In fact, Libertad y Patna was responsible for the tanquezeto, a failed military 
uprising which occurred on June 29, 1973 Additionally, the Schneider plot in 1970 
which resulted m the murder of army commander-in-chief General Schneider was 
"intended to provoke a coup" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 66) Many right-wing leaders 
seemed to favor a military takeover of government The report does not ignore, though it 
is not strong in its condemnation of the role of the United States' policy towards Chile in 
creating a climate enabling the failure of Allende's government It makes note of the U S 
attempts to prevent Allende from coming to power in 1970 and when that failed 
destabilized the Allende government through economic policies detailed earlier in this 
thesis The Rettig Report notes in its analysis that the economic crisis brought about in 
part by U S policies towards Chile, played a part m bringing about the events of 
September 11,1973 
The commission found that m the events following the coup, the armed forces set 
up temporary detention sites like the Ministry of Defense, the Military Academy, the 
Tacna Regiment base, Dawson Island, the National Stadium, the Chile Stadium, the 
Cultural Center in Barrancas (now Pudahuel), Barros Arana National Institute, the San 
Bernardo Infantry Regiment base, Londres No 38, Villa Gnmaldi, the navy ships 
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Esmeralda, Maipo, and Lebo, among other detention centers The report detailed the 
death of Salvador Allende and his aides and concluded that based on the information 
received by witnesses, Allende took his own life and that the manner and circumstances 
of his death "mark[ed] the extremes of division in Chilean society" (Rettig Report, 1993, 
p 186) 
The commission also found that there were varying methods and patterns of 
arrest Sometimes individuals were asked to surrender themselves to the military 
authorities, at others they were arrested in their homes, workplaces or on the street 
Raids, searches and roundups were common and generally involved the armed and 
security forces, while arrests were made by the police, investigative police and civilians 
"What can be observed of the police is that they generally acted in coordination with, 
jointly with, or subordinated to the army In Paine and sporadically elsewhere m the 
region, civilians were significantly involved, either m turning in people, or directly in 
arresting them" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 178) 
The judicial system was also held responsible for its complicity in the violations 
of human rights Legal advice made available to the prisoners was of poor quality and 
judges m the war tribunals had a poor understanding of the rule of law As such in some 
cases, "the war tribunal was simply a way of legalizing or formalizmg a decision already 
made" by military administrators (Rettig Report, 1993, p 166-667) 
Though this list is not exhaustive, some other famous detention sites throughout the country included 
Cernllos Park, Tejas Verdes prison camp that was a part of the Military Engineering School, The Artillery 
School, El Bosque Air Base within the air force, Pisagua, Quinquina Island, Dawson Island, as the Naval 
War Academy in Valparaiso, Ritoque, Puchuncavi, the El Belloto naval air base, the Silva Palma garrison 
at the Naval War Academy, Cuatro Alamos, Jose Domingo Canas, The Discotheque or La Venda Sexy, 
Cuartel Venecia, Colonia Dignidad 
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The TRC discovered that between the years 1974 and 1977, the military junta 
created legal frameworks that enabled the consolidation of power through the violation of 
human rights by the police and armed forces under the paradigm of national security, and 
which were met with impunity The legal system also failed to offer protection to 
citizens In fact, the report is highly critical of the judiciary for failing in its duties to 
respond to violations of law It found that the chief executive of the state (the president) 
was able to consolidate power, particular when it came to the security services Through 
DINA and the ability to declare states of emergency the president "had the power 'to 
arrest persons for up to five days m then- own houses or sites other than prisons'" (Rettig 
Report, 1993, p 109) 
The commission also concluded that during 1974-1977 DINA was "responsible 
for most of the political repression " and disappearances Disappearances in this period 
were coordinated and planned in a centralized manner with the intention to "eliminate 
particular categories of people, namely those who were regarded as politically 
dangerous" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 613) Other agencies also coordinated with DINA 
For example, from 1974-1975 SIFA (Air Force Intelligence Service) later known as 
DIFA (Air Force Intelligence Directorate) operated "in parallel to the DINA, and to some 
extent, in competition with it" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 614) Though SIFA/DIFA did not 
carry out forced disappearances, some of its members were part of the Joint Command, a 
defacto intelligence gathering group, which operated from 1975 to 1976, and was made 
up of members from DIFA (Air Force Intelligence Directorate) DICAR (Police 
Intelligence Directorate), "to a lesser extent agents from SIN (Naval Intelligence 
Service), DINE (Army Intelligence Directorate), some members of the Chilean 
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investigative police and civilians who belonged to nationalistic or far right groups " The 
agency "coordinated intelligence activities and political repression" and disappearances, 
mainly of the Communist Party, with the help of the air force (Rettig Report, 1993, p 
614) The Joint Command was held responsible for around 30 disappearances by the 
commission's investigation The SICAR (Police Intelligence Service) also coordinated 
intelligence under DINA's control, and some members were of this service were also part 
of the Joint Command and focused largely on operations, but was preplaced in 1974 by 
DICAR, the Police Intelligence Directorate, to undertake intelligence, counter-
intelligence, information analysis and public protection activities The DICAR operated 
in Santiago in the ex-offices of the El Clarin newspaper on Calle Dieciocho No 229 
Though the DICAR officers were paid by the police, many were also assigned to work 
for the DINA though few to none formal records of coordmation between the agencies 
were kept 
While these agencies worked in Santiago and interior parts of the country, the 
Naval Intelligence Service, SIN, operated in coastal cities such as Valparaiso and 
Concepcion, where many members of the MIR and socialist party were targeted for arrest 
and disappearances during 1974-1975 while from late 1975-1976 "most of those who 
disappeared were from the Communist Party" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 614) DINA also 
coordinated with security services of other Southern Cone countries such as Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay in a plan called "Operation Condor" which sought to arrest, 
torture and disappear people on government lists The commission held DINA 
"responsible for the disappearance of hundreds of people after their arrest, for other 
executions, and for running a number of secret detention sites where torture was practiced 
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systematically" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 615) SIFA, the Air Force Intelligence Service, 
from its operational base at the Air War Academy, and composed of air force personnel, 
members of the investigative police and a close working relationship with the Air Force 
Prosecutor's office, was responsible largely for "professional intelligence activities" and 
repressing members of the MIR through a special operations group SIFA often worked 
in competition with DINA and the two agencies engaged in conflicts over arrests of key 
MIR targets, however, although SIFA was held responsible for torture by the 
commission, the commission noted that the agency have a policy of forced 
disappearances (Rettig Report, 1993) In 1975, the Air Force chiefs decided the 
Communist Party As a result SIFA was renamed and re-organized as DIFA Although 
DIFA was controlled by the high command of the air force, it was often responsible 
directly to the air force commander-in-chief It also had a section called Special 
Operations and relied on civilians who had been active in nationalistic or far-nght groups 
to provide intelligence information These civilians were contracted as agents who were 
given a rank 
The Navy's Intelligence Service, SIN, took on the task of targeting the MIR in 
coastal areas such as Valparaiso where the Almirante Silva Palma garrison was used to 
hold and torture prisoners Though the connections between SIN and DINA were unclear 
to the commission, what investigations did reveal were that once DINA moved its coastal 
operations to the Maipo Regiment, SIN handed over its prisoners to DINA in 1975 and in 
1976 naval offers worked with the Jomt Command In Concepcion, the Regional 
Intelligence Service, SIRE, composed of "members from various units," including army, 
police, investigative police and navy officers, also targeted the MIR Members of the 
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MIR were arrested, detained, tortured and killed at various sites Though on occasion, 
SIRE conflicted with the DINA's operations in Concepcion, it also "turned over its own 
prisoners to the DINA" numerous times (Rettig Report, 1993, p 629) 
In 1975 intelligence activities were centralized when DINE, SIN, DIFA, and 
DICAR began to work out of the same building in Santiago at Calle Juan Antonio Rios 
No 6 The organizations collaborated in staff and training but not necessarily in 
intelligence operations, though each week the heads of the agencies, along with the head 
of DINA, would meet to share information There was competition between DINA and 
these agencies, particularly the Joint Command, m which DICAR played a large role over 
intelligence operations 
After the dissolution of DINA in 1977, National Center for Information (CNI) 
was created During this period the most serious human rights violations were earned out 
by the CNI The commission found that in its first few years, from 1977-1980, the CNI 
was concerned with political intelligence and as such the "number of fatal human rights 
violations cases declined dramatically" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 828 ) Additionally, m 
1979, the MIR and Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) later known as MAPU 
Lautaro also began participating in armed violence which resulted m deaths from terronst 
activities against the state The CNI reacted to the operation of these groups with "intense 
repression or countennsurgency from mid-1980" to 1990 The commission concluded 
that dunng 1978-1985 the CNI was responsible for 160 "fatal human nghts violations" 
(Rettig Report, 1993, 828 ) 
Dunng the anti-government protests that took place between 1983 and 1985, 
government agents were responsible for the deaths of 38 people while people killed by 
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private citizens in politically motivated killings totaled 90 Between 1978 and 1981 
disappearances, though they still occurred, were not as systematic and not earned out by 
the CNI However, in 1981 the CNI started disappeanng people m a selective manner to 
include members of the MIR, FPMR and the Communist Party While DINA had focused 
on elimination potential future threats by targeting all activists associated with anti-
government positions, the CNI focused on the aforementioned specific enemies in their 
counter-insurgency strategy, the number of fatal human nghts decreased This, however, 
did not stop mdividuals from being disappeared Those were not disappeared were said to 
have been killed in gun battles and then* bodies "were generally handed over to their 
relatives" or "in some instances were left on different properties, along a road, or in a 
swamp" (Rettig Report, 1993, p 841) 
The commission also examined killings committed by private citizens during 
1977 to March 1990 Dunng this penod 93 lives were lost Fifteen of these were civilians 
killed by terronst activities such as bombs in public places The rest belonged to the 
armed forces (Rettig Report, 1993) who had been killed in terrorist attacks, "selective 
assassination attempts," bombings and attacks on police and armed forces' units This 
terronst activity took place sporadically dunng 1978-1979, declined m 1981-1982 and 
increased exponentially dunng 1983-1989 The Commission attnbuted most of this 
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